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ABSTRACT
Respected commentators have floated several proposals for star-
tling reforms of America’s seventy-year-old securities regulation
scheme. Many involve substantial deregulation with a view toward
allowing issuers and investors to contract privately for desired levels
of disclosure and fraud protection. The behavioral literature explored
in this Article cautions that in a deregulated securities world it is ex-
ceedingly optimistic to expect issuers voluntarily to disclose optimal
levels of information, securities intermediaries such as stock ex-
changes and stockbrokers to appropriately consider the interests of
investors, or investors to be able to bargain efficiently for fraud pro-
tection.
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I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness
of people.
Sir Isaac Newton1
1. NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT 1 (2000) (quoting Sir Isaac Newton, speaking
after he lost £20,000 in the stock market).
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INTRODUCTION
United States securities regulation is at a critical juncture. After
eight years of investor-friendly Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) leadership by Arthur Levitt,2 Congress is contemplating a top-
to-bottom review of all federal securities laws, beginning with the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.3 In such a review, Congress might well
turn for guidance to the writings of leading academics who propose
dramatic changes in federal securities regulation.
For example, Congress might well look at the writings of Profes-
sor Paul Mahoney4 and Professor Adam Pritchard,5 who have both
recommended a dramatically reduced role for current enforcement
mechanisms and an attendant increase in the power and responsibility
of stock exchanges. In the alternative, they might examine Professor
Roberta Romano’s proposal to largely replace federal securities
regulation with state regulation in a system of competitive federal-
ism.6 They also might study Professor Stephen Choi’s plan to refocus
regulatory attention from the professional actors in the securities sys-
tem to the investors.7
These proposals, however, should be considered with some
trepidation because they are not informed by a large body of behav-
ioral research8 that directly bears upon their premises and conse-
2. See Mike McNamee, Wanted: Another Investor-Friendly SEC Chief, BUS. WK., Jan. 29,
2001, at 39, 39 (describing that during the bull market of the 1990s “Levitt’s SEC championed
lower fees, fuller disclosure, and crackdowns on insider games and Internet fraud”).
3. Before he resigned as chair of the Senate Banking Committee and announced his im-
minent retirement, Senator Phil Gramm explicitly promised such a thorough review. Jaret Sei-
berg, Gramm Aims to Make Changes in Securities Law, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at B11. Cer-
tainly the events of September 11, 2001, moved securities law reform down on the nation’s, and
the Senate’s, list of priorities. The unfolding Enron scandal also will likely render any major de-
regulatory moves politically unpopular for at least a time.
4. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453
(1997).
5. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
6. See generally Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securi-
ties Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
7. See generally Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Pro-
posal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000).
8. Recent years have seen a significant injection of behavioral research into legal scholar-
ship. Among the leading works not otherwise cited in this article are Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A.
Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in the Hindsight Bias,
73 OR. L. REV. 587, 621–30 (1994) (applying the insights of the psychology literature’s hindsight
bias to the contrasting rules for reviewing decisions of doctors and directors); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
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quences; and they are inconsistent with a growing body of empirical
evidence supporting the developing consensus that American securi-
ties regulation is the optimal system for governing capital markets.9
Because the debate already has been joined regarding the “ex-
change as regulator” proposals10 and Professor Romano’s competitive
federalism plan,11 I focus my attention upon Professor Choi’s investor
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1132–56 (1977) (presenting an early effort to
apply behavioral psychology and organizational behavior research to the corporate setting);
Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR.
L. REV. 23, 43–57 (2000) (using behavioral theory to evaluate the choice between rules and
standards); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 164–66 (1994) (suggesting that rational-actor
based models used to analyze why parties fail to settle litigation should be replaced with a richer
model incorporating psychology literature); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2094–109 (1998) (at-
tempting to explain punitive damages with behavioral insights); Richard L. Hasen, Comment,
Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 391, 435–38 (1990) (arguing that psychological models of human behavior produce more
realistic and nuanced policy prescriptions than do economic models).
Although the bandwagon for behavioral analysis is quickly adding new riders, several
scholars have serious concerns about its implications. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of
Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 717, 718 (2000) (suggesting that because behavioral evidence indicates that human be-
havior is “complex and contradictory,” behavioral theory “is not likely to contribute very suc-
cessfully to instrumental legal reform”); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a
Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1586–90
(1998) (expressing reservations that leading behavioral analysis lacks a coherent theory); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1552 (1998) (complaining that behavioral economics is “antitheoretical”); Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1639–46 (2000)
(noting the difficulty of generalizing appropriate legal norms from particular behavioral stud-
ies).
9. See infra notes 472–85 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regula-
tion, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1517–18 (1997) (discussing numerous limitations in a regime with ex-
changes as regulators, including that exchanges will not always have optimal motivation to sanc-
tion violations).
11. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race
to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1199 (1999) (arguing that in the
area of tender offer defenses, competitive federalism has created a “race to the bottom”); James
D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1201 (1999)
(arguing that regulatory competition naturally leads to a “race to the bottom”); see also Merritt
B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338–39 (1999) (arguing that competitive federalism will
decrease U.S. economic welfare). Romano has responded to Fox, who issued a rejoinder. See
generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE NEED FOR COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 00-49, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (arguing that the absence of a uniform international regulatory scheme benefits
investors because it allows for competition between competing regimes, and that there is no
PRENTICE.DOC 05/07/02 10:54 AM
2002] SECURITIES REGULATION 1401
regulation proposal because as of this writing it has not been chal-
lenged seriously;12 due to its grounding in traditional law and eco-
nomics thinking, it might be the proposal that conservative legislators
interested in securities reform would find the most appealing; and its
premises are starkly inconsistent with recent behavioral insights aris-
ing from scholarship in behavioral economics, behavioral finance, be-
havioral psychology, decision theory, and related fields. New behav-
ioral insights in these disciplines have prompted Professor Stephen
Bainbridge to note that “[f]or corporate and securities law scholars,
behavioral economics probably is the most exciting intellectual devel-
opment of the last decade.”13
The basic points I make are relevant to any proposal regarding
the future of securities regulation, but much of my attention focuses
on Professor Choi’s bold notion of moving the locus of regulation
from securities market professionals to investors—from its potential
fraud perpetrators to its potential fraud victims.14 Investor regulation
is consistent with a large body of economic thinking that assumes pri-
vate contracting is universally superior to government regulation.15
evidence supporting the view that greater competition would lead to a “race to the bottom”);
MERRITT B. FOX, THE ISSUER CHOICE DEBATE (Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 01-007, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“If Professor Romano is serious . . . she
should engage in a serious attempt to show that despite the market failure inherent in issuer
choice, there is inevitably an even greater failure in the regulatory response.”).
12. Professor Edmund Kitch expresses some mild reservations about Choi’s plan, espe-
cially the logistics of testing investors’ knowledge and sophistication. Edmund W. Kitch, Pro-
posals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 629, 641 (2001).
13. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023, 1058–59 (2000) (advocating caution in assessing behavioralism’s usefulness in gener-
ating policy prescriptions); see also JENNIFER ARLEN ET AL., ENDOWMENT EFFECTS WITHIN
CORPORATE AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 1 (Univ. of S. Cal., Ctr. in Law, Econ., & Org., Research
Paper No. C01-1, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting the ascension of behavioral
law and economics research in legal scholarship in recent years).
14. This bold plan could be viewed as akin to proposing that the Food and Drug Admini-
stration regulate not the drug companies that produce drugs but the patients who consume
them, or that consumers be given the option to pay less for food in exchange for promising not
to sue producers whose products give them botulism.
Choi asks: “If investor protection is the goal, why not structure regulations directly
around investors?” Choi, supra note 7, at 282. This is arguably analogous to asking, “If citizen
protection is the goal, why not structure criminal laws directly around victims?” and proposing
that people be licensed. For example, unless citizens carried a concealed handgun, they would
not be allowed to enter certain neighborhoods at certain times of the day and other neighbor-
hoods at any time.
15. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 157 (1992) (arguing that private dispute
resolution in the diamond industry is more efficient than use of the legal system); Jonathan R.
Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal
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This contractarian approach has long been ascendant in academia,
but Professor John C. Coffee notes that a “paradigm shift is now un-
derway in the manner in which financial economics views corporate
governance, with the new scholarship emphasizing both the centrality
of legal protections [such as insider trading regulation] for minority
shareholders and the possibility that regulation can outperform pri-
vate contracting.”16 This Article presents the empirical research and
provides behavioral analysis supporting this paradigm shift.
Specifically, Part I briefly summarizes the essential elements of
Professor Choi’s investor regulation proposal. Part II uses behavioral
research and other analysis to examine critical assumptions underly-
ing investor regulation and some of the other recent proposals. Part
III extends the behavioral analysis to examine generally the ability of
investors to protect themselves from fraud and inadequate disclosure.
Part IV raises several potential problems that likely would be caused
by investor regulation and the other recent proposals for dramatic se-
curities law reform.
I.  INVESTOR REGULATION
Professor Choi’s proposed investor regulation model is moti-
vated by his conclusion that the current system of regulating securities
professionals indirectly and unnecessarily regulates investors them-
selves.17 As an example of problems with the current system, Choi
notes that because of the 1933 Act’s registration system, investors
wishing to buy the stock of a company that chooses not to go public
must “participate in a far more restrictive private placement of securi-
ties.”18 Similarly, he notes that because exchanges, broker-dealers,
and investment advisers must register with a national securities asso-
ciation or with the SEC, “[i]nvestors are effectively prohibited from
Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1997) (“[E]ven in legitimate, democratic regimes[,] pri-
vate ordering generates substantive legal principles that are superior to those that the state pro-
duces.”).
16. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securi-
ties Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1999).
17. Choi, supra note 7, at 280–83.
18. Id. at 281. Although this statement is generally accurate (yet an average individual in-
vestor might well be able to buy such stock through a Regulation A offering, a Regulation D
offering, or through Rule 144), it turns out that Choi’s system is in many ways even more restric-
tive. An average individual investor under Choi’s proposal could not buy this stock either but is
instead limited to buying stock in passive mutual funds. Id. at 300–01.
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receiving advice from the intermediary of their choice without ob-
taining regulatory approval.”19
Choi joins Romano, Mahoney, and other commentators who also
are naturally concerned with the cost and inefficiency of government
regulation.20 He believes that the market can sort itself out without
governmental intervention, and that well-informed investors need no
governmental protection:
[R]egulation of any sort may be unnecessary for rational investors
with good information on the risks and returns offered through par-
ticular issuers. These investors will price privately-supplied investor
protections, paying more for securities from issuers offering valued
protections. Market participants, in turn, will have an incentive to
adopt investor safeguards to the extent the increase in the amount
investors are willing to pay exceeds the cost of the protections. The
same incentive exists for all securities market participants that deal
with rational investors, including issuers, broker-dealers, mutual
funds, and exchanges. Although different participants pose varying
risks to investors, rational investors can price these risks accordingly
in their investment decisions. Thus, there is a strong argument for
19. Id. at 282. Choi overstates this point slightly. He makes it sound as if investors choose
with whom they wish to deal and then the SEC must pass “yea” or “nay” on that selection
when, in fact, thousands of broker-dealers and investment advisers are registered under the sys-
tem and investors may choose to deal with any one of them without consulting the SEC. Under
Choi’s scheme, however, many individual investors will not be able to choose the broker-dealers
of their choice, but will be limited to dealing with prominent ones that the government deems to
be of high visibility. Id. at 296–302. Thus, Choi actually reduces rather than increases freedom of
choice for a wide range of investors.
20. Id. at 331; see supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. Choi is also concerned with
“regulatory capture.” Choi, supra note 7, at 294. This should not be a serious concern. See JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET xv (rev. ed. 1995) (“Few have suggested
seriously that the SEC has been a ‘captive’ of the industries it regulates. . . . [S]uch a suggestion
cannot be sustained by a reasonable reading of the Commission’s history.”); see also Ian Ayres
& John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 435, 436 (1991) (noting that “capture has not seemed to be theoretically or empirically
fertile to many sociologists and political scientists working in the regulation literature”); John C.
Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis,
41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 543 (2001) (noting that the SEC’s responsiveness and resistance to bu-
reaucratic inertia means that it “remains a highly respected government agency, even among
political constituencies otherwise inclined to doubt the value or abilities of government regula-
tors”); David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 819 CAL. L. REV. 917, 961 (2001) (“The most important
defect of capture theory is that it is unsupported by the evidence.”); David B. Spence & Frank
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 122–23 (2000) (de-
bunking agency capture theory generally).
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removing the many layers of regulation from market participants
that deal with these investors.21
Choi’s proposal deregulates issuers, and apparently stock ex-
changes, broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other securities
professionals.22 Only investors will be regulated. Most churning,
touting, front-running, insider trading, parking, manipulating, con-
cealing information, outright lying, and other forms of securities fraud
apparently become perfectly legal.23 Choi expects investors, within
certain constraints, to protect themselves by contracting for the level
of investor protection they desire from issuers, stockbrokers, and oth-
ers. All forms of wrongdoing essentially become matters of contract
law.
Believing that many investors do not have good information on
issuers in the marketplace, Choi proposes a scheme that recognizes
four categories of investors based on their level of knowledge.24 He
then proposes to restrict their freedom to invest to the extent neces-
sary to prevent the various categories from harming themselves by
their lack of information.25
Rather than regulating issuers, exchanges, or securities profes-
sionals,26 Choi’s proposal regulates the market’s more than sixty-five
million investors who, under one version of Choi’s plan,27 must take a
21. Choi, supra note 7, at 282–83 (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 285 (proposing no regulations in either primary offerings or secondary market
transactions for “issuer-level investors”). Although Choi focuses only on deregulating issuers,
the logic of his proposal and his notion to regulate investors indicates that he would deregulate
other securities actors as well.
23. Choi allows that “[w]here the market is unable to fully internalize third-party effects
even under [his scheme of] investor regulation, some mandatory regulatory response may be
necessary.” Id. at 325 (emphasis added). It is unclear in exactly what circumstances such regula-
tions would be allowed. The statement follows a discussion of apparently salutary regulations
that the SEC instituted to improve price transparency, liquidity, competition, and price stability
in trading activity. Id. at 319–23. Investor regulation appears to allow the SEC to continue to
work toward these ends and to regulate manipulation that affects third parties. Although Choi
suggests that such regulation be “based on the risk presented to third parties,” id. at 325, he is
extremely vague regarding its scope.
24. Id. at 284.
25. Id. at 300–02.
26. Id. at 283 (suggesting that the focus of regulation be placed upon investors rather than
“issuers or intermediaries”).
27. Choi proposes either (a) mandatory licensing, which I discuss; (b) voluntary self-
selection under which investors could just choose whether they wished to be treated as sophisti-
cated or unsophisticated investors; or (c) some hybrid of the two. Id. at 310–19.
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test (drafted, administered, and graded by the SEC) to demonstrate
that they are qualified to invest.28
Choi deems investors whose test results indicate that they lack
the information or expertise to make value-maximizing decisions in
the marketplace to be unsophisticated investors.29 Think of them as
the market’s D students.30 Under Choi’s scheme, these investors may
deal only with “high visibility organizations” (HVOs), or HVO-
sanctioned market participants.31 Two types of entities would qualify
for regulatory treatment as HVOs. First are organizations aggregating
the interests of several intermediaries, such as the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).32 Second are
certain high-visibility individual intermediaries, such as Charles
Schwab and Merrill Lynch.33 Unsophisticated investors must deal
through these intermediaries and are limited further in that they may
invest only in passive index mutual funds supplied by the HVOs.34
Choi reasons that limiting unsophisticated investors’ options in this
fashion protects them from the informational asymmetries that disad-
vantage them in the market.35
Other investors will do better on Choi’s exam, demonstrating
that they have good information about HVOs’ reputation and inves-
tor protections, even though they might lack information on the repu-
tation and investor protections provided by issuers or other low-
profile intermediaries. These investors, whom Choi calls “aggregate-
level investors,”36 are the market’s C students. They are free to buy all
instruments (not just passive mutual funds) that HVOs offer.37 They
cannot buy through non-HVOs in either the primary or secondary
markets,38 although how this limitation will be enforced is unclear.
Market participants who wish to sell to the market’s C students, then,
28. Id. at 310–13.
29. Id. at 300–02, 310–13.
30. There are no F students in Choi’s system.
31. Id. at 300.
32. Id. at 297.
33. Id. at 297–98.
34. Id. at 301.
35. See id. at 301–02 (noting that the passive nature of index funds keeps informational
asymmetries “at a minimum”).
36. Id. at 296.
37. Id. at 299.
38. See id. (“[A]ggregate-level investors would be required to go to an HVO for all securi-
ties transactions, whether primary- or secondary-market-related.”).
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must work through HVOs, giving HVOs the ability to impose private
regulatory constraints to replace the SEC’s current rules and regula-
tions. Choi envisions that an HVO, such as the NYSE, might choose
to adopt a self-tailored regulatory system in which it grants itself sub-
poena powers, provides for criminal penalties,39 and punishes non-
member parties who use NYSE facilities to manipulate the market.
Investors earn a B on the government’s exam by demonstrating
that although they lack sufficient issuer-level information to protect
themselves fully in their investment decisions, they have knowledge
about a range of securities-market intermediaries.40 These “interme-
diary-level investors” may deal through non-HVOs, such as Ameri-
trade.41 Choi reasons that Ameritrade could, in its own discretion,
provide various contractual warranties to assure the market’s B stu-
dents of the suitability of their investments.42 Thus intermediary-level
investors might buy Alpha Corporation stock through Ameritrade
not because they know anything about Alpha Corporation, but be-
cause they know about Ameritrade. Such investors could not deal di-
rectly with Alpha Corporation without first going through an HVO or
non-HVO intermediary.43
Choi deems issuer-level investors to be those investors who ace
the government’s exam by demonstrating that they are informed
about issuer-specific risks and the various types of investor protec-
tions that issuers may adopt.44 They then may deal directly with issu-
ers, contracting for whatever level of risk and antifraud protection
they desire.45 Issuer-level investors need not go through intermediar-
ies, although, of course, they may choose to do so. Choi reasons that
an A student will be willing to pay more for an issuer’s shares if that
issuer warrants not to defraud her.46 Therefore, issuers will have an
incentive to coordinate with other market participants to “serve[] the
interests of all investors.”47 Choi prophesies that issuers will either
39. It is unclear how a private entity can constitutionally command criminal law in this
manner.
40. Id. at 290.
41. Id. at 291.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 292 (noting that issuers would face the choice of either dealing with “issuer-
level investors” or with “intermediary-level investors associated with an intermediary”).
44. Id. at 285.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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self-regulate or select the level of public regulation to which they will
be subject (“self-tailored regulation”).48 Issuers may set their liability
standard as one of negligence or strict liability.49 They may choose to
face antifraud or criminal liability.50 They instead simply may choose
to do away with private antifraud liability, negligence liability, and,
presumably, contract liability.51 All things are possible for Choi’s un-
regulated market participants when they deal with issuer-level inves-
tors.52
Importantly, Choi provides “a presumption of issuer-level
status”53 for investors in companies trading on efficient markets.
Therefore, even unsophisticated investors presumably can continue to
purchase IBM stock.54
48. Id.
49. Id. at 287.
50. Id. Again, the constitutionality and practicality of a system whereby individuals and
firms contractually opt in and out of the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system at will is ques-
tionable, but beyond this Article’s scope.
51. See id. at 288 (“[I]ssuers that desire to defraud investors may abuse self-tailored regula-
tion and simply opt out of any liability.”). Presumably Choi’s plan preempts state statutory
regulation and common law liability. Otherwise, it would accomplish none of its goals.
52. See id. at 286 (“In a world with full information and without transaction costs, issuers
and investors could costlessly specify and enforce contracts that allocate every possible risk be-
tween the issuer and the investor.”). In discussing the licensing aspect of investor regulation,
Choi compares investors to pilots who are licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Id. at 312. But the investors are more like passengers on a commercial airliner. It is cer-
tainly possible that the FAA does not always strike the perfect balance between cost and safety;
many passengers may pay more for their airline tickets than they would choose to pay if they
were completely rational and bargaining with full information. Choi’s logic would suggest that
(a) airline safety be deregulated, (b) passengers negotiate with airlines to pay for just the level
of safety they desire, and (c) competition (hopefully) would lead to a race to the top rather than
a race to the bottom. Although the events of September 11, 2001, make this deregulation un-
thinkable, consider a brief thought experiment. Choi’s logic suggests that passengers take a test
regarding aerodynamics and airplane safety procedures. Presumably those who flunked simply
would have to take a train. Those who passed could select Delta over TWA if they were risk-
seeking, and Delta could cut thirty dollars from the price of a plane ticket by laying off me-
chanics. But one might legitimately wonder whether passengers could ever truly have the infor-
mation and rational decisionmaking capacity to bargain efficiently in this context—to know ex-
actly what increase in the chance of accident they were incurring in exchange for their thirty
dollars in savings. Because of the horrific nature of an airplane crash, at least potential air trav-
elers have better information upon which to base such a decision than investors who operate in
a world in which most securities frauds are not even detected by the fraudulent issuer’s inde-
pendent auditors who are on the job year after year. In this realm, can investors—even sophisti-
cated investors—ever truly be able to intelligently bargain for less disclosure and less fraud pro-
tection and know exactly what price discount they should demand in return?
53. Id. at 302.
54. To summarize, “issuer-level investors” (A students) (and all investors in efficient mar-
kets) can deal with all issuers and through all intermediaries and HVOs. “Intermediary-level
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II.  ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING INVESTOR REGULATION
Before examining some of Choi’s key assumptions about investor
regulation, I must clarify just a bit. Because of the wide range of
choices that Choi’s proposal allows, I must specify which version of
his plan I address.55 For example, under Choi’s proposal, an issuer
could completely deregulate itself by offering no protection for inves-
tors whatsoever. On the other hand, it could opt into a regime that
carried all the current protections (or more), complete with SEC and
Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement. Brokers, exchanges, and
other actors could do the same. If issuers and brokers opt into a rela-
tively full measure of public regulation, then investor regulation really
would not accomplish much. It would not save any money or create
any meaningful efficiencies. Issuers, for example, would continue to
bear the expense of full disclosure and antifraud liability.
Choi stresses that due to the self-tailored nature of his plan, mar-
ket participants would have lots of flexibility.56 He suggests, for exam-
ple, that issuers could choose to subject themselves to antifraud li-
ability, but with fee shifting and a ban on class actions.57 However, if
the changes that investor regulation brings are this minor, clearly it
would be superior simply to continue tinkering with the current sys-
tem with more laws—like the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995,58 the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
investors” (B students) can deal with all intermediaries and HVOs, but only with issuers that are
associated with intermediaries or HVOs. “Aggregate-level investors” (C students) can deal only
with issuers and intermediaries associated with HVOs. And, finally, “unsophisticated investors”
(D students) can deal only through HVOs and intermediaries associated with them and even
then can buy only passive index funds.
55. The great flexibility in investor regulation makes it difficult to criticize with certainty.
On the one hand, Choi clearly dislikes current public regulation of the securities markets. On
the other hand, he realizes that absence of regulation could create huge problems, so he fre-
quently falls back to the option of allowing issuers or brokers to opt into public regulation if that
is what investors really want. By this approach, Choi simultaneously can claim the advantages of
deregulation and the advantages of regulation. One has to be an illusion; either deregulation
will not occur to any great extent because the market participants will opt into public or private
regulation that mimics public regulation, or real deregulation will occur and the comfort of a
backstop system of public regulation will not exist.
56. Id. at 285–88 (“Where public regulatory bodies have a comparative advantage in reme-
dying certain private market defects, market participants may decide for themselves their level
of public liability and enforcement.”).
57. Id. at 288.
58. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as additions and amendments to 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77–78 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000)).
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1996,59 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
199860—and more rule changes, such as the proposed Aircraft Car-
rier.61 It makes little sense to scrap an entire regime of regulation if
the unregulated parties simply opt back into a pale version of the
original.
Therefore, in discussing investor regulation, I assume that Choi’s
proposal truly does bring substantial change—that issuers and other
market participants take advantage of the options it presents to re-
duce dramatically the level of public regulation that currently exists.
A. Market Efficiency
Most of the academic reformers assume that the stock market is
naturally efficient.62 This is largely true, of course, but there is over-
whelming evidence that its efficiency is substantially bounded.63 One
cause of inefficiency stems from investors’ actions that do not fit the
rational-man model of economic hypothesizing,64 creating “noise” in
59. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
60. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
61. The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998).
62. Choi, supra note 7, at 302–03 (describing the various forms of efficient markets); Ro-
mano, supra note 6, at 2366 n.17 (arguing that markets are generally efficient due to the equal-
izing presence of informed investors and arbitrageurs, but admitting that unsophisticated inves-
tors are unprotected against broker fraud).
63. See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT TERM GAIN
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 49–55 (1988) (citing several studies rejecting or limiting
the efficient market hypothesis); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR:
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 88 (2000)
(“The weight of the evidence—the success of value investing over the long term, post-earnings-
announcement drift, and post-recommendation drift—all go against market efficiency.”);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 171–90 (2000) [hereinafter SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE] (pointing out various holes in the efficient market hypothesis
while admitting that it is “approximately true”); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 1–27 (2000) (challenging the efficient market
hypothesis); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND INVESTOR
GOVERNANCE 6 (Cardozo Law Sch., Working Paper No. 32, 2001) (on file with Duke Law
Journal) (arguing that “the [efficient market hypothesis] has always suffered from theoretical
and empirical limitations or exceptions, which of late have gone to consume it”); ROBERT J.
SHILLER, BUBBLES, HUMAN JUDGMENT, AND EXPERT OPINION 11 (Cowles Found., Discus-
sion Paper No. 1303, 2001) [hereinafter SHILLER, BUBBLES] (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal) (“[I]f one looks at data over long intervals of time, it appears that the stock market is any-
thing but efficient.”); Jeff Madrick, Market Messes Happen. And Inefficiencies Have
Consequences., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at C2 (“A growing number [of economists] argue that
according to the best new evidence, financial markets do not appear all that efficient after all.”).
64. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 51
(1965) (noting that stock prices are based on “traders’ fortuitous hunches and perhaps little
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the financial markets.65 Professor Richard Thaler and several col-
leagues catalogue numerous “anomalies” that are inconsistent with
the efficient market hypothesis.66 Empirical analyses show, for exam-
ple, that nice weather tends to make people feel better and their up-
beat mood translates into higher daily stock returns,67 making it diffi-
else”); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 153–57 (1936) (noting that stock prices are often the result of “mass psychology”);
LARS TVEDE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCE 18 (1999) (noting that, because the market can
“be subjective, emotional and ruled by the whim of changing trends,” it can be argued that “in-
vestors’ attempts to be rational can therefore actually be irrational behavior”); Kenneth J. Ar-
row, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 7–8 (1982) (conclud-
ing that psychological models of “irrational” decisionmaking can help explain pricing in
speculative markets); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Funda-
mental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 592 (1986) (stating that “existing evidence does not establish that
financial markets are efficient in the sense of rationally reflecting fundamentals”).
65. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 530 (1986) (“Noise makes financial markets
possible, but also makes them imperfect.”); J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in
Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 703 (1990) (contending that asset “prices can diverge
significantly from fundamental values”); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 917 (1992) (“Both
the behavioralist critique and noise theory call into question some of the first principles under-
lying [efficient market] models.”); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Behavioral Capital Asset
Pricing Theory, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 323, 345–46 (1994) (discussing how be-
havioral factors can create noise during trading that disrupts efficient market trading).
66. See BRUCE I. JACOBS, CAPITAL IDEAS AND MARKET REALITIES: OPTION
REPLICATION, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR, AND STOCK MARKET CRASHES 87 (1999) (“A growing
body of literature investigating the role of investor psychology in stock pricing suggests that in-
dividual investors share common cognitive defects that may cause them to err in the same direc-
tion . . . .”); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992) (explaining anomalies that include the winner’s curse, the endowment
effect, loss aversion, the status quo bias, mental accounting, and preference reversals); Kent
Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN.
1839, 1865 (1998) (noting that “[e]mpirical securities markets research in the last three decades
has presented a body of evidence with systematic patterns that are not easy to explain with ra-
tional asset pricing models,” and proposing a new model taking into account investor overconfi-
dence, self-attribution, and other biases); Daniel Kahneman & Mark W. Riepe, Aspects of In-
vestor Psychology, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1998, at 52, 53–63 (cataloguing a large
number of cognitive illusions that affect even the decisionmaking of professional investors);
Jayendu Patel et al., The Rationality Struggle: Illustrations from Financial Markets, 81 AM.
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 232, 233–35 (1991) (using behavioral analysis to explain herding
behavior and other market inefficiencies); Allen M. Poteshman, Underreaction, Overreaction,
and Increasing Misreaction to Information in the Options Market, 56 J. FIN. 851, 875 (2001)
(finding inefficiencies in options markets consistent with behavioral theories). See generally
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard Thaler ed., 1993) (collecting numerous articles
showing how behavioral research undermines the efficient market hypothesis).
67. David Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the
Weather 16–18 (Mar. 28, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Another recent study found that lunar cycles also affect people’s moods and, consequently, their
stock market behavior. See Alison Beard, Moonstruck Stock Investors Find Another Reason to
Howl, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at 25 (reporting on a University of Michigan Business School
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cult to deny that psychological effects play an important role in the
stock markets. In his recent widely publicized book, Professor Robert
Shiller notes:
The market level does not, as so many imagine, represent the con-
sensus judgment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-
term evidence. The [current] market is high because of the com-
bined effect of indifferent thinking by millions of people, very few of
whom feel the need to perform careful research on the long-term in-
vestment value of the aggregate stock market, and who are moti-
vated substantially by their own emotions, random attentions, and
perceptions of conventional wisdom.68
At a macro-level, investor irrationality has, throughout history,
helped cause speculative bubbles and panicky crashes.69 Any proposal
study finding that “[o]ver a year, the full moon discount amounts to a return difference of be-
tween 5.4 and 6.9 per cent.”).
68. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 203. As another prominent
commentator notes:
[I]t is difficult to sustain the case that people in general, and investors in particular,
are fully rational. At the superficial level, many investors react to irrelevant informa-
tion in forming their demand for securities; as Fischer Black . . . put it, they trade on
noise rather than information. Investors follow the advice of financial gurus, fail to
diversify, actively trade stocks and churn their portfolios, sell winning stocks and hold
on to losing stocks thereby increasing their tax liabilities, buy and sell actively and ex-
pensively managed mutual funds, follow stock price patterns and other popular mod-
els. In short, investors hardly pursue the passive strategies expected of uninformed
market participants by the efficient markets theory.
SHLEIFER, supra note 63, at 10 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL SPECULATION 345 (1999) (explicating in detail several of the great bubbles
throughout history, and noting that “speculative euphoria” can drive share prices above their
intrinsic value); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES 28 (1978)
(“Manias and panics . . . are associated on occasion with general irrationality or mob psychol-
ogy.”); LOWENSTEIN, supra note 63, at 33 (“[A]s various academic studies have subsequently
shown, the market tends to extremes. Euphoria and despair are as much the faces of the market
as objective analysis.”); TVEDE, supra note 64, at 46 (“[T]he market from time to time gets
completely dominated by such irrational emotions as hope, greed and fear.”); David M. Cutler
et al., What Moves Stock Prices?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1989, at 4, 9–11 (finding no fun-
damental economic news to cause the dramatic stock market crash of October 1987); Frank
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 755–57
(2000) (discussing cognitive errors as causes of stock market crashes).
Professor Peter Garber argues that the famous tulip mania of 1636–37 was not truly a
bubble; its causes just have not been understood before. PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST
BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 126 (2000). But Mike Dash makes the “tu-
lipomania” seem a prototypical example of irrational trading leading to a bubble. MIKE DASH,
TULIPOMANIA: THE STORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST COVETED FLOWER & THE
EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED 158–64 (1999).
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to completely restructure securities market regulation should pay less
obeisance to simplifying assumptions of traditional economic rea-
soning and more attention to that reasoning’s limitations than Choi’s
proposal does.
B. Optimal, Voluntary Issuer Disclosure
If sophisticated investors are insufficiently attentive to matters of
issuer disclosure and issuers are insufficiently motivated to voluntarily
disclose accurate financial information, Choi’s proposal might well
create a market reminiscent of that of the 1920s, when fifty percent of
all newly issued stocks were worthless.70 Choi would not want that,
but he believes that investors will tend to value accurate disclosure
and adequate remedies. Choi thinks that his plan incentivizes market
participants to give investors what they want.
Unfortunately, Choi seems to anthropomorphize issuers as a sin-
gle entity that rationally decides what is in its best interests in terms
of long-term disclosure.71 In so doing, he assumes both that issuers
and their managers are rational and that it is in their rational best in-
terests to provide full and accurate disclosure of an optimal amount
of information and to refrain from careless and fraudulent acts. Sub-
stantial behavioral evidence undermines these assumptions.72
Garber also attempts to rationalize the John Law Mississippi bubble, GARBER, supra,
at 91–107, but, again, a detailed examination of the event makes it seem far from rational.
TVEDE, supra note 64, at 39–40.
70. Donald A. Ritchie, The Pecora Wall Street Exposé, 1934, in 4 CONGRESS INVESTI-
GATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, 1792–1974, at 2555–56 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Rich-
ard Burns eds., 1975).
71. Choi had earlier proposed a system of issuer choice regarding disclosure of financial
information. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 228–33 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & An-
drew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 917 (1998). For some insightful criticism of these proposals, see
Partnoy, supra note 69, at 793–800.
72. Professor Merritt Fox notes that it is the issuer’s managers who will make the decision
whether or not to disclose, and therefore it is their incentives, and not the hypothetical best in-
terests of the firm as an entity, that must be considered. Fox, supra note 11, at 1343. Professor
Donald Langevoort notes that “[t]here is ample reason to believe that these [disclosure] deci-
sions [made by managers] often diverge from what would be optimal in the long run from the
issuer’s perspective.” Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liabil-
ity in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 54 (Summer
2000).
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1. Are Individuals and Organizations Rational?
a. Individuals. Conventional law and economics assumes that
individuals are rational, self-interested utility maximizers.73 However,
as Professors Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric Talley note,
“a substantial (and growing) body of experimental and empirical evi-
dence suggests that people’s behavior deviates from [the] traditional
account, often in systematic ways.”74 I explored much of that evidence
in some detail in an earlier article75 and will not repeat that explica-
tion here.76 Suffice it to say that virtually everyone now recognizes
that there is a large gap between the manner in which economists tra-
ditionally assume that people think and act, and the manner in which
people actually do think and act.77 Assuming individual rationality is a
dangerous simplification.78
73. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750–51 (1990) (summarizing core assumptions of the
standard model); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations
of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 636 (1996) (“The foundation of economic analysis of
choice is based on the rationality of individual decision making.”).
74. ARLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 9; see also JACOB JACOBY, IS IT RATIONAL TO
ASSUME CONSUMER RATIONALITY? SOME CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 2–3 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper #CLB-00-
009, 2000) (on file with Duke Law Journal) (“Virtually without exception, those familiar with
the extensive scholarly empirical literature on (individual) consumer behavior would conclude
that, as proposed by those contemporary economists and legal theoreticians who espouse it, Ra-
tional Choice Theory is a simplistic theory having little correspondence with the real world of
(individual) consumer behavior.”); Reinhard Selten, What Is Bounded Rationality?, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 13, 13 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard
Selten eds., 2001) (“Modern mainstream economic theory is largely based on an unrealistic pic-
ture of human decision making.”).
75. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Secu-
rities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 139–81 (2000).
76. However, some of that evidence is in this Article. See infra notes 245–57 and accompa-
nying text.
77. See, e.g., R. Duncan Luce & Detlof von Winterfeldt, What Common Ground Exists for
Descriptive, Prescriptive, and Normative Utility Theories?, 40 MGMT. SCI. 263, 263 (1994) (de-
fending the normative properties of the classic view, but admitting that “[t]here is no doubt that
[subjective utility theory] is descriptively wrong”); Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility
Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence, and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 529, 530 (1982)
(“[M]ost of the empirical evidence is difficult to reconcile with the principle of [expected utility]
maximization.”).
78. In simply assuming human rationality in the manner of the traditional economic model,
investor regulation risks implementing unrealistic reforms. See Anne C. Dailey, Book Review:
Striving for Rationality, 86 VA. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (2000) (reviewing JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN
MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL (1998)) (“I am quite sure the law’s resis-
tance to irrationality reveals a deep flaw in its ability to account for, and hence regulate, human
behavior.”).
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b. Organizations. There is also a wide chasm between the
way in which traditional economic analysis presumes organizations to
act and the way in which organizations actually act. Economists often
assume that firms are the proverbial “black box”; they ignore a firm’s
actual human-oriented decisionmaking processes and simply assume
that firms make value-maximizing decisions.79 Because they act
through agents who are not rational and whose interests are often
poorly aligned with those of their employers, organizations often do
not engage in value-maximizing behavior. Indeed, they are often just
a bit of a mess.80 The entire field of organizational theory exists be-
cause organizations have such difficulty acting rationally.81 There is an
extensive management literature indicating that employees’ goals of-
ten are not well aligned with those of their employers and that various
heuristics and biases often prevent employees from maximizing their
employers’ goals even when they seek to do so.82
2. Is Honest, Full Disclosure Rational? Even if one accepts the
assumption that issuers and their managers are rational, it is impor-
tant to examine the concomitant assumption that it is irrational for
these managers and issuers to do anything other than make full and
accurate financial disclosure to the market. Choi’s position, for exam-
ple, is consistent with numerous studies arguing that it is rational for
issuers to develop reputations for honesty because such actions re-
duce long-term capital costs.83 It similarly is claimed that it would be
79. See ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN, LAWYERS, LAW AND CONTRACT FORMATION 3 (Van-
derbilt Univ. Law Sch., Joe C. Davis Working Paper No. 99-16, 2000) (on file with Duke Law
Journal) (noting that a “standard criticism of economics . . . is that it too often ignores how deci-
sions are made inside a firm”).
80. John Freeman, Efficiency and Rationality in Organizations, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 164
(1999) (“Foolishness and rational choice exist side by side in every organization.”); Robert Gib-
bons, Taking Coase Seriously, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 145, 146 (1999) (noting that “recent economic
models of internal organization predict that organizations will be a mess but not a mystery”).
81. See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 675 (1996) (con-
tending that many economic models “are motivated by anomalies” involving bounded rational-
ity or imperfect information).
82. Prentice, supra note 75, at 181–86.
83. See, e.g., Richard Frankel et al., Discretionary Disclosure and External Financing, 70
ACCT. REV. 135, 149 (1995) (finding that firms accessing capital markets are more likely to dis-
close forecasts than those that do not, although not finding that they do so more frequently in
the period surrounding an offering); Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determi-
nants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 246, 269 (1993) (finding that
firms issuing securities tend to disclose more than firms not issuing securities); Christian Leuz &
Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure 33 (July 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding in a study of German
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irrational for a corporate manager to derail a promising individual ca-
reer by engaging in financial disclosure shenanigans.84
And yet, deceptive financial reporting by corporations remains a
serious problem.85 It is not just that full disclosure is made involuntar-
ily;86 what is disclosed is often inaccurate and/or fraudulent.87 Finan-
cial fraud and “earnings management” are inconsistent with standard
firms that a switch from the German to a fuller reporting regime, such as in the United States
appeared via indirect measures to allow them to “garner economically and statistically signifi-
cant benefits”).
But there is evidence that firms doing well are more liberal with their disclosure than
firms doing poorly. Lang & Lundholm, supra, at 269; see also Baruch Lev & Stephen H. Pen-
man, Voluntary Forecast Disclosure, Nondisclosure, and Stock Prices, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 49, 74
(1990) (finding that stock price behavior reflects that “earnings forecasts generally distinguish
firms with particularly ‘good’ annual earnings from other firms”). It seems more likely that they
disclose more because they are doing well than that they are doing well because they disclose
more.
It does appear that when firms get caught engaging in financial fraud, their capital costs
rise. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 30
(1996) (“[O]ur results are consistent with the firms experiencing a significant increase in their
costs of capital following the revelation that their earnings have been overstated.”).
84. One study shows that of the companies that were targeted for accounting irregularities
by the SEC between 1982 and 1989, seventy-two percent fired or forced resignations of top
managers. Ehsan H. Feroz et al., The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC’s Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 107, 108 (1991).
85. See Diana B. Henriques, Business Fraud of the 90’s: Falsifying Corporate Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at A1 (noting that in the previous year at least twenty widely traded pub-
lic companies had disclosed serious lapses in their financial reporting); Louis Uchitelle, Corpo-
rate Profits Are Tasty, But Artificially Flavored, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 3, at 4 (quoting
several sources as indicating that gimmicky accounting inflates the reported profits of U.S. cor-
porations).
86. Baruch Lev, Information Disclosure Strategy, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1992, at 9, 9
(finding very modest levels of voluntary financial disclosure).
87. There is an estimated $100 billion of fraud in the financial services industry every year.
Rachel Witmer, House Panel Divides on Antifraud Bill over Privacy, Confidentiality, Fairness,
33 SEC. REG. L. REP. 719, 719 (2001) (citing an estimate of the Financial Services Roundtable).
The SEC is bringing record numbers of financial fraud cases. Kip Betz, SEC Brought 484 Cases
in FY 2001; Financial Fraud, Reporting Top Agenda, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Dec. 17, 2001, at D4.
Earnings management is also a huge problem. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gate-
keeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Account-
ing 3–4 (May 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting the
scope of earnings management and explaining limitations that prevent the current audit industry
from effectively curbing the practice); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in
Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1055, 1091 (1999) (describing a “pervasive run of [securities] fraud, theft, and
malfeasance [that has recently] imposed astounding costs upon our economy”).
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economic assumptions, yet they exist in abundance.88 And they tend
to fool even professional investors.89 Why is this so?
a. Issuers. Professor Merritt Fox persuasively argues that
companies, if left unregulated, will not disclose the socially optimal
amount of financial information.90 His argument is that even if indi-
88. Accounting fraud by corporations is currently the SEC’s “chief priority” and the Com-
mission is filing 100 accounting-related enforcement cases annually. Michael Schroeder, SEC
Increases Accounting-Fraud Probes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1998, at B8 (quoting SEC Director of
Enforcement Richard Walker).
Michael Young notes:
The [recent] accounting irregularities to attract the most public attention, of
course, were those that surfaced at Cendant Corporation in April 1998, where the an-
nouncement of misstated financial results at Cendant’s newly acquired CUC Interna-
tional unit led to a $14 billion loss in market capital in just a few hours. But Cendant
is far from alone. Highly publicized financial misreporting problems have also sur-
faced at McKesson, Livent, Mercury Finance, Donnkenny, Rite Aid, Boston Scien-
tific, Informix, Sunbeam, Micro Warehouse, Northstar Health Services, Paracelsus
Healthcare, Penguin, Photran, Sensormatic, Thor Industries, BT Office Products,
Guildford Mills, Bankers Trust, and Physician Computer Network. And that’s just to
name a few.
Evidence of an increase in accounting irregularities is more than anecdotal. A se-
ries of surveys conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers shows that claims based on al-
leged accounting irregularities have increased from 25% of securities claims in 1997
to 49% just two years later. A similar study concluded that between 1992 and 1998,
the number of securities lawsuits based on the need to restate audited financial
statements increased by 750%. A separate survey of chief financial officers, con-
ducted on a strictly anonymous basis, found that fully two-thirds had recently been
subjected to pressure within their companies to misrepresent financial results. Ac-
cording to the survey, 55% had successfully resisted. At the same time, 12% had not.
Michael R. Young, The Origin of Financial Fraud, in ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES AND
FINANCIAL FRAUD 1, 1 (Michael R. Young ed., 2000).
Management of earnings is also a major SEC priority, as exemplified by its action
against W.R. Grace & Co. in 1999. Ann Davis, SEC and W.R. Grace Are Near Accord over Al-
leged Earnings Manipulation, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1999, at B5; see also Jonathan Burton, When
Earnings Bear Closer Scrutiny: What Should CEOs Do to Avoid Embarrassing Blow-Ups over
Reported Earnings, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, May 1, 1999, at 46 (quoting Warren Buffett as com-
plaining that “the attitude of disrespect that many executives have today for accurate reporting
is a business disgrace”); Carol J. Loomis, Lies, Damned Lies, and Managed Earnings, FORTUNE,
Aug. 2, 1999, at 74 (giving numerous examples of companies that manipulated earnings).
89. See SHLEIFER, supra note 63, at 187 (describing studies that show earnings manipula-
tion and studies that show that “[s]uch manipulation appears to work: analysts are excessively
optimistic about the earnings potential of recent IPOs and their growth prospects”); Siew Hong
Teoh et al., Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Of-
ferings, 53 J. FIN. 1935, 1966 (1998) (finding that issuers manage earnings around IPOs and in-
vestors irrationally fixate on these high earnings and are disappointed with subsequent earn-
ings); Siew Hong Teoh et al., Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 50 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 93–94 (1998) (finding the same earnings management and
the same irrational investor reaction in seasoned offerings as those associated with IPOs).
90. See Fox, supra note 11, at 1390 (“[I]ssuer choice would lead U.S. issuers to disclose at a
level significantly below . . . [the] social optimum.”). Fox notes that even most economists real-
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vidual managers’ interests are aligned perfectly with their firms’ in-
terests, they will disclose suboptimally because disclosure implicates
two types of costs. First are operational costs (out-of-pocket ex-
penses, diversion of staff time, etc.). Second, and more critical, are in-
ter-firm costs that can put a disclosing firm at a disadvantage relative
to its competitors. For example, if a company discloses that one of its
product lines is particularly profitable, its competitors may plunge
into that product line. Although operational costs are costs to both
the disclosing firm and society, inter-firm costs are imposed only on
the disclosing firm.91
Others note that although an unregulated world gives some in-
centive to disclose, especially to firms that are doing well, firms that
are doing poorly have less incentive to disclose and their silence, al-
though a signal to the market, is inferior to full information.92 Profes-
sors Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer note that, notwithstanding
economic theory to the contrary, “[f]ull voluntary disclosure . . .
rarely seems to occur in reality, and firms typically do not disclose
more than regulation requires.”93 There is substantial evidence that
ize that corporations will not voluntarily choose to disclose sufficient information for the effi-
cient operation of securities markets and therefore side with the notion of government-
mandated disclosure. Id.; see also, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel P. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 684–85 (1984) (explaining how
disclosure rules may reduce information costs). This conclusion is also shared by the Sommer
Commission’s extensive study. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 566–67 (finding several grounds to
“doubt[] that market forces alone would result in the publication of sufficient, reliable, and
timely data”). Substantial evidence indicates that firms generally do not voluntarily disclose so-
cially optimal financial information to signal the market that they are good investments. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,
70 VA. L. REV. 717, 752 (1984) (“Economic logic also points to the conclusion that there will be
inadequate securities research and verification in the absence of a mandatory disclosure sys-
tem.”); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1, 5–9 (1983) (arguing, based on historical evidence, that corporations will not volun-
tarily disclose sufficient information).
91. As Fox explains:
[Inter-firm costs] are not social costs because the inter-firm disadvantages to the is-
suer from the disclosure are counterbalanced by the advantages disclosure confers on
the other firms. Thus, at all levels of disclosure, an issuer’s private marginal costs will
exceed its social marginal cost by an amount equal to these inter-firm costs. Even
managers who completely identify with existing shareholders—managers who seek to
maximize share value so that costs to the shareholders are equivalent to costs to
them—would therefore choose a regime with a disclosure level below the social opti-
mum.
Fox, supra note 11, at 1345–46.
92. Id. at 1361–62.
93. ANAT R. ADMATI & PAUL PFLEIDERER, FORCING FIRMS TO TALK: FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND EXTERNALITIES 2 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working
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voluntary corporate disclosure was seriously inadequate before pas-
sage of the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act,94 and that these Acts created important improvements over pre-
Paper, 1998) (emphasis added) (on file with Duke Law Journal) (arguing that although there is
a role for government regulation in disclosure policy, “getting it right” can be difficult); see also
RAY BALL ET AL., INCENTIVES VERSUS STANDARDS: PROPERTIES OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
IN FOUR EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF IAAS 27 (Univ. of
Rochester, Working Paper No. FR 00-04, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding in
a study of four Asian nations that incentives to disclose, such as liability, are much more impor-
tant to creating financial transparency than adoption of high-quality accounting standards).
Palmiter argues that in some private placements, issuers often disclose the same infor-
mation that is typically disclosed in full prospectuses. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure
Choice in Securities Regulation, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21. The main reason is the same
reason that summary prospectuses allowed under SEC Rule 431, 17 C.F.R. § 230.431 (2001), are
seldom used, and it relates to the status quo bias. See infra notes 410–25 and accompanying text.
Institutional investors are used to the disclosure format and content of the full-fledged, SEC-
mandated prospectus. That is the status quo, and it affects all other disclosure. Once the status
quo is changed and the disclosure bar is lowered, ripple effects likely will reduce disclosure
broadly.
Other examples that Palmiter gives undermine his point on voluntary disclosure. For
example, he notes that over-the-counter (OTC) issuers often provided ongoing periodic disclo-
sure on the same basis as listed issuers even before they were required to do so in 1964. Palmi-
ter, supra, at 22. But obviously, these OTC companies simply were trying to appear to be as
reputable as the listed companies. Take away the required disclosure of the listed companies,
and it is unlikely that either the listed companies or the OTC companies would have voluntarily
disclosed nearly as much. Palmiter also notes that Daimler-Benz chose to list on the New York
Stock Exchange and disclose in accordance with SEC standards in 1993 to gain access to the
U.S. capital markets and that foreign issuers whose American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
trade in the United States often list on U.S. exchanges to “move into a new capitalist league.”
Palmiter, supra, at 23. These observations also seem to undermine Palmiter’s point. The issuers
did not voluntarily disclose more than they had to disclose; only when they felt they needed to
access U.S. capital did they make the decision to disclose the required information necessary to
do so. Voluntary disclosure in many European countries remains limited because legal require-
ments are lacking. See Neal E. Boudette, Muppet Meltdown: After Buying Kermit and Pals, Firm
Finds It Isn’t Easy Seeing Green, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, at A1 (quoting London analyst
Alan Howard as saying that “[i]t’s a Wild West market in Germany”).
94. The best history of accounting in the United States that has been written points out
how spotty voluntary corporate disclosure was before 1933. Previts and Merino note that “bal-
ance sheet secrecy was a distinctive characteristic of financial statement disclosure by railroads”
in the late 1800s and that Westinghouse issued no annual financial statements between 1897 and
1905. GARY J. PREVITS & BARBARA D. MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 117 (2d ed. 1998). When audits did happen to be done on a company’s books,
“[t]wo out of three new audit engagements during the 1890s were likely to reveal defalcations.”
Id. at 135. Several factors finally improved disclosure somewhat, including not so much the re-
putational effects of economic theory but more the demands of regulatory agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 126, 131, 185 (listing threats of additional regulation by
government agencies and financial exchanges). When Congress created the Industrial Commis-
sion to study combinations in restraint of trade and that commission expressed serious concerns
about deception of investors “either through suppression of material facts or by making mis-
leading statements,” corporations realized that “[v]oluntary disclosure offered a seemingly vi-
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vious practices and thereby improved market efficiency.95 In his com-
prehensive history of federal securities regulation, Professor Joel
Seligman notes that several SEC and academic studies indicate that
mandatory disclosure provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts reduced
underwriter costs and that the disclosure programs increased investor
able means of avoiding fundamental structural changes.” Id. at 185–86. The voluntary disclosure
that did occur likely helped corporations avoid passage of a federal incorporation statute that
was repeatedly proposed in Congress between 1903 and 1930. Id.
Initially, the SEC did not regulate the most important document to shareholders—the
annual report to stockholders. Absent SEC requirements, corporate reporting to shareholders
remained pitifully inadequate:
Reports to stockholders, whether judged by the standards set by the SEC or by
one’s own lights, seem very inadequate. On vital counts, investors are left conjectur-
ing—sales, cost of sales, depreciation, inventories and surplus generally are so inade-
quately described that an investor does not have a minimum of information upon
which to form an intelligent opinion on buying and selling. The seventy corporations
included in this study represent the best in American reporting practice—yet their ac-
counting to stockholders falls far short of the minimum requirements which these
very corporations must meet in their reports to the SEC.
Maurice C. Kaplan & Daniel M. Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC, 48
YALE L.J. 935, 978 (1939); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 318–19 (1932) (noting the inadequacy of
contemporary corporate disclosure).
95. See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and
the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 311–13 (1989) (finding lower price
variance for new shares issued after the 1933 Act than those new shares issued before); George
J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 BUS. LAW. 721, 727 (1964) (noting
lower variance in stock price ratios after the formation of the SEC than in the 1920s).
George Benston performed a similar study of the 1934 Act. George J. Benston, Re-
quired Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Benston’s study is flawed, being based on some erroneous fac-
tual assumptions. As Seligman has pointed out:
Several economists have criticized the appropriateness of Benston’s studies, the qual-
ity of his research designs, and his analysis of his empirical findings. The economists,
however, generally ignored the rather glaring deficiencies of Benston’s historical re-
search. In particular, Benston’s suggestion that there was little securities fraud before
1934 was ludicrous. His “search of the available literature” apparently did not lead
him to read of a single enforcement action brought by any of the forty-seven states
that enacted blue sky securities regulation laws between 1911 and 1933. Yet in the
year 1932, the State of New York alone secured injunctions against 1522 persons and
firms and instituted 146 criminal prosecutions.
SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 564–65 (footnote omitted).
Even so, Benston’s results (and those of George Stigler before him) clearly indicate
that the 1934 Act improved pricing accuracy. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CONVERGENCE AND
ITS CRITICS: WHAT ARE THE PRECONDITIONS TO THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL? 48 (Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 179, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“[T]he total package of new disclosures produced immediate and observable results
that are logically interpreted as an increase in pricing accuracy.”); Fox, supra note 11, at 1376–80
(“Taken as a whole, the Stigler, Simon, and Benston studies suggest that imposition of the cur-
rent system of mandatory disclosure did increase price accuracy and the amount of meaningful
information in the market.”).
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confidence and led directly to a large increase in investor participa-
tion in the stock markets.96
As noted, companies not only fail to voluntarily disclose optimal
amounts of financial information, they often alter accounting proce-
dures to make their bottom lines look better,97 and even commit fi-
nancial fraud, despite the arguable irrationality of such an act.98 Pro-
fessor Patricia Dechow and her colleagues note: “Existing research
argues that there are long-term benefits to building reputations for
providing reliable and timely disclosures. Yet the sample of firms in-
vestigated in this study chose to risk (and ultimately lose) these bene-
fits for the prospect of short-term gain.”99
It is not difficult to detect corporations’ motives to commit finan-
cial fraud. Studies reveal that firms often misrepresent their financial
condition to minimize (at least in the short term) external financing
costs.100 Others misrepresent to encourage investment in the firm and
to increase the price of outstanding stock.101 Some manage earnings in
response to unique circumstances, such as increasing the price they
96. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 561–62.
97. See John W. Hill & Robert W. Ingram, Selection of GAAP or RAP in the Savings and
Loan Industry, 64 ACCT. REV. 667, 677 (1989) (finding that S&Ls switched accounting methods
when traditional GAAP disfavored the firm, and concluding that “[t]hese findings are consistent
with earlier studies that have shown that managers select and lobby for accounting alternatives
that are consistent with their self-interest”).
98. Companies that are caught committing fraud may pay dearly for it. See Jonathan M.
Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal
Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 797 (1993) (finding that corporations caught committing fraud suf-
fer large reputational penalties). One study shows that eighty-one percent of companies tar-
geted by the SEC for enforcement actions because of accounting irregularities were sued by
their shareholders. Feroz et al., supra note 84, at 108.
On the other hand, another study finds that legal sanctions, not reputational damage,
are the most important factors disciplining and deterring environmental violations. JONATHAN
M. KARPOFF ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS, LEGAL PENALTIES, AND REPUTATION
COSTS 24 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 71, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
99. Dechow et al., supra note 83, at 31.
100. See id. at 30 (“The results indicate that important motivations for earnings manipula-
tion are the desire to raise external financing at low cost and to avoid debt covenant restric-
tions.”); see also Richard G. Sloan, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and
Cash Flows About Future Earnings?, 71 ACCT. REV. 289, 314 (1996) (finding substantial evi-
dence of earnings manipulation, but not speculating as to management’s motivation).
101. IRVING KELLOGG & LOREN B. KELLOGG, FRAUD, WINDOW DRESSING, AND
NEGLIGENCE IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS § 5.02, at 5-3 (1991).
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can charge for their shares in a planned IPO,102 or being instigators of
a United States International Trade Commission investigation for
tariff increases and quota reductions whose case would be strength-
ened by showing reduced earnings.103 A recent study finds that most
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violators
charged by the SEC had suffered poor stock market performance
prior to the violation, concluding that “this likely provided incentives
to manage reported earnings.”104 If a firm is on the brink of bank-
ruptcy,105 Professors Jennifer Arlen and William Carney provide a ra-
tionale consistent with the rational economic-man theory that can ex-
plain a subset of securities frauds committed by managers in the “last
period.”106 However, Professor Donald Langevoort suspects, I think
correctly, that there may be additional cases in which it is rational to
trade off credibility with investors (and to risk liability) to obtain
some profit-enhancing gain in another area.107
Regardless of whether the stock market is particularly rational,
firms clearly can benefit in the short run by massaging their financial
numbers to look better than they truly are,108 and may feel extreme
102. See John M. Friedlan, Accounting Choices of Issuers of Initial Public Offerings, 11
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 2 (1994) (finding “that issuers make income-increasing accruals before
going public”).
103. See Jennifer J. Jones, Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, 29 J.
ACCT. RES. 193, 223 (1991) (finding empirical support for the hypothesis “that managers make
income-decreasing accruals during import relief investigations”).
104. Messod D. Beneish, Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings
Management Among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance, 16 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 271,
274 (1997); see also Mark L. DeFond & James Jiambalvo, Incidence and Circumstances of Ac-
counting Errors, 66 ACCT. REV. 643, 653 (1991) (describing an empirical study finding that firms
that overstate earnings tend to have lower growth in earnings).
105. See Kenneth B. Schwartz, Accounting Changes by Corporations Facing Possible Insol-
vency, 6 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 32, 40 (1982) (finding that companies on the brink of bank-
ruptcy are much more likely to change accounting methods to increase earnings per share).
106. Professors Arlen and Carney argue that in a “last period” scenario, when a company is
about to become insolvent and managers face mass firings, it is rational for them to attempt to
postpone or avoid disaster by committing securities fraud. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Car-
ney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REV. 691, 724–30.
107. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 115
(1997) (“The problem with this theory, however, is that it does not provide a compelling motiva-
tional story for the majority of cases that make up the class-action practice today, and that in-
volve the management’s concealment of product defects or the company’s financial difficulties
that are unlikely to lead to insolvency.”).
108. See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for “Dirty
Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 161–73 (1997)
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pressure to do so when competitors are widely engaged in similar
pursuits of “financial statement beautification.”109 Thus, Warren Buf-
fett argued in 1999 that the stock market pressures CEOs into inflat-
ing earnings so that their firms can keep up with the ever-rising stock
market, like a dog chasing its tail.110
In their study of financial fraud cases, Professors Irving Kellogg
and Loren Kellogg found thirteen reasons why firms misrepresented
their financial condition.111 There may be eight million stories in the
“naked city,” but the bottom line is that firms often have what appear
to be rational (at least in the short term) reasons to hide financial in-
formation and even to affirmatively commit fraud. These violations
are often significant. A study of SEC accounting enforcement actions
found that the median effect of reversing improper accounting proce-
dures was to lower the reporting firm’s income by fifty percent.112
Consider Enron’s spectacular fall to bankruptcy. Through rather
opaque disclosure of its unusual, complex, and aggressive business
practices, Enron’s management pumped its stock up to almost $90 per
(describing beautification techniques that companies adopt to improve their financial appear-
ance to investors). Hill explains that appearances matter—and they matter a great deal. Because
most firms engage in at least modest amounts of financial manipulation, those that do not “play
the game” are ranked poorly by comparison. See id. at 195 (“Companies who do not beautify
may act at their peril; they are ranked in a world where their peers do.”). Companies get away
with financial manipulation in large part because money managers engage in the rational ignor-
ance spoken about in this Article, see infra notes 267–79 and accompanying text, and settle for
“good enough” analysis of companies’ finances. Hill, supra, at 147.
109. Hill, supra note 108, at 145 n.11.
110. See Uchitelle, supra note 85, § 3, at 4 (quoting Warren Buffett as saying that stock mar-
ket pressures force firms to resort to “unadmirable accounting stratagems”).
111. Among those reasons were:
1. Encourage investors to buy an interest in a company stock as owners, or in
bonds as creditors. . . .
2. Increase the value of the stock of present shareholders of a company. . . .
3. Maintain or increase the price of the stock in order to use the stock to acquire
companies, obtain financing, or earn bonuses. . . .
4. Convince creditors to lend money or advance credit on the most favorable
terms. . . .
5. Avoid disclosing the fact that management’s policies have been unsatisfactory
(or, at the worst, disastrous). . . .
6. Establish a rationale for increased dividends or special distributions.
7. Avoid the discovery of the violation of performance covenants in loan agree-
ments.
8. Persuade a buyer to buy the business or to pay a higher price for the business.
KELLOGG & KELLOGG, supra note 101, § 5.02, at 5-2 to 5-4.
112. Feroz et al., supra note 84, at 113 (finding also that in thirty-six percent of the cases
“the income effect of the error exceeded the income reported in the preceding four quarters”).
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share and told analysts that it should be trading at $126.113 “Analysts,
who were paid to scrutinize the Texas-based group, joked with jour-
nalists about failing to understand its books—and proceeded to issue
the next ‘buy’ recommendation.”114 Not too many months after the
claim of a $126 share price, Enron’s shares dropped from $90 to less
than 90 cents and the firm filed for bankruptcy.115
Unfortunately, factors such as the drive for economic success and
competition for scarce resources mean that “unlawful business con-
duct is a natural accompaniment of modern life.”116
b. Managers. Before they were required to do so by outside
forces, corporate managers in the United States did not voluntarily
disclose much information to investors. “What they did, what they
earned, how many assets they controlled, and similar matters were
facts which they considered to be purely private affairs. To permit the
public or their own stockholders to know even the barest details of
their financial affairs was unthinkable . . . .”117
Managers make decisions as to how much their firm should dis-
close and they often make the decisions with an eye “toward[] the
impact of that decision on the manager’s own utility function.”118 Nu-
merous theories explain why managers do not voluntarily choose to
disclose optimal information, even if it is in their firms’ best interests:
Everything else being equal, managers prefer as low a level of peri-
odic disclosure as possible. Low disclosure reduces the effectiveness
of devices that limit managerial discretion and hence provides man-
agers with more room to satisfy their own objectives at the expense
of shareholders. This preference will exist even when the gains to
the managers are smaller than the losses to the shareholders.119
Worse still, managers often choose not only to disclose at a less
than socially optimal level, they also choose to defraud. Economists
who cannot understand why companies would mislead also argue that
113. Geoffrey Colvin, One Number That Won’t Lie, FORTUNE, Jan. 21, 2002, at 42, 42 (not-
ing that although Enron made these claims, its return on capital was quite low).
114. Sheila McNulty, A Victim of Its Opacity, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at 13, 13.
115. John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corporate Veil: Behind Enron’s Fall, A Culture
of Operating Outside Public’s View, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at A1.
116. Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MICH.
L. REV. 1377, 1401 (1982).
117. GEORGE L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 428–29 (1957).
118. Cox, supra note 11, at 1236.
119. Fox, supra note 11, at 1411.
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it is rational for managers to take the long-term view regarding repu-
tation and therefore to report honestly or suffer future wage revisions
for their inaccurate signaling.120 However, managers are not always ra-
tional in the long-term view, and there is evidence that when a com-
pany faces financial distress, its managers may suffer from myopia,
however irrational that may be.121 And it may not be irrational. Man-
agers as individuals or groups often have seemingly rational motives
to deceive.122
First, it may appear to be in a manager’s best interests to cook
the books. Assume that the company is doing poorly; a rational man-
ager looking out for the company’s best interests might well attempt
to conceal the company’s struggles to give it time to recover and to
preserve his or her own job.123
Second, managers sometimes may defraud to help themselves
even if it doesn’t help their firms or even hurts them.124 Sometimes
they seek to avoid being fired by hiding their poor performance.125
Given that companies’ managers often have bonuses and other incen-
tives tied to their firms’ reported financial success, they have incen-
tives to lobby aggressively for favorable accounting standards,126 and
120. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 295 (1980) (describing “how pressure from managerial labor markets helps to disci-
pline managers”).
121. Schwartz, supra note 105, at 41 (finding that financially distressed companies make
more accounting changes than healthy companies).
122. See Vaughan, supra note 116, at 1401 (noting that because of such factors as the drive
for economic success and organizations’ competition for scarce resources, we should recognize
that “unlawful business conduct is a natural accompaniment of modern life”).
123. See Nicholas Dopuch & Dan Simunic, Competition in Auditing: An Assessment, in
SYMPOSIUM ON AUDITING RESEARCH IV 403, 407 (Dep’t of Accountancy, Univ. of Ill. eds.,
1982) (“[A] rational top management could be motivated to conceal actions and their associated
outcomes which are not in the best interests of current and prospective investors.”).
124. See KELLOGG & KELLOGG, supra note 101, § 1.03, at 1-5 (“There have been, there are,
and there will be a substantial number of CEOs, CFOs, and CPAs whose moral standards are
low or nonexistent. Those individuals betray the shareholders, partners, lenders, and bondhold-
ers to whom they owe a duty of trust.”).
125. See Langevoort, supra note 72, at 54 (noting the “change in managerial thinking [that
comes if] managers sense a risk of being fired for inadequate performance”).
126. See Cox, supra note 11, at 1204 (“Indeed, there is a rich history of opportunistic and
artful use of accounting standards by managers to advance their interests at the expense of in-
vestors.”); Lawrence Revsine, The Selective Financial Misrepresentation Hypothesis, ACCT.
HORIZONS, Dec. 1991, at 16, 21–22 (citing several studies showing that corporate “managers
lobby [accounting] standard setting bodies to approve reporting methods that maximize manag-
ers’ welfare” and then use the resulting standards for that purpose). But see Dechow et al., supra
note 83, at 30 (finding no strong evidence of managers manipulating earnings to boost their bo-
nuses or to engage in insider trading in a study of companies in SEC disciplinary proceedings).
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then to use those accounting standards for their own best interests.127
Not surprisingly, Enron’s executives’ compensation was calculated by
a formula based on internal estimates that were inflated dramati-
cally.128 “[S]ome managers may shrug [reputational constraints] off if
the immediate gains are large enough and if they cannot be required
to disgorge their ill-gotten gains.”129
Although plaintiffs’ attorneys no doubt exaggerate insider trad-
ing as a motive for securities fraud, it is a real problem.130 Langevoort
127. See, e.g., Andrew A. Christie, Aggregation of Test Statistics: An Evaluation of the Evi-
dence on Contracting and Size Hypotheses, 12 J. ACCT. & ECON. 15, 33 (1990) (finding manage-
rial compensation to be one of the key variables explaining accounting procedural choice); Dan
S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the Choice of Accounting
Methods, 4 J. ACCT. & ECON. 41, 52 (1982) (predicting that “management controlled firms are
more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which result in increased
or early reported earnings”); Wilbur G. Lewellen et al., Self-serving Behavior in Managers’ Dis-
cretionary Information Disclosure Decisions, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 227, 228 (1996) (noting that
“managers’ accounting decisions appear often to reflect self-serving behavior, as evidenced by
systematic relationships between accounting choices and variables that proxy for management’s
self-interest,” and finding that self-serving behavior by managers is also present in discretionary
information disclosure decisions in that they choose underperforming peers when publicly
benchmarking their own performance); Schwartz, supra note 105, at 33, 43 (noting that “man-
agement may be motivated to make accounting changes because of the methods that are used to
evaluate and reward their performance,” and finding that “a considerable number of firms
[make accounting changes] to improve financial appearance”); see also Hill, supra note 108, at
154–55 (finding that although accounting firms apparently have a reputational motive to be
strict on such matters, they tend to lobby for lax accounting standards to please their clients);
Anthony G. Hopwood, An Empirical Study of the Role of Accounting Data in Performance
Evaluation, 10 J. ACCT. RES. 156, 166–72 (1972) (finding that managers evaluated on meeting a
short-term budget found the system unfair and tended to manipulate accounting reports).
Others point out that managers often have incentives to falsify reports as well, perhaps
to increase their own income which may be tied to reported client earnings. See David S. Ng &
Jan Stoeckenius, Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting, 17 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 2 (1979)
(“[M]ost remuneration contracts which are nonconstant have the potential for inducing false
reporting.”).
128. See Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58
(“[E]xecutives were compensated based on a market valuation formula that relied on internal
estimates.”).
129. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 138 (1985); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to
Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,
79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 393 (1981) (noting that “the executive vice president who is a candidate
for promotion to president may be willing to run risks which are counterproductive to the firm
as a whole because he is eager to make a record profit for his division or to hide a prior error of
judgment”); George Getschow, Overdriven Execs: Some Middle Managers Cut Corners to
Achieve High Corporate Goals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1 (studying a series of cases in
which middle managers sent falsified data to corporate headquarters, often to avoid being
branded as incompetent).
130. See, e.g., David J. Bershad et al., A Dissenting Introduction, in SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 5, 19 (Edward J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994):
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discusses this problem while assuming good intentions (but bounded
rationality) by corporate managers.131 But there will be other situa-
tions, such as the “final period” scenario, where it will be charitable to
assume good intentions.132 Furthermore, managers realize that corpo-
rate failures are not easily traceable to specific managers, so even
their intentional misdeeds may go undetected and/or unpunished.133
C. Intermediaries and Their Motives
If issuers and their managers do not always find it in their (per-
ceived) rational best interests to disclose optimally or to hew scrupu-
lously to the truth, then it may be a far stretch to claim that stockbro-
kers or stock exchanges can be counted on to provide optimal
investor protection. In Section C, I examine stockbrokers and stock
exchanges in some detail.
1. Stockbrokers. Rational actors would not incur sexual harass-
ment liability at the astounding rate that stock brokerage firms do.134
[E]xecutives whose compensation is tied to the stock price of their companies’ shares,
or who have options to exercise or shares to sell, have a subtle but powerful motive to
close their eyes to bad news percolating upward from the ranks, and postpone giving
it serious consideration, let alone disclosing it publicly, until the next quarter or the
next year.
Although plaintiffs’ attorneys may get carried away in attempting to meet recently heightened
pleading requirements—allegations of insider trading doubled following passage of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, see Vanessa O’Connell, Lawyers Scan Insider Sales to
Build Suits, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at C1 (“Lawyers who specialize in suing companies
whose stock prices drop increasingly are using insider sales to help build class-action securities-
fraud suits.”)—it is still exceedingly plausible, especially with small companies whose officers
have their entire net worth tied up in the company’s stock, that insider trading (selling) often
accompanies the issuing of overoptimistic projections or the hiding of bad financial news. In-
deed, studies show that short selling often begins to increase a couple of months before earnings
manipulation is disclosed. See Pritchard, supra note 5, at 930–37 (discussing insider trading and
other causes of corporate misstatements).
131. Langevoort, supra note 107, at 101.
132. The traditional economic assumption is that managers’ interests are aligned with those
of corporate owners, but this ceases to be the case in a “final period” scenario when managers
fear that they are about to lose their jobs and will not be able to secure comparable jobs in the
labor market. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 106, at 702–03 (noting that managers’ incentives
change when they’re about to lose their jobs); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin:
Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 292–94 (1991) (referring to studies
showing that managers become more risk averse as financial ruin draws near).
133. See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End:
The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694 (1999) (“[A] company’s stock
price is, at best, only a rough and noisy signal of corporate managerial performance.”).
134. The randy antics depicted in the movie Boiler Room and books such as License to Steal
apparently have more than a little basis in fact, judging from the outcome of litigation. See, e.g.,
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But without reexamining the issue of stock brokerage firm rationality,
consider whether it is always in the best interest of brokerage firms
and individual brokers to provide investors with optimal accurate in-
formation and suitable investments and whether the reputational ad-
vantage is likely sufficient to constrain their self-serving behavior.
As he did with issuers, Choi again assumes that the reputational
constraint will be sufficient to keep brokerage firms on the straight
and narrow, yet the discussion in Section B demonstrates that the re-
putational constraint is often insufficient to prompt managers and is-
suers to disclose optimal amounts of accurate information to inves-
tors. “[T]here are limits to reputation.”135 Even economists concede
Brokerage Agrees to Pay $330,000 to Settle Harassment Suit by EEOC, BNA CORP. COUNS.
DAILY, Aug. 31, 2000, at D10 (reporting that brokerage firm Josephthal & Co. will pay $330,000
to settle an EEOC suit based on “fairly egregious” sexual and other illicit harassment); Broker-
age Harassment Suit Settled, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at C6 (“Two Wall Street
brokerage houses Thursday settled a $10 million sexual harassment lawsuit that was filed over
antics so outrageous they prompted comparisons to ‘Animal House.’”); Kate Kelly, Floor Gov-
ernor at Big Board Claims Sex Bias at ING Barings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at C1 (noting an
addition to the “long list of sexual-harassment cases that have been brought on Wall Street in
recent years”); Elizabeth Sanger, 1998 Stars and Stumblers, NEWSDAY (New York, NY), Dec.
27, 1998, at F6:
First Asset Management Corp., the Garden City firm that used to be called Lew Lie-
berbaum & Co., shut down in August after agreeing to pay $1.75 million to settle fed-
eral charges of sexual harassment and racial discrimination. The U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission said the settlement was the second largest in history
involving sexual harassment.
John Schmeltzer, Millions Offered for Harassment: 1,850 Women Receive Salomon Smith
Barney Offer, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1999, at N1 (“Salomon Smith Barney offered millions of
dollars altogether Monday to settle sexual harassment claims that nearly 2,000 women filed
against the brokerage house.”). Sexual harassment—and just about every other form of wrong-
doing imaginable—also played a prominent role in the Prudential-Bache limited partnership
scandal. KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 200, 258–59 (1995) (describing the ne-
farious, prodigious, and prolific sexual and alcoholic escapades of Prudential employees); see
also Reed Abelson, A Survey of Wall St. Finds Women Disheartened, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001,
at C1 (describing a survey of Wall Street employees finding that one-third of women reported
working in a sexually hostile environment). Are these the results of actions by rational actors?
135. George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 288 (1998); see Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bar-
gaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 823 (1973) (“[I]f we had to rely on reputation alone,
the benefits of coordination would escape us in a myriad of situations . . . .”); Donald C.
Langevoort, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 94 (1998)
(“Reputation [of corporate managers] provides a check on the incentive to deceive, but hardly a
complete one.”); Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44
EMORY L.J. 587, 595 n.21 (1995) (“[E]ven in a competitive market, reputational concerns do not
completely deter the temptation of parties to evade their contractual responsibilities.”); Robert
E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 907 n.23 (1986)
(observing in the financing context that “the incentive to protect commercial reputation and
good will does not completely deter the debtor from misrepresenting his financial status”).
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that providers of both goods and services with high-quality reputa-
tions are constantly “tempted to provide a low-quality service at a
high-quality price and thus earn a large return.”136
I demonstrate elsewhere that the reputational constraint, as-
sumed by economists to be so critically important to audit firms, often
is insufficient to constrain their improper behavior.137 Professor Ted
Schneyer makes the same point regarding law firms,138 as does Profes-
sor G. Richard Shell regarding businesses in general.139 It is not diffi-
cult to construct a similar case regarding stockbrokers as well.
 Surely all securities firms would love to have a reputation for
impeccable service to clients. Why is it then that the securities busi-
ness is well known as an industry in which prominent firms such as
Bankers Trust had derivatives sales representatives who, in their own
words, liked to “lure [clients] into that calm and then just totally fuck
‘em,”140 where Morgan Stanley employees enjoyed “ripping [the cli-
ent’s] face off,”141 where Salomon Brothers employees became “minor
heroes” by “blowing up” their customers,142 where Dean Witter alleg-
edly sold $2 billion of high-risk bond funds by targeting elderly clients
and presenting the funds as safe and secure investments,143 where Re-
public New York Securities Corporation assisted a financial adviser in
136. Michael Firth, Auditor Reputation: The Impact of Critical Reports Issued by UK Gov-
ernment Inspectors, 21 RAND J. ECON. 374, 374 (1990); see also Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615,
616 (1981) (“[I]t is possible that economic agents with well-known brand names and reputations
for honoring contracts may find it wealth maximizing to break such potentially long-term ex-
change relationships and obtain a temporary increase in profit.”).
137. See Prentice, supra note 75, at 199–217 (discussing countervailing pressures to reputa-
tional capital and damage to auditor reputation).
138. See Ted Schneyer, Reputational Bonding, Ethics Rules, and Law Firm Structure: The
Economist as Story Teller, 84 VA. L. REV. 1777, 1779–87 (1998) (illustrating limits of law firm
reputational bonding).
139. See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Con-
tracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 266–70 (1991) (describing non-
legal mechanisms to deter opportunism).
140. FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET 33 (1997).
Unfortunately for Bankers Trust, this statement was made on tape, preserved for posterity.
141. Id. at 61.
142. MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE OF WALL
STREET 164–70 (1989) (recounting the tale of ripping off institutional investor “Herman the
German”).
143. Broker-Dealers: Dean Witter, Officials Face NASDR Charges over Sales of Risky Bond
Trust Investments, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Nov. 21, 2000; see also MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA,
MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET 4 (1996) (noting “a
seemingly unending stream of recent scandals” involving professional stock traders).
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bilking more than one hundred institutional investors out of $700
million even though the president of its futures division stated on tape
that “a doofus flipping a . . . coin every day” would have had more
success than the adviser (who lost $556 million while trading)?144
Although securities firms can be and sometimes are seriously
damaged by scandals involving their wrongdoing, the ability of the
reputational constraint to encourage firms and individual brokers to
act on behalf of their clients is often limited by several factors. First
and foremost, reputational constraint theory notwithstanding, the in-
terests of stockbrokers and their clients often are not well aligned.
Brokerage firms make money in the retail business through the com-
missions and mark-ups charged in each transaction.145 Individual bro-
kers’ compensation is largely commission-based and tends to be
larger if the securities are either house products or at the riskier end
of the spectrum.146 Other things being equal, it is in both the firm’s
and the individual broker’s best interests to have more trades rather
than fewer, and to sell riskier securities rather than safer ones, re-
gardless of whether these practices are in the client’s best interest.147
On Wall Street, where “bonuses are in the millions of dollars, there
144. Mitchell Pacelle, Republic New York Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Agrees to Pay Restitution,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2001, at C10.
145. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behav-
ioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 648–49
(1996).
146. Id. at 649 & n.71; see also NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATIONS § 1.2, at 21 (1995) (discussing the inherent conflict of interest arising from bro-
kers being compensated by volume-based commissions).
147. See ANONYMOUS & TIMOTHY HARPER, LICENSE TO STEAL: THE SECRET WORLD OF
WALL STREET AND THE SYSTEMATIC PLUNDERING OF THE AMERICAN INVESTOR 19 (1999)
(“Like most brokers, I always wanted to make money for my clients. But, like any other broker,
I was more likely to make recommendations from the handful of stocks that I followed—all
stocks that gave me higher commissions.”); LEWIS, supra note 142, at 180 (noting that brokers
pushed products known as priorities “either because selling them would make us [Salomon
Brothers] rich or because not selling them would make us poor”); MARTIN MAYER, STEALING
THE MARKET: HOW THE GIANT BROKERAGE FIRMS, WITH HELP FROM THE SEC, STOLE THE
STOCK MARKET FROM INVESTORS 34–35 (1992) (giving examples of incentives given to brokers
to push “house products”); Leah N. Spiro & Michael Schroeder, Can You Trust Your Broker?,
BUS. WK., Feb. 20, 1995, at 70, 70 (“[I]ngrained commission compensation policies, which are at
the very core of the way Wall Street does business, still tend to encourage brokers who work
almost entirely for commissions, to put their own interests ahead of their customers’ [inter-
ests].”).
The 1990s Prudential limited partnership interest scandal poses a classic example of this
type of misdeed. See generally EICHENWALD, supra note 134 (relating the seamy, seductive, and
scandalous side of Prudential).
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are strong rational reasons to push the limits of normative behav-
ior.”148
Second, even when brokers pursue their own interests at their
clients’ expense, their reputations may not suffer. For much of the
1990s, the stock market rose so dramatically that it was difficult for
even dishonest and incompetent brokers to lose money for their cli-
ents. Clients who are making money often do not notice that they
could have made a lot more had their brokers made better deci-
sions.149 Additionally, due to cognitive dissonance150 and other factors,
investors often will remember having made more money than they
truly did.151 Even if they do notice that they did relatively poorly at
their brokers’ hands, many investors will not complain for reasons
explained by regret theory.152
148. ABOLAFIA, supra note 143, at 187.
149. If an investor’s fixed reference point is the pre-investment position, a modest profit
may seem just fine even if a greater profit was easily possible. This is so because people tend to
evaluate gains and losses in terms of fixed reference points. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Stat-
man, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash Dividends, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE, supra note 66, at 393, 408. Shefrin and Statman reference Kahneman and Tversky’s
work showing that decisionmaking is often strongly affected by how choices are framed. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 32 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (“Our
perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the
evaluation of absolute magnitudes.”).
150. Cognitive dissonance is the tendency of people who have made decisions to process
information that supports their decisions and to ignore information calling their decisions into
question. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–33 (1957) (ex-
plaining cognitive dissonance generally); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 22–30 (1993) (same).
151. SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 130 (finding that mutual fund owners remembered that their
funds had performed much better than was truly the case).
152. “Regret” combines loss and a feeling of responsibility for loss. Shefrin illustrates by
noting that if a person drives her normal route to work and ends up in an accident, she will feel
bad. But if she deviated from her normal route to try a short cut and ended up in an accident,
she will feel worse, thinking “If only I had done what I always do!” Id. at 30–31.
This phenomenon plays a major role in financial decisions. Consider an institutional in-
vestor, such as the ABC Fund. Sam is in charge of investments for ABC. Sam can put ABC’s
money into mutual funds and probably do quite well, although if the funds struggle Sam will
obviously feel that he is to blame. Therefore, Sam, like most other people in his position, will
hire a money manager to make these decisions for him even though the studies show that
money managers in general do not improve performance. As Shefrin points out:
The treasurer’s office directs pension assets by transferring the responsibility for
investment decisions to money managers. If things go well, employees can pride
themselves on having selected top performers. However, if things do not go well, they
can mitigate the criticism directed at them by blaming the money managers. People
look for ways to minimize their exposure to regret.
Id. at 222.
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Third, even if investors do notice and complain about their bro-
kers’ poor decisions, any firm’s ability to trade on its reputation de-
pends more on appearance than fact.153 “To be an effective deterrent
. . . information regarding a party’s untrustworthiness must be trans-
mitted efficiently throughout the market.”154 Therefore, it is often in a
firm’s interest not to find out which of its employees are crooks, not
to disclose their existence to the outside world if they do find them,
and even if they find and catch them not to fire them because they
then become adverse witnesses against the company, helping inves-
tors who might want to sue the company. In the Prudential-Bache
scandal of the early 1990s, it was clear that Prudential-Bache often re-
fused to fire its crooked employees because it needed them as
friendly witnesses in litigation already filed or about to be filed by the
very customers they had ripped off.155
Firms often can keep their defalcations and other errors quiet,156
especially because most disputes are handled through low-profile ar-
bitration rather than more newsworthy litigation.157 Due to the avail-
ability heuristic,158 investors bombarded with advertisements about
153. See Randolph A. Shockley, Perceptions of Auditors’ Independence: An Empirical
Analysis, 56 ACCT. REV. 785, 785 (1981) (stating that an auditor’s “credibility depends ulti-
mately on the perception rather than on the fact of independence”).
154. Shell, supra note 139, at 269–70.
155. EICHENWALD, supra note 134, at 227.
156. See PARTNOY, supra note 140, at 51 (noting that “[i]n the early 1990s a few DPG [De-
rivative Products Group] clients lost significant amounts of money on derivatives, but Morgan
Stanley had kept those losses quiet—and even those clients who lost money kept coming back
for more”).
157. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securi-
ties Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (1993) (“Today, arbitration has largely, but by
no means entirely, replaced litigation as the method of resolving disputes between customers
and their brokers.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavior Economics of Inducing
Agents’ Compliance with Legal Rules 25 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“In the securities area, for example, there has been a sustained effort by
the industry to move customer complaints out of public litigation forums into private arbitra-
tion. This makes threatening information less available.”).
The arbitration provisions also will likely contain confidentiality provisions that, under
Choi’s plan, will presumably be enforceable since they were “freely” negotiated. See Cariveau v.
Halferty, No. A087296, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2000) (invalidating a provision pro-
hibiting customers from discussing a broker’s wrongdoing with regulators).
158. When affected by the availability bias, people estimate frequencies or probabilities by
the ease with which they can remember examples or associations. Thus, people tend to think
that more people die of homicides than strokes (when the ratio is 11-1 the other way) because
they read about homicides in the paper and see them on the television frequently and can there-
fore call them to mind. See generally Timure Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades
and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 707 (1999) (“While underestimating dangers that
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the reliability of a brokerage firm are likely to believe them despite
numerous problems with the company’s true actions.159 Thus, in the
mid-1990s Dean Witter successfully marketed its reputation with the
“we measure success one investor at a time” advertising slogan, while
seventy-five percent of the mutual funds its brokers sold were Dean
Witter products, the highest percentage in the industry.160 Dean Wit-
ter brokers were not pushing those products because they were in the
customers’ best interests—Dean Witter’s funds placed ninth out of
the ten largest independent and brokerage-fund families rated by
Morningstar Mutual Funds.161 Rather, the brokers were motivated by
the fact that the highest profit margins for Dean Witter arose from its
own products and by the firm’s special contests for its brokers, who
could win prizes by selling particular Dean Witter products.162 As with
most other behavioral foibles, the availability heuristic affects profes-
sional investors as well as amateurs,163 perhaps even more.164
are not highly publicized (heart disease, strokes, asthma), [people] grossly overestimate risks to
which the media pay a great deal of attention (accidents, electrocution).”); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 178 (Daniel Kahnemen et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] (noting that “availability provides a
mechanism by which occurrences of extreme utility (or disutility) may appear more likely than
they actually are”).
159. See HOWARD KURTZ, THE FORTUNE TELLERS 35 (2000) (explaining the “Squawk ef-
fect”—the tendency of traders to buy the stock of whatever company was featured on the
CNBC show “Squawk Box”); Jonathan Clements, How Stock Investors Take It Personally,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2000, at C1 (quoting Professor Meir Statman as noting that many inves-
tors buy stocks just because the stocks are in the news and have caught their attention); Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Ma-
nipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 731 (1999) (“[T]he availability heuristic can be easily tapped
into by simply maximizing the frequency and intensity of advertisements.”).
As Salomon Brothers president Tom Strauss once noted, “Customers have very short
memories.” LEWIS, supra note 142, at 167 (noting that the guiding principle of customer rela-
tions at Salomon seemed to be “Screw ‘em, they’ll eventually forget about it!”).
160. Spiro & Schroeder, supra note 147, at 74.
161. See id. (“The average Morningstar rating for a Dean Witter fund is 2.72 stars out of 5
stars, placing it ninth out of the 10 largest independent and brokerage-fund families.”).
162. See id. (detailing how one broker won a trip to California by selling $1 million of a
Dean Witter fund).
163. See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact?, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 52, 53–57 (1990) (finding that securities analysts’ forecasts are affected by the
availability heuristic); Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neu-
trality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 820 (2000) (noting that derivatives industry participants are likely
not immune to the availability heuristic).
164. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 502 (2002) (“[E]xperts may be more susceptible to the
availability heuristic than are laypeople.”).
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Fourth, even if customer mistreatment does receive some media
attention, firms can (and do) blame the wrongdoing on a “rogue”
employee and thereby limit reputational damage to the firm.165 This
scapegoating involves the firm portraying itself as the real victim of
the fraud.166
Fifth, even if the “rogue” broker defense does not fly in the court
of public opinion, a securities firm always can point to its competitors’
misdeeds and functionally tell its clients “Hey, you’re not going to do
any better with them.” After all, most prominent securities firms have
had their own major scandal.167
Finally, for the reputational constraint to work, individual stock-
brokers must have a long-term focus. For even established firms,
long-term focus often remains more of an aspiration than a reality in
an atmosphere in which so many of their employees are evaluated on
the basis of short-run results.168 Because seventy-five percent of all
165. Prudential-Bache tried to use the “rogue broker” defense even in a scandal in which it
ultimately became clear that treachery toward its clients had been widespread within the firm.
See KATHLEEN SHARP, IN GOOD FAITH 217 (1995) (noting that the new CEO blamed “the
firm’s past problems on ‘rogue bankers’ rather than rogue chiefs”). Kidder Peabody labeled
trader Joseph Jett a “rogue” soon after naming him “Man of the Year.” James Denn, Conquest,
Controversy on Wall Street, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), May 30, 1999, at B1.
This “rogue employee” defense often has been used by other types of professional
firms to limit reputational damage. See, e.g., Dan Atkinson, Accountants Pay $2.5m Settlement,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 15, 1999, at 23 (noting that PricewaterhouseCoopers had blamed
various independence violations on a small group of “rogue” employees even though a later
study found thousands of violations, including by most partners on the firm’s governing commit-
tee); Christopher Lee, Flurry of Enron Hearings to Begin, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 24,
2002, at 1D (noting that accounting firm Arthur Andersen sought to blame the shredding of
documents episode in the Enron scandal on “rogue employees”).
166. Langevoort, supra note 157, at 26.
167. Several of these scandals have merited book-length investigations. As noted earlier,
Michael Lewis’s famous Liar’s Poker detailed wrongdoing at Salomon Brothers, see supra note
142 and accompanying text, Kathleen Sharp’s In Good Faith skewered Prudential-Bache, see
supra note 165, and Frank Partnoy’s F.I.A.S.C.O. hammered Morgan Stanley, see supra notes
140–41 and accompanying text, and struck First Boston a glancing blow. Most recently, Kidder
Peabody suffered through the Joseph Jett scandal. See, e.g., G.E. Stockholder Lawsuit Settled for
$19 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at C3 (“Government regulators have called Jett’s fraud
one of the largest in the history of the securities industry.”). Merrill Lynch got embarrassed in
the Sumitomo copper debacle. See, e.g., Martin Waller, Copped It, TIMES (London), May 25,
2000, at 31 (noting that Merrill Lynch paid $275 million to settle the case).
168. As two experts note:
Sales managers rarely remain with any branch longer than two years and are both
paid and promoted based on the short-term results of those two years. They have lit-
tle or no incentive to emphasize the development of asset-gathering and long-term
relationships over short-term sales. As a result, they tend to hire, praise, and hold up
as models those brokers who produce large amounts of commission by selling even
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new brokers leave the industry within the first three years,169 it is
nearly impossible for most brokers to take a long-term view consis-
tent with the theory of reputational constraint.
In sum, the ambiguous nature of reputational feedback means
that securities industry professionals’ bad acts often do not translate
directly into reputational damage.170 Even if they do, “[r]eputational
sanctions also have limited effect on especially venal parties,”171 and
there is never a shortage of them in the securities industry. Unsur-
prisingly, empirical evidence indicates that the reputational constraint
affects brokers, but weakly.172 There are so many different ways that
bond traders, for example, can exploit their informational advantage
to the detriment of their customers that only close monitoring of the
trading process can prevent exploitation and “even the institutional
investor is not in a position to design or enforce” such monitoring.173
2. Securities Exchanges. Professors Choi, Mahoney, Pritchard,
and others propose a significant expansion of the role that stock ex-
changes play in the securities regulation scheme. When considering
larger amounts of product. Unfortunately, selling is viewed as transactional, while the
long-term benefits to the firm of consultative selling are played down.
STEVEN R. DROZDECK & KARL F. GRETZ, THE BROKER’S EDGE: HOW TO SELL SECURITIES
IN ANY MARKET 27 (1995).
169. Id. at 29.
170. See Amar Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest if Honesty Doesn’t Pay?,
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1990, at 121, 121 (“There is no compelling economic reason to tell
the truth or keep one’s word—punishment for the treacherous in the real world is neither swift
nor sure.”).
171. Shell, supra note 139, at 269.
172. Thus, one prominent study shows evidence of a reputational constraint, but also evi-
dence that the constraint is hardly a strong one. Carleton, Chen, and Steiner studied thousands
of stock recommendations made by national brokerage firms, regional brokerage firms, and
non-brokerage firms. See Willard T. Carleton et al., Optimism Biases Among Brokerage and
Non-Brokerage Firms’ Equity Recommendations: Agency Costs in the Investment Industry, FIN.
MGMT., Spring 1998, at 17, 19–20 (exploring the influence of reputation on brokerage and non-
brokerage environments). The brokerage firms have an incentive to give more positive recom-
mendations than non-brokerage firms because they want to stay on goods terms with the issuers
whose business they would like to cultivate. And, indeed, the study’s findings were that broker-
age firms’ recommendations were more optimistic than those of non-brokerage firms. Id. at 19.
On the other hand, they found that “regional brokerage firms, which have less reputational
capital to protect, tend to inflate their recommendations as compared to national brokerage
firms.” Id. at 19–20. Thus, the non-brokerage firms that had less self-interest at stake had more
accurate recommendations than the brokerage firms. Id. at 20. But among the brokerage firms,
the national firms with more reputational capital to protect proffered more accurate recom-
mendations than the regional firms. Id.
173. ABOLAFIA, supra note 143, at 33.
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turning much of the responsibility for producing an honest and effi-
cient securities market over to exchanges, a few points are worth con-
sideration. First, the same misalignment of interests that exists be-
tween brokers and their customers also exists between exchanges and
the investing public.174 For example, a former NYSE broker sued the
exchange, alleging that exchange officials knew about illegal trading
by its floor brokers and did nothing to stop it because the illegal
trading generated both trading volume and profits.175 A subsequent
investigation discovered concerted efforts to hide the practices from
the SEC.176
Second, company managers will have effective control over
where a company’s stock is listed, and they are not necessarily moti-
vated to list with the exchange that best protects investor interests.
There is substantial evidence that managers make self-serving deci-
sions in choosing where their firms should incorporate, and, as Pro-
fessor Marcel Kahan has pointed out, “incentives for managers to en-
gage in opportunistic relistings [on exchanges] for personal benefit
are, if anything, higher than incentives to engage in opportunistic re-
incorporations or charter amendments.”177
Third, investor regulation in this area and others can provide its
envisioned benefits only if there develops substantial competition so
that exchanges and other intermediaries will engage in a “race to the
top” to provide desirable investor protections. Because the same in-
creased trading that hurts investors will profit exchanges and other in-
termediaries, what may well develop is a “race to the bottom” in-
stead.178 After all, exchanges “exist to maximize the profits of their
174. See JOHN S. GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A
WORLD POWER, 1653–2000, at 213 (1999) (“It is a law of human nature that, absent outside
pressure, organizations tend to evolve in ways that favor their elites. . . . [F]ew better examples
of this phenomenon exist than the New York Stock Exchange in the 1920s.”).
175. NYSE Ex-Broker Sues Big Board over Issue of Illegal Floor Trades, WALL ST. J., June
27, 2000, at C8. The NYSE eventually won dismissal of the suits on grounds that it enjoyed ab-
solute immunity in performance of its self-regulatory function. D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
258 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
176. Greg Ip, New Issues Arise in NYSE Trading Controversy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2001, at
C1.
177. Kahan, supra note 10, at 1511–12.
178. One scholar has pointed out that in the area of consumer products, competitive pres-
sures did not lead automobile makers to compete to see which could win customers with the
most pro-consumer contract; instead, competitive pressures acted “to compel every producer to
make its contracts at least as unfair as the contracts of the other members of its industry.”
W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH–CENTURY REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW 35 (1996).
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members.”179 As indicated, this factor is exacerbated by the ex-
changes’ “incentive to compete for the favors of managers or control-
ling shareholders and to relax listing conditions that constrain
them.”180
Another possibility is that there will be no race at all. Before
federal securities regulation began, the New York Stock Exchange
was pretty much the only game in town.181 It was often rife with
fraud.182 Even after the creation of the SEC, the NYSE strove to re-
gain a monopoly position.183 With the rise of electronic competition, it
certainly seems that it would be more difficult for the NYSE to regain
a monopoly position.184 Still, the NYSE has the characteristics of a
natural monopoly,185 and Kahan points out that “presently, there is lit-
tle international or intranational competition among stock ex-
changes . . . . [W]e cannot be confident that the market for stock list-
ings that will evolve will be one characterized by vigorous
competition rather than a near monopoly or oligopoly.”186
179. Pritchard, supra note 5, at 1020.
180. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., THE RISE OF DISPERSED OWNERSHIP: THE ROLE OF LAW IN
THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 81 (Univ. of Chi. Ctr. for Research in Sec.
Prices, Working Paper No. 182, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
181. See MARSHALL E. BLUME ET AL., REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 21–34 (1993) (detailing the rise of the NYSE
as a monopoly).
182. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 254 (1970) (noting that
during the 1920s, there “was a marked decline in [investment] banking judgment and ethics and
unscrupulous exploitation of public gullibility and avarice”); GORDON, supra note 174, at 215
(“[In light of pools, wash sales, bear raids, and the like, the NYSE] was, at least for the quick-
witted and financially courageous, a license to steal. Whom they were stealing from in general,
of course, was the investing public at large.”).
183. See SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 498 (quoting economist Paul Samuelson as criticizing
an NYSE proposal as a mere attempt “to re-establish the eroding monopoly power of the New
York Stock Exchange and to subject that power primarily to regulation by the monopolist”).
184. See, e.g., Paula Dwyer & Mike McNamee, Why the Bourses Are Spooked, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 15, 1999, at 46, 46 (discussing the inroads that electronic-communications networks
(ECNs) were making on the NYSE and NASDAQ).
185. See Hans R. Stoll, The Causes and Consequences of the Rise in Third Market and Re-
gional Trading, 19 J. CORP. L. 509, 514 (1994) (arguing that the NYSE “has many of the charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly,” such as an average cost of production that continues to de-
crease with increased production).
186. Kahan, supra note 10, at 1515; see also Cox, supra note 11, at 1232 (“We may question
[in looking at international regulatory competition] whether there are indeed a sufficient num-
ber of regulatory jurisdictions for competition.”); Pritchard, supra note 5, at 963 n.156 (“With
the merger of the AMEX and NASDAQ, there are effectively now only two competitors among
the national exchanges . . . .”).
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Mahoney sings the praises of the NYSE, pointing to its listing re-
quirements and its gradual increase in the disclosures it required of its
listed companies in the years preceding 1933.187 No doubt these were
important developments in the history of corporate financial report-
ing. However, at least three points are clear. First, the pre-1933 dis-
closure practices were egregiously bad and although the NYSE’s re-
quirements for its listed companies clearly improved earlier practices,
the NYSE did not go nearly far enough. For example, Fox points out
that opponents of mandatory disclosure assume that the stock ex-
changes required that listed companies send certified financial state-
ments to stockholders before annual meetings, but “[i]n fact, there
were no such rules.”188 In the late 1920s, Professor Laurence Sloan did
an exhaustive study of the financial disclosures of all the major corpo-
rations in the United States,189 finding that industrial financial reports
were “woefully inadequate,” lacked uniformity, and lacked meaning-
ful explanation.190 Indeed, he concluded that “[i]n several important
respects, no criticism of the abuses that exist can be too harsh.”191
Second, the disclosure requirements that the NYSE did impose
were often enforced indifferently.192 For example, one of the most in-
187. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 1466 (noting that the NYSE developed requirements for
an independent auditor and a quarterly reporting system).
188. Fox, supra note 11, at 1376. Fox points out also that:
Kaplan and Reaugh conducted a survey of the 1930 annual reports of a representative
sample of the nation’s 500 or 600 largest publicly traded industrial corporations.
While most firms (though not all) provided some kind of income statement, almost
one-third did not reveal how much depreciation, if any, was deducted to arrive at
their earnings figures. Without information about depreciation, earnings numbers are
virtually meaningless.
Id. at 1378 (citations omitted). Furthermore, thirty-eight percent of NYSE-listed firms did not
even disclose sales prior to the 1934 Act. Benston, supra note 95, at 142; see also WILLIAM Z.
RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 155 (1926) (noting that corporate financial state-
ments “have more or less conformed to the instructions . . . ‘to be clear and cryptic’”).
189. LAURENCE H. SLOAN, CORPORATION PROFITS: A STUDY OF THEIR SIZE,
VARIATION, USE, AND DISTRIBUTION IN A PERIOD OF PROSPERITY 1–2 (1929).
190. Id. at 333–37.
191. Id. at 334.
192. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 47 (“Nor did the New York Stock Exchange scrupulously
enforce its listing requirements.”).
During the late 1800s, of course, the situation was even worse given the power of the
robber barons. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES,
TIMES AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 215–16 (7th rev. ed. 1999) (“Gulling
and milking the investor were taken as a matter of course, and the stock market was regarded as
a kind of private casino for the rich in which the public laid the bets and the financial titans fixed
the croupier’s wheel.”). Things had not improved markedly by the time of the Great Crash. See
GORDON, supra note 174, at 213 (noting that in the 1920s, as in the 1820s, the NYSE “was a pri-
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famous scandals of the time—the Ivar (the “Match King”) Kreuger
scandal that began before and ended after the great crash of 1929—
was made possible by Kreuger’s total secrecy.193 When auditors ques-
tioned him, he simply refused to answer any of the questions or pro-
vide any of the information that would have disclosed his Ponzi
scheme.194 “Krueger, Samuel Insull, the utility wizard and other pro-
moters had no fear that independent auditors would be called in.”195
When the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) attempted to
devise a plan for auditing all corporations, “[t]he reaction of the
[NYSE] was disinterest.”196
Third, and most important, the inadequately designed and imper-
fectly enforced disclosure requirements that were imposed by the Ex-
change before 1933 were motivated largely by the NYSE’s desire to
forestall passage of more stringent state and federal legislation. The
few improvements the NYSE made before the 1933 Act were the re-
sult of numerous investigations and threats of federal legislation. The
first may have been the congressionally created Industrial Commis-
sion’s final report in 1902 that called for required publication of a
properly audited annual report by larger corporations.197 Then came
the Hughes Committee investigation (1909), the “Money Trust” in-
vestigation (1913), and the hearings on Proposed Bill S. 3895 (1914),
all contemplating increased federal regulation and all encouraging
self-regulation.198 Potential state regulation in New York also
vate club, operating for the benefit of its members, the seat holders, and not the investing pub-
lic”); CHRIS WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 13 (1975) (“When Exchange members ex-
ploited their position to conduct blatant stock manipulations and swindles, other members
cheered them on. Even officials of the NYSE regarded such activities as one of the inalienable
privileges of Exchange membership and simply looked the other way.”).
193. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH, 1929, at 82–83 (5th ed.
1979) (detailing an interview in which Kreuger said his success was attributable to “silence,”
“more silence,” and “still more silence,” and noting that “his aversion to divulging information,
especially if accurate . . . kept even his most intimate acquaintances in ignorance of the greatest
fraud in history”).
194. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 94, at 234–35.
195. Id. at 235.
196. Id.
197. Anita Dennis, Taking Account: Key Dates for the Profession, J. ACCT., Oct. 2000, at 97,
99.
198. J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 463 (rev. ed. 1930). The
NYSE did make some improvements as a result of the Hughes Committee investigation, for ex-
ample. ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK MARKET 198
(1965).
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prompted disclosure reforms.199 During this time, “demand for reform
and government supervision of the securities industry was inces-
sant.”200 Other NYSE reforms often have been motivated by an at-
tempt to buy off regulation.201 Absent the government pressure that
Choi’s plan removes, it is unclear that the NYSE would make any
significant steps toward requiring mandatory disclosure.
The fundamental misalignment of interests often has caused the
NYSE to be slow to take action against fraudsters202 and to make
199. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 94, at 250 (“The New York Stock Exchange, faced
with demands by New York State legislators for reform in the Progressive Era, had imposed
reporting requirements on companies listed after 1913.”).
Even in its early history, the Stock Exchange in New York kept one eye on government
regulators:
Most of the time, the [Stock and Exchange] Board could regulate so as to advance the
interests of its own members, without explicit regard for . . . anti-market thought . . . .
But the Board’s long-term self-interest required it to act strategically on occasion.
Too much speculation or too much price manipulation in the short run might cause
government to step in and impose broad limits on trading, as it periodically threatened
to do, and might result in losses in the long run. The Board had to keep one eye on
public opinion.
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 279 (1998) (emphasis added).
200. CAROSSO, supra note 182, at 155.
201. See SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 12 (observing that the 1932 amendments requiring
brokers to secure written permission from clients before lending their shares to short-sellers
were passed to “thwart congressional action”); id. at 75 (noting that in 1933 the NYSE opposed
all New Deal stock exchange reforms, but agreed to take “modest” actions to avoid legislation);
id. at 119 (describing how in 1935 the NYSE “voluntarily” adopted several SEC recommenda-
tions in the face of legislative proposals to make those changes and more); id. at 163 (noting that
the mid-1930s reorganization of the NYSE was undertaken when the NYSE’s “President Gay
and much of the Old Guard realized how much more financially expensive SEC-imposed trad-
ing rules and a public feud with the Commission would be than reorganization”); see also ALEC
BENN, THE UNSEEN WALL STREET OF 1969–1975: AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TODAY xi
(2000) (noting that during the 1969–1975 period “the opposition [ in the NYSE] to nearly every
reform that would benefit investors was formidable”); CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A
HISTORY 249 (1997) (noting that important NYSE reforms in the 1930s stemmed from
“[p]racticality and the implied threat of [government] intervention”); GORDON, supra note 174,
at 238–39 (noting that it was government pressure that prompted the NYSE to make reforms in
1934); ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1935–
1975, at 373 (1975) (noting that twentieth-century NYSE reforms have come “at times because
of internal pressures but more often as a result of demands from the outside, from Washington
and its rivals”).
202. See SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 11 (noting the NYSE’s reluctance to answer Herbert
Hoover’s call for action against pool operators and bear raiders in 1932); COFFEE, supra note
180, at 80 (arguing that “the NYSE seldom, if ever, enforced its own disciplinary rules” in the
context of market manipulation before creation of the SEC); John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson
MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1034–35 (1934)
(noting that the Hughes Commission in 1907 had “chided the New York Stock Exchange for its
spirit of conservative camaraderie that made members lax in punishing culpable fellow-
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other necessary reforms.203 Indeed, even Pritchard, who advocates a
much greater role for the exchanges, admits that they traditionally
have not done much to stop fraud.204 Nor have they been active in
stopping manipulation, as those sharing Choi’s point of view have
long theorized that they would. As Professor Oliver Williamson
points out, “[r]eputational effect mechanisms are no exception to the
general proposition that all theories of economic organization must
eventually be confronted by the realities.”205 And the reality is, as Pro-
fessor Stephen Pirrong demonstrates in some detail, “[a]n examina-
tion of the history of self-regulation at 10 exchanges [including the
NYSE] prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows
that they took few, if any, measures to curb manipulation.”206
Indeed, exchanges have structural incentives to refrain from in-
vestigating or discovering wrongdoing by their listed companies, for
to do so creates adverse publicity that harms the exchange’s reputa-
tion and hurts its profits.207 As Coffee notes,
Exchanges do not have ideal incentives, however, for the task of en-
forcement. Because they profit on trading volume, and they com-
pete to list companies, they will not wish to delist an actively traded
members, with the result that punishment, though swift, was only meted out after the horse,
figuratively speaking, had been stolen”).
203. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 359 (quoting former SEC chairman Manuel Cohen as
stating that Wall Street “rarely moves toward reform unless it is pushed”). Even those who
strongly support exchanges admit that the NYSE’s actions regarding the nonvoting common
stock issue indicate that it will forfeit the interests of shareholders at the altar of self-interest.
Pritchard, supra note 5, at 1013–14. The NYSE was unwilling to enforce its pro-shareholder rule
against the issuance of such stocks when it faced the possibility of losing listings to rivals that did
not have such a rule; it was a classic “race to the bottom” situation. See Jonathan Macey & Hi-
deki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New
York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1039 (1990) (discussing the
NYSE’s abandonment of the rule).
204. Pritchard, supra note 5, at 981–82 (offering some rather lame excuses for why after a
couple of hundred years the NYSE still has never responded vigorously to fraudulent activity).
205. Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159, 169 (1991).
206. Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of
Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1995). Pirrong also points out that the regula-
tion of manipulation that did occur was “primarily due to the threat of further government in-
tervention.” Id. at 143 (referring to the commodities markets); see id. at 174–75 (discussing the
Chicago Board of Trade’s reluctance to implement rules proscribing manipulation); see also
Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions:
The Successes and Failures of Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 254–55 (1995)
(finding that exchanges do not always adopt the most efficient rules and that government inter-
vention can sometimes improve the situation).
207. Kahan, supra note 10, at 1518.
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company, even when it misbehaves badly. Similarly, their incentives
to take enforcement action against powerful broker-dealers may
also be suboptimal.208
Recent examples include the NYSE’s failure to police widespread il-
legal trading by floor brokers209 and the NASD’s failure to control
widespread market-maker collusion and price fixing.210
It is certainly arguable that a large part of the reason that the
NYSE’s enforcement record has been reasonably good is that it has
been backed by SEC enforcement attorneys.211 When he was chair-
man of the SEC, William O. Douglas recognized regarding both the
NYSE and NASD that “without an SEC ‘shotgun in the closet,’ there
was little incentive for an industry self-regulatory organization to per-
form the unpleasant task of disciplinarian.”212 To eliminate the SEC’s
role as a backup enforcer could eviscerate the NYSE’s desire and
ability to do an adequate job. Professor Bernard Black observes:
In the United States, for example, investment bankers must belong
to either the New York Stock Exchange or the National Association
of Securities Dealers. A member evicted by one is unlikely to be ac-
208. Coffee, supra note 16, at 32; see also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Pre-
conditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001) (“The . . . backbones
[of intermediaries such as accounting firms, investment banks, and law firms] are stiffened by
liability to investors if they endorse faulty disclosure, and by possible government civil or crimi-
nal prosecution if they do so intentionally.”); COFFEE, supra note 95, at 49 (noting that an “en-
forcement shortfall” is “inherent in a self-regulatory system” because “(1) A private body has
weak incentives to enforce rules against its own members and clients; (2) Enforcement is too
costly for a private body to undertake on a thorough-going basis; and (3) Private bodies neces-
sarily lack the investigative tools and punitive sanctions that the state has at its disposal.”).
Furthermore, as Pritchard points out, “the threat of SEC enforcement against fraud-
sters adds credibility to the exchanges’ promises of antifraud efforts because the exchanges’
reputations as antifraud enforcers will be diminished if the SEC uncovers frauds that the ex-
changes missed or ignored.” Pritchard, supra note 5, at 981. Investor regulation will probably
eliminate this current incentive for the exchanges to enforce good behavior.
209. See Gary Weiss, Can the Big Board Police Itself?, BUS. WK., Nov. 8, 1999, at 154, 154
(“In June, the NYSE settled SEC charges that it had systematically failed to curb or detect ille-
gal trading by many of its 500 floor brokers.”).
210. Brokerages, Investors Settle $1 Billion Suit, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 10, 1998, at
C1 (reporting a “$1.03 billion class-action settlement between 37 brokerages and investors who
alleged they were cheated by the firms in a price-fixing conspiracy involving Nasdaq-listed
stocks”); see also ABOLAFIA, supra note 143, at 35 (noting that self-regulation “has little impact
on the day-to-day actions of [bond] traders whose opportunism is aimed at other traders and at
large financial institutions such as insurance companies and mutual funds”).
211. See SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 179 (contrasting the NYSE with the American Stock
Exchange, which reform efforts had largely ignored).
212. Id. at 189.
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cepted by the other. Thus, a mandatory SRO [(self-regulatory or-
ganization)] can put a misbehaving member out of business, not
merely deprive it of the reputational enhancement from voluntary
membership.213
Choi’s confidence in exchanges is excessive in the first instance;214
his proposal then weakens exchanges and their ability to enforce best
practices by eliminating this mandatory feature.215
III.  INVESTOR SELF-PROTECTION
A. Dealing with Issuers
Because investor regulation is potentially such a radical change
from the status quo and because Choi’s article admittedly “does not
provide all the details of a fully functional regulatory system,”216 it is
difficult to envision how investor regulation will work when imple-
213. Black, supra note 208, at 788.
214. In an earlier article, Choi cited kosher foods as an example of a purely private certifica-
tion market that could work successfully as he envisions the exchanges working under his plan
of investor regulation. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
916, 920 n.18 (1998) (noting that courts have held that state regulation of Kosher foods is uncon-
stitutional). However, there is evidence that this market has traditionally been flawed, see gen-
erally Harold Philip Gastwirt, Fraud, Corruption and Holiness: Kashrut Supervision in New
York City, 1881–1940, at 349–50 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)
(on file with the Columbia University Library) (summarizing the failure of New York organiza-
tions to effectively supervise kashrut, the ritual lawfulness of food), and remains so today. For
instance, there was a scandal in Washington, D.C., where it appears that the Rabbinical Council
of Greater Washington, the certifying agent for kosher foods in the area, whitewashed a major
violation by a kosher restaurant to suppress a scandal in the Jewish community. See generally
Judith Colp, Koshergate; the Strange Case of the Moshe Dragon Restaurant, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1990, at E1 (presenting the facts of the scandal); Alicia Mundy, The Case of the Smoking
Duck; Moshe Dragon Chinese Kosher Restaurant Investigation, REGARDIE’S MAG., Apr. 1990,
at 86, 86 (same).
Perhaps these flaws with the private certification market account for why it has been
widely supplemented by false advertising legislation enforced by governmental bodies. See
Gastwirt, supra, at 3 (“The degree of fraud and scandal in the kosher food industry has been
great enough to prompt . . . legislation in an attempt to protect the consumer.”). Authorities
have supplemented the private certification agencies by punishing false claims of compliance
with kosher requirements via either general deceptive trade practices provisions or statutes spe-
cifically addressing misrepresentation about kosher food. For example, Maryland has a law
subjecting violators to a year’s imprisonment, a fine of $500, or both. Colp, supra, at E1.
215. Seligman points out that one of the reasons the NYSE’s disclosure requirements in the
1920s had so little impact was that “[b]eing purely voluntary standards, they could be avoided by
any corporation that chose to register as an ‘unlisted’ security on” another exchange.
SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 47.
216. Choi, supra note 7, at 334.
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mented. In this Section, I raise questions about investor regulation’s
impact on investors dealing directly with issuers. In Section B, I go
into a little more depth about how it might affect investors dealing
with broker-dealers. In that Section, I intend to delve heavily into the
behavioral literature to question Choi’s argument that his proposal
will allow investors to bargain for an optimal arrangement with mar-
ket intermediaries like stockbrokers.
1. Small Companies Raising Capital. Consider a relatively small
company that is trying to position itself to go public, but is not there
yet. Choi complains early in his article that because of SEC registra-
tion provisions in the 1933 Act, investors are unable to purchase secu-
rities of companies that have yet to go public unless they qualify to
participate in a private placement.217 In regard to unsophisticated in-
vestors, Choi’s proposal is intentionally even more restrictive than the
status quo. Although widows, orphans, and grandmothers (WOGs),
as well as other unsophisticated investors can now invest in such a
small company under Rules 504, 505, or 506 of Regulation D or under
Regulation A, or can buy from sophisticated investors who have held
the shares for a year under Rule 144, Choi keeps them out of the
market altogether.218 In this regard, he is much more paternalistic than
the SEC.219 If this were truly a good idea, it easily could be accom-
plished with relatively minor revisions of the status quo.
Choi aims to benefit issuers who can sell to sophisticated inves-
tors without worrying about the strictures of private placement rules,
such as Rule 506. Although there is no doubt that it can be difficult to
comply with the technical requirements of some of these rules, in light
of the huge amount of venture capital and private placement activity
in the American economy,220 it seems unlikely that the rules serve as
an undue constraint on raising capital.
217. Id. at 281.
218. Remember, Choi limits the market’s “D” investors to passive mutual funds and shares
traded on an efficient market. Id. at 301–02; see supra note 54.
219. See William J. Carney, Jurisdictional Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L.
717, 738 (2001).
220. U.S. companies received a record $19.6 billion in venture capital money in the second
quarter of 2000. Jerry Mahoney, By All Accounts, Accounting Not the Same; Amounts of Ven-
ture Capital, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 21, 2000, at C2. Indeed, in 1999 private placement
activity was nearly a half a trillion dollars. Akil Salim Roper, Year-End Rankings: Weathering
the Storm, PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER (Sec. Data Pub., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 21, 2000, at 1.
Certainly the stock market and overall economic downturn in 2000–2001 had a dampening im-
pact on this activity and will continue to do so for a time.
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The real advantage that Choi claims is that the investors can bar-
gain for just the right level of protection, paying more for securities if
they want higher levels of protection (e.g., strict liability or negligence
standards) and less if they want lower levels of protection (e.g.,
antifraud protection or no liability standards). However, it is unclear
that investor regulation will produce results meaningfully different
from the status quo. Venture capital funds are Choi’s prototypical so-
phisticated investors. In terms of the contracts these funds negotiate
with issuers, the funds are usually form-givers rather than form-
takers.221 Already under Regulation D, for example, if an issuer sells
to sophisticated investors such as Choi’s issuer-level (A student) in-
vestors, there is no requirement that they provide any particular fi-
nancial information.222 In other words, in private placements and small
offerings, sophisticated investors already can bargain for lots of in-
formation, some information, or no information.223 Thus, Professor
John Coates notes “the large degree of private choice of securities
regulation already available to issuers, as well as the extent to which
even the most full-blown of the SEC’s disclosure requirements are
tailored by the issuer to itself and to the issue.”224
Already under the status quo, investors, if they so choose, can
sign documents indicating that the issuer has made no promises to
them, thereby effectively bargaining away antifraud liability.225 Be-
221. See generally STEVEN KAPLAN & PER STROMBERG, FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
THEORY MEETS THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL
CONTRACTS (Univ. of Chi. Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 513, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (presenting an extensive study of venture capital contracts).
222. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2001).
223. Even with regard to public offerings, Palmiter has noted that due to substantial de-
regulation by the SEC, “[i]ssuers can now choose from among a richly-layered set of disclosure
levels and methods in offering their securities to public investors.” Palmiter, supra note 93, at 3–
4.
224. Coates, supra note 20, at 534. Furthermore, Professor Amir Licht has identified a sub-
stantial trend toward choice of international securities exchanges that provides many of the
benefits urged by Choi. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition,
and the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 626 (2001) (identifying
“stock exchange mobility as a new type of dynamic affecting today’s international securities
market” and arguing that “stock exchanges have become the new agents of change in regulatory
reform”).
225. There are many cases holding that such clauses are enforceable and will bar recovery
even from plaintiffs who can prove that the defendant made fraudulent oral statements. E.g.,
Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 2000); Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544,
547–48 (7th Cir. 1996); Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 415–17 (1st Cir. 1989); One-
O-One Enter., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286–87 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1511, 1517–18 (10th Cir. 1983).
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cause sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act do not apply to private
placements,226 and section 10(b) antifraud liability can (unfortunately)
be bargained away,227 it is difficult to see what significant added nego-
tiating flexibility Choi’s proposal grants to sophisticated investors in
this setting.
2. Companies Preparing to Go Public. For companies on the
brink of what the current system deems “going public,” it seems un-
likely that investor regulation feasibly could bring many advantages.
A company preparing to issue hundreds of thousands or millions of
shares is unlikely to desire to negotiate individually each specific sale
with each specific investor, creating several classes of obligation and
several layers of confusion for future investors, who would have diffi-
culty knowing what sorts of liabilities went with which classes of
shares. Absent some degree of uniformity, a Tower of Babel is cre-
ated.228 Shareholders will be more hesitant to buy shares carrying
rights they cannot understand, and liquidity will be impaired.
226. Section 11 covers only false statements made in registration statements. E.g., Anisfeld
v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1461, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Section 12 of the 1933
Act does not apply to private placement transactions. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
567–84 (1995).
227. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Contractualizing Federal Securities Fraud Litigation:
A Behavioral Analysis (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(criticizing a recent trend in the case law that permits contractual waiver of federal securities
fraud provisions).
228. Choi himself recognizes that if too many overlapping private enforcement regimes re-
place the single SEC regime, mass confusion could result. Choi, supra note 7, at 289. Under
Choi’s plan, an investor looking at a particular security must determine whether the issuer has
opted in or out of public enforcement. If the issuer opted in, then the investor needs to know if
it opted for contract liability, negligence liability, antifraud liability, strict liability, criminal li-
ability, or some combination thereof. If the issuer opted out of public enforcement, then the in-
vestor must determine which of a possible multitude of private enforcers is responsible, which
types of liability are present (breach-of-contract, negligence, strict, antifraud, criminal) and how
efficient and reliable the private enforcer’s enforcement mechanisms are. If all this is deter-
mined, the investor must learn if there is anything preventing the issuer from leaping back and
forth between public and private regulation or keeping it from raising or lowering its standard
of liability. And, if the bargaining that Choi envisions has occurred, all these things must be de-
termined for each of many different classes of stock. And, all the while, the investor must com-
pare financial statements that may now be totally lacking in uniformity and comparability.
Choi suggests that perhaps issuers will opt into an SEC-promulgated menu of default
options, and perhaps his system “might spawn sets of relatively standardized publicly available
procedures.” Id. at 290. Keep in mind, however, that the less uniformity Choi’s system spawns,
the more confusion, investor reluctance, and inefficiency will be created. But if more uniformity
occurs, then Choi’s system is not creating that diversity of options that is the centerpiece of his
plan.
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Rather, the issuer is likely to issue shares under a single liability
regime. That decision alone eliminates most of the claimed advantage
of Choi’s scheme. What liability regime is the issuer likely to offer? I
suspect it often will be a no-liability regime. Choi hypothesizes that
because issuers will want more money for their shares and investors
will be willing to pay more if there are meaningful investor protec-
tions attached to the shares, issuers will be motivated to provide val-
ued protections.229
But Choi may be wrong. It seems surpassingly clear that issuers
going public are willing to leave large amounts of money on the table
for a variety of reasons. The underpricing of IPOs is a well-known
phenomenon that reached surprising levels in the late 1990s.230 The
causes of underpricing are not certain. One theory, that IPO–under-
pricing is prompted by liability considerations,231 has been largely dis-
credited.232 There are a number of more plausible theories of IPO un-
derpricing,233 but whatever the cause, it is clear that issuers are not
hesitant to leave large amounts of money on the table.
229. Id. at 282.
230. For a long time, the standard underpricing seemed to be between five and twenty per-
cent. See, e.g., Robert Hansen, Evaluating the Costs of a New Equity Issue, MIDLAND CORP.
FIN. J., Spring 1986, at 42, 42 (noting underpricing of 15–20%); Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Per-
formance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 254 (1975) (finding underpricing of
11.4%); Robert E. Miller & Frank K. Reilly, An Examination of Mispricing, Returns, and Un-
certainty for Initial Public Offerings, 16 FIN. MGMT. 33, 34 (1987) (finding underpricing of
9.87%); Jay R. Ritter, The “Hot Issue” Market of 1980, 57 J. BUS. 215, 218 (1984) (finding un-
derpricing of around 19%); Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisi-
tion Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON 3, 20–21 (1986) (finding underpricing of 15% or more).
Between 1990 and 1998, $27 billion dollars was left on the table due to IPO underpric-
ing. Timothy J. Mullaney, Is the Street Lowballing IPOs?, BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at EB112,
EB112 (citing a study by scholars at Notre Dame and the University of Florida). In 1999 and
early 2000, the average underpricing for IPOs underwritten by prestigious firms skyrocketed. Id.
(citing average first day gains of 178% for Morgan Stanley, 141% for Goldman Sachs, 103% for
Merrill Lynch, and 78.5% for First Boston).
231. Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789,
790 (1988).
232. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Of-
ferings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 20 (1988) (arguing that the lawsuit avoidance
theory accounts for but a small portion of underpricing); John H. Langmore & Robert A. Pren-
tice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of
Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1082–89 (1991) (showing, inter alia, that underpricing is just
as prevalent in countries with virtually no securities liability as in the United States).
233. Two such theories are that underwriters use their market power to reward institutional
investors who are repeat customers and that much of the run-up is due to irrational exuberance
of day traders. See John C. Coffee, Jr., IPO Underpricing and Dutch Auctions, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
16, 1999, at 5 (“[T]he phenomenon of IPO underpricing . . . has increased at a hyperbolic rate.”).
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That being the case, issuers likely will be motivated to leave a lit-
tle on the table in return for a lifetime of minimal securities liability.
The years 1999 and 2000 saw repeated instances of companies going
public at, say, $28 and the price jumping to $58 in secondary trading
the very next day.234 Assume that if the issuer offers no investor pro-
tection, investors are willing to pay $2 less per share than they other-
wise would be willing to pay. To drop that $28 to $26 and the $58 to
$56 would be unlikely to raise significant qualms for the issuer. After
all, the company may never dip into the market again and likely will
not do so often;235 it therefore will be happy to take $26 or $25 or $24
in exchange for liability immunity.
Perhaps even more important, the managers making the decision
to accept the underwriter’s suggested pricing of the firm are the same
people who are potential civil and criminal defendants in securities
lawsuits. These agents are particularly motivated to accept a few dol-
lars less on their principal’s behalf to preserve substantial personal
peace of mind. In another context, Choi addresses this agency prob-
lem and suggests that stock options be used to align the agent’s inter-
est with the company’s.236 However, the agent can make just as much
money on $18 shares that go to $23 as on $20 shares that go to $25.
Furthermore, using options to align managers’ interests with those of
their firms often just encourages fraud as the officers manipulate their
own company’s share price to maximize their option profits.237
Investors may appreciate the price-break from $20 to $18. More
importantly, for a variety of psychological reasons,238 these investors
234. When Netscape went public on August 9, 1995, it debuted at $28 per share and was
trading at $58-1/4 by day’s end. E.g., John Cassidy, Striking It Rich; The Rise and Fall of Popular
Capitalism, NEW YORKER, Jan. 14, 2002, at 63, 63. Netscape was not alone. For example, Red
Hat Software went from $14 per share to $302.63 per share in less than five months, and VA
Linux Systems went from $30 per share to $239.25 per share on its first day of trading. E.g., Lisa
F. Smith, Durham, N.C.-Based Red Hat, Other Linux Stocks Take a Beating, HERALD-SUN
(Durham, NC), Aug. 10, 2000. In the 1998–2000 period, high tech IPOs “skyrocket[ed] as a mat-
ter of routine.” Sandy Portnoy, Jupiter Takes Shareholders into Orbit, COMPUTER RESELLER
NEWS, Nov. 29, 1999.
235. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
1992 DUKE L.J. 977, 1014 (noting that for most companies their only public offering is their first
and even for others “public offerings are exceptional occurrences”); Lynn A. Stout, The Unim-
portance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 647 (1988) (“On average, publicly held corporations issue
only once every eighteen years—less often than locusts.”).
236. Choi, supra note 7, at 288–89.
237. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 267–444 and accompanying text.
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probably will not worry very much about the protections and there-
fore will accept the proffered no-liability contract. Investors will be
overly optimistic that they will not be ripped off, overconfident that
they will be able to sell the shares before the bottom drops out even if
fraud is involved, and (assuming that the missing investor protections
are valued at $2 per share) just as happy to buy at $18 and sell at $23
as to buy at $20 and sell at $25.239 Secondary market purchasers will be
similarly confident and optimistic and will tend not to worry much
about the low-probability event of a major fraud occurring, so they
will buy happily at $23.
The bargaining between investor and issuer that Choi envisions
as the raison d’être of his entire proposal may not occur. For all sorts
of reasons, including simplicity, issuers will likely offer a low-liability
regime on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and investors will likely accept.
B. Dealing with Stockbrokers
Choi assumes that investors could perfectly shape their world but
for their lack of only one thing—information. As noted in Part II,240 it
seems unlikely that investor regulation will lead to investors having
more accurate information; less accuracy is more probable. Today in-
vestors have tons of information thanks to the SEC requirements that
investor regulation would eliminate.
More fundamentally, Choi is likely wrong in believing that lack
of information is the key problem for investors. Thanks to SEC dis-
closure requirements, EDGAR, and the Internet, even the most un-
sophisticated and dunderheaded investors have access to much the
same information available to the most sophisticated of professional
and institutional investors.241 Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) will
239. IPO investors are usually looking for a quick flip to capture profits. See Adam Levy,
Shut Out: Getting In on IPOs Is a Game Rigged for Wall Street’s Favored Few, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., May 7, 2000, at K01 (quoting Professor Laura Field as saying that, “‘[g]enerally
the pros flip their shares within a few hours or days. . . . [t]hat generates big returns’”).
240. See supra Part II.B–C.
241. Indeed, many believe information overload is a bigger problem for investors than insuf-
ficient information. See GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG
MONEY MISTAKES—AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM 188 (1999) (“Investors who tune in too
closely to financial reports probably fare worse than those who tune the news out.”); KURTZ,
supra note 159, at 306 (“The fact is, America is drowning in financial information.”); Paul An-
dreassen, On the Social Psychology of the Stock Market: Aggregate Attributional Effects and the
Regressiveness of Prediction, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 495 (1987) (finding that
media explanations for movements in the stock market tend to lead investors to fail to regress
sufficiently to the mean in their predictions of future stock performance, and noting “one might
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only add to the previously “inside” information now available to lay
investors,242 as might the disclosure reforms contemplated by SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt.243
very well ask how much news an investor ought to try to absorb, given that in the process of ex-
plaining the past, we may allow ourselves to justify the present”) (citation omitted); Alex Ber-
enson, Of Information Overload and the ‘Efficient’ Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, § 3, at 1
(stating that increased stock market volatility may be due to information overload of investors);
Stacy Forster, The Cop: An SEC Commissioner Talks About the Challenges of Battling Online
Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2000, at R18 (quoting SEC commissioner Laura Unger as re-
marking that individual “[i]nvestors also have massive amounts of information available to them
that was previously available only to professionals” that might give them “a false sense of secu-
rity”); Sara Hewitt et al., SEC Internet Report, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at B5 (remarking that
the Internet has “resulted in many over-informed investors who are unsure of how to digest the
information made available to them”); Charles Zehren, Online Investing: Here’s a Winnow of
Opportunity, NEWSDAY (New York, NY), May 24, 2000, at A50 (observing that information
overload “rank[s] among online investors’ greatest enemies”).
Information overload has been noted as a potential problem in other areas, such as
product warnings and health care disclosure. See Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Prod-
ucts, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1211–15 (1994) (discussing the phe-
nomenon of information overload, and warning of its problems for product safety warnings);
Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Mar-
keting, and the Law of Information Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health Care Reform, 12
YALE J. ON REG. 207, 238–40 (1995) (exploring information overload’s implications for health
care information delivery).
Information overload is a particular problem because studies show that as people are
flooded with more information, they examine a smaller percentage of that information in part
because they systematically underestimate the benefits of larger sample sizes. See Chip Heath et
al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcom-
ings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 11–12 (1998) (summarizing the relevant research).
242. Regulation FD, adopted by the SEC on August 10, 2000, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-
43154, is aimed at minimizing the informational advantage that industry insiders, particularly
professional analysts, have over lay investors by requiring corporations to widely disseminate
information that they formerly leaked selectively to such analysts. See generally SEC Bans Tra-
dition of Advance Notice, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 2000, at 2 (discussing the promulgation); David
Schellhase, Arthur Levitt’s Cultural Crusade, RECORDER (San Francisco), Aug. 16, 2000, at 4
(critiquing Regulation FD).
In its first year of operation, Regulation FD received mixed reviews. Most observers
seemed to think that it had improved fairness. Whether it had increased or decreased overall
disclosure remained unclear. See Broker-Dealer: AIMR Survey Finds Reg FD Succeeding in
Fairness Goal, Overall Disclosure Reduced, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Oct. 22, 2001 (reporting that
an Association for Investment Management and Research survey of financial analysts and port-
folio managers found that they believed the rule had “succeeded in providing small investors
and investment professionals with the same information” but had “given many companies an
excuse to provide less information to the marketplace”); Lynn Cowan, Disclosure Rule is Re-
ceiving Mixed Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2001, at B11F (noting that small investors and
large corporations liked the effects of Regulation FD, but analysts and institutional investors
thought it had reduced the quality of corporate disclosure).
243. Pitt is apparently considering reforms that would require companies to make more
trend-like information available to all investors on a monthly or even weekly basis. John Labate,
SEC Disclosure Reforms May Override RegFD, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at 26.
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Choi assumes that given the right amount of factual information,
investors can bargain for just the right amount of disclosure and in-
vestor protection. But what makes investors vulnerable often is not
their lack of information, but a wide variety of limitations on human
reasoning exposed by a substantial body of behavioral literature that
Choi largely ignores.244 That literature indicates that many if not most
investors, even with more information, will be unable to adequately
protect themselves under his system. Psychological factors often pre-
vent investors from adopting sufficiently wary attitudes.245 Impor-
tantly, even sophisticated (issuer-level) investors tend to be subject to
these limitations.
In his article, Choi offers several personalized illustrations. To
use his method, assume that Kira, an underemployed college gradu-
ate, has put much of her modest resources into (a) studying for the
SEC’s investor test so that she can have a wide variety of investment
options, and (b) investing in several Internet services so that she can
have real-time access to great amounts of market information. As-
sume that Kira’s studying paid off—she qualified to be an intermedi-
ary-level investor (a B student) and can deal through any intermedi-
ary in the country. Are there grounds to worry that Kira will not be
able to adequately protect herself from fraud? Yes, several.
Before examining Kira’s ability to negotiate effectively on her
own behalf, note the type of form contract that the brokerage firm
she selects would likely present to her. Unlike a venture capital fund,
Kira is likely to be a form-taker rather than a form-giver. The broker-
age firm’s self-interest246 will likely prompt it to insert in its adhesion
244. See Donald McCloskey & Arjo Klamer, One Quarter of GDP Is Persuasion, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 191, 191 (1995) (“Knowledge is information plus judgment. An economics of in-
formation alone is going to miss the judgment part and is not going to be a complete economics
of knowledge.”).
245. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Law-
yers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 102 (1993):
The apparently ascendant view in psychology is that “hot” influences—such as ego,
emotion and mood—have demonstrably significant effects on both perception and in-
ference that can lead to diminished as well as enhanced vigilance. And within this
genre, much of the inquiry focuses on the role of self-serving biases in the cognitive
process. This research suggests strongly that under special circumstances, people will
be motivated preconsciously to avoid the appreciation of adverse information and
hence fail to adopt appropriately vigilant cognitive modes. Their thinking turns wish-
ful . . . .
See also TVEDE, supra note 64, at 127 (listing psychological phenomena that distort how finan-
cial journalists and their audiences process financial information).
246. Presumably Choi would agree that the securities firms and issuers with whom Kira
deals will tend to act in their own best interests. See ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY:
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contract a provision substantially limiting, if not eliminating alto-
gether, its liability for negligence, and even fraud. Brokerage firms
might well use as their model the contract that automobile dealers
used in selling new cars before courts and legislatures imposed the
strict liability doctrine. A nice example was the landmark case of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.247 The plaintiff was seriously
injured when the steering mechanism in her brand-new car broke,
causing the car to veer off the road.248 According to the adhesion con-
tract, willingly signed by plaintiff Henningsen and millions of other
car purchasers, defendant Chrysler’s liability was limited to repairing
the broken steering mechanism if plaintiff shipped it to Chrysler (ap-
parently in Detroit), return shipping prepaid!249 Even this extraordi-
narily limited warranty, available only to the purchaser within the
first ninety days or four thousand miles (whichever came first), was in
tiny print in a sea of form provisions.250
If one listens to the contractarians, one would think that rational
product consumers would not have accepted contracts that left them
so vulnerable and without remedy, but they did until the courts inter-
vened.251 Stockbrokers provided and investors accepted very similar
contracts before the 1933 Act was passed. A standard contract spoke
at length about the rights of the broker—to hold securities as collat-
eral, to make transfers among the customer’s accounts without notice,
to segregate collateral in excess of margin requirements, to demand
THEORY AND RESEARCH 6–7 (1978) (“Even the most contentious scientist would find it diffi-
cult to challenge [the] proposition . . . that . . . individuals will try to maximize their outcomes.”);
Linda J. Keil & Charles G. McClintock, A Developmental Perspective on Distributive Justice, in
EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 13, 19 (David M. Mes-
sick & Karen S. Cook eds., 1983) (“[I]t is safe to assume that humans are generally motivated to
maximize their own gain . . . .”). This is a widespread human tendency, as I have explored else-
where. See Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for In-
dependent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1606–29 (2000) (analyzing the self-serving bias and
providing illustrations of the way in which the self-serving bias affects different professionals).
247. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
248. Id. at 75 (noting that the car had been driven only 468 miles).
249. Id. at 74.
250. Id. Before the courts intervened, “all manufacturers disclaimed liability for the costs of
personal injuries in their warranties.” Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolu-
tion: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 727 (1993).
251. Professor W. David Slawson has discussed the evolution of contract law in this arena,
illustrating with the Henningsen case, and noting that before the courts and legislatures inter-
vened, “the chief and most evident consequence of these systematic inequalities of bargaining
power was to make contracts very unfavorable to consumers. Producers everywhere took ad-
vantage of the opportunities their superior bargaining powers opened to them.” SLAWSON, su-
pra note 178, at 32.
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additional security at any time, to receive payment of commissions on
demand, to employ sub-brokers, to sell, assign or deliver the cus-
tomer’s securities without advertisement or notice of sale whenever
necessary to protect the broker’s interests, to hold the customer liable
for any deficiencies, and to be held harmless and indemnified by the
investor from any loss, damage, or liability arising out of securities
transactions.252 The contract provided that a customer could not rely
on the oral statements of his broker agreeing to liquidate the cus-
tomer’s accounts: “all such agreements must be in writing.”253 The
only duties of the broker mentioned in a standard agreement were to
execute orders in compliance with exchange rules and to use reason-
able care in selecting sub-agents.254
Before passage of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,255 issuers and
underwriters marketed debentures, bonds, and notes by relying in
large part upon the reputation of the trustees who would supposedly
look out for the best interests of the investors; unfortunately, the in-
dentures themselves usually exonerated the trustees from liability
when they abandoned the investors’ interests.256
Similarly, the exchange rules did not vigorously protect inves-
tors.257 The NYSE rules did require that no investor pay less than the
minimum commission rates prescribed by the exchange,258 but beyond
that price-fixing provision, did little more than formally forbid circu-
lation of rumors, demoralization of the market, and “reckless and un-
businesslike dealing.”259 The rules did make a member subject to ex-
252. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS, app. XIX, at 773–74
(1935).
253. Id. at 774.
254. Id. at 773, 774.
255. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa–77bbbb (2000).
256. See generally 6 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES: TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTURES 2–6 (1936) (discussing the
facts underlying passage of the TIA). As the Supreme Court noted in Caplin v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416 (1972), “[e]ven in cases where misconduct by the
indenture trustee was the proximate cause of injury to debenture holders, they found them-
selves impotent under the terms of most indentures to take action against the trustee.” Id. at
425.
257. For the most part, the rules prohibited stealing from investors. See TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 252, at 757 (summarizing stock exchange rules regulating the
broker-customer relationship).
258. Id. at 760.
259. Id. at 763.
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pulsion for fraud,260 but whether this was meant to protect customers
or other exchange members and how stringently it was enforced are
unclear.261
If Choi’s assumptions were correct, investors before passage of
the 1933 Act should have bargained for just the right level of disclo-
sure and protection from fraud. They did neither. According to Choi,
investors should have demanded full disclosure. They did not.262 The
massive increase in individual investors in the 1920s “did not translate
into increased demand for audits.”263 Similarly, securities industry pro-
fessionals provided and investors accepted a status quo of relatively
little investor protection from fraudulent, deceitful, and unfair securi-
ties practices before the 1933 and 1934 Acts changed the situation.264
260. CONSTITUTION, BY-LAWS AND RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, art.
XVII, § 2 (1914), reprinted in SAMUEL P. GOLDMAN, A HANDBOOK OF STOCK EXCHANGE
LAWS AFFECTING THE MEMBERS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS, BROKERS, AND INVESTORS 117,
140 (1914).
261. Underwriters acted similarly. In 1927, National City Company investigated bonds from
Peru. All the information it discovered was unfavorable, yet it undertook to underwrite the
bonds. It did not disclose any of the negative information it had discovered, but simply put this
disclaimer in the prospectus: “The above statements are based on information received partly
by cable from official and other sources. While not guaranteed, we believe them to be reliable,
but they are in no event to be construed as representations by us.” Unsurprisingly, the bonds
went south and investors lost nearly $75 million although underwriters’ commissions were a
neat $4.5 million. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 28.
262. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 94, at 250; Pritchard, supra note 5, at 1008 (“More
fundamentally, the failure of the securities markets to impose [voluntarily] more stringent dis-
closure requirements also suggests that the demand for such disclosure among investors was
limited.”).
263. PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 94, at 250. The authors go on to note that “[t]he hand-
ful of reformers who called for greater protection of investors were ignored. Nor were investors,
who did not rebel when stripped of their voting rights through issuance of nonvoting common
stock, likely to demand independent audits to protect their interests.” Id.
264. Despite the failure of pre-1933 securities professionals to voluntarily provide protection
to investors, there was at least Blue Sky regulation and state common law. Unfortunately, states
typically did not allocate sufficient funds so that Blue Sky antifraud provisions could have any
teeth. See SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 46 (noting that only eight states appropriated enough
money for full-time enforcement staff and that in most states securities regulation was a political
football). The hornbook law was that stockbrokers, as other agents, owed a duty of skill and
diligence and well as good faith to their customers. See DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF
STOCKBROKERS 41 (2d ed. 1922) (“The degree of skill and diligence which he must exercise is
that which competent and experienced stockbrokers are accustomed to show under similar cir-
cumstances.”) (citation omitted). However, the pre-1933 cases imposing liability on stockbro-
kers are few and far between. My own search uncovered very few: Boyle v. Henning, 121 F. 376,
376 (C.C.W.D. Ky. 1902) (holding a stockbroker to a duty of due care in handling an investor’s
money and carrying out his instructions); Hopkins v. Clark, 53 N.E. 27, 27 (N.Y. 1899) (affirm-
ing a judgment against a stockbroker for engaging in an unauthorized transaction); Levy v.
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Today, industry professionals’ self-interest has not changed, only
the law has changed. Unregulated, securities professionals are still
unwilling to provide much in the way of investor protection. For ex-
ample, the field of derivative products remains relatively unregulated.
However, under governmental pressure the key firms (CS First Bos-
ton, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan
Stanley and Salomon Brothers) set up the Derivatives Policy Group
(DPG) to establish a plan of self-regulation.265 What were the results
of the DPG’s plan? “Although it appears that the DPG was willing to
agree to protect itself, it was not willing voluntarily to provide protec-
tion to end-users. Th[e] section dealing with sales practices is care-
fully worded to avoid creating any legal obligations to purchasers of
the derivatives . . . .”266
The following Sections explain why investors were willing to set-
tle for inadequate protection in the 1920s, and why they would
probably be willing to do so again today.
1. Bounded Rationality and Rational Ignorance. If Kira, as an
intermediary-level investor, walks into the office of an intermediary,
she will be at an immediate disadvantage. Whereas standard eco-
nomic theory assumes that economic actors such as Kira are rational
decisionmakers in possession of the full information needed to make
important decisions, the reality, of course, is that human rationality is
bounded. It is now widely recognized, as Professor Herbert Simon
noted forty-five years ago, that because they seldom have complete
and perfectly accurate information and never have perfect capacity to
process that information, people are “intendedly rational, but only
limitedly so.”267 Because of bounded rationality, it is erroneous to as-
sume that the parties usually will negotiate the most efficient possible
contract.268
Loeb, 85 N.Y. 365, 365 (1881) (finding a stockbroker liable for breach of contract); Harris v.
Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92, 92 (1880) (affirming a judgment based on unauthorized transactions).
265. Allen D. Madison, Derivatives Regulation in the Context of the Shingle Theory, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 271, 320–21.
266. Id. at 321.
267. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1957).
268. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1505 (1998) (suggesting that “bounded rationality, in particular the endowment ef-
fect, casts doubt on the conventional law and economics claim” that parties negotiate the most
efficient contracts and that any imposition of mandatory terms makes them worse off).
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Related to bounded rationality is the concept of rational igno-
rance. It is reasonable for decisionmakers such as Kira, who do not
have unlimited time and unlimited resources, to choose not to gather
all the relevant information for their decisionmaking. Decisionmakers
must choose among numerous demands on their time and attention
and will often sensibly choose to “satisfice” rather than to optimize
their decisionmaking.269
Bounded rationality and rational ignorance apply as well to pro-
fessional investors as to lay investors. Professor Jacob Jacoby reports
that “[r]esearch shows that, operating under conditions that have
both financial and ego consequences and where information acquisi-
tion costs are virtually zero, even professional security analysts de-
ciding on which securities to select do not acquire most (or even
much) of the information available.”270
Given bounded rationality and rational ignorance, it is unlikely
that Kira’s contracting with her intermediary (or issuer) will go as
Choi assumes. Whereas economic analysis assumes that contracts
should be complex, in fact they are generally simple, at least the part
that is actually bargained over.271 Because an intermediary likely will
present Kira with a relatively detailed form contract (investor regula-
tion invalidates the SEC’s “plain English” requirements,272 so the in-
termediary is free to inundate Kira with massive legal boilerplate),
her ability to understand its obscure terms is bounded.273 An invest-
ment of the time and mental energy needed to master the details of
the contract may not be cost-justified, especially because the agent
with whom Kira is dealing probably has no authority to alter the con-
269. See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 50–56 (1988)
(discussing the implications of the tendency of people to “satisfice” rather than to optimize,
choosing the first alternative that produces a satisfactory result rather than searching for the
alternative that would provide an optimal result); Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the
Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129 (1956) (noting that organisms tend to
“satisfice” rather than optimize when making decisions).
270. JACOBY, supra note 74, at 66–67 (citing Jacob Jacoby et al., Effectiveness of Security
Analyst Information Accessing Strategies: A Computer Interactive Assessment, 1 COMPUTERS &
HUM. BEHAV. 95, 95–113 (1985)).
271. See KAREN EGGLESTON ET AL., SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXITY IN CONTRACTS 13–14
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 93, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(suggesting that bounded rationality is one of the reasons that real world contracts are much
simpler than economic analysis predicts).
272. Plain English Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act Release No.
39,593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,011, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 86,003 (Jan. 28, 1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
273. See EGGLESTON ET AL., supra note 271, at 13–14.
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tract anyway.274 Therefore, rather than bargain extensively over the
terms of the contract and how much she will pay for protection from
fraud or unsuitable recommendations, Kira likely will sign the con-
tract without meaningful negotiation and usually without reading
more than a few parts of it. It is well known that investors typically do
not read disclosure documents when investing in securities,275 and Pro-
fessor Melvin Aron Eisenberg notes in the context of insurance con-
tracts and other similar types of contracts that this is a sensible (if not
optimally rational) strategy,276 concluding that “most form takers will
find it irrational to engage in search and deliberation on any given
form.”277
In other commercial contracts, the consumer is protected by the
doctrine of unconscionability278 and the general rule that provisions of
274. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1225 (1983) (“Customers know well enough that they cannot alter any individual
firm’s standard document.”). Such written contracts often contain provisions that agents have
no authority to alter or to make any statements inconsistent with.
Economists recognize that negotiation “costs” justify parties’ decisions to enter into in-
complete contracts. See Ronald A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT’L ECON. REV.
233, 236–37, 245–46 (1985) (arguing that a simple contract with few contingencies would be ex-
tremely expensive to write).
275. Kripke argued for years that SEC disclosure rules needed revamping in light of the fact
that investors typically did not read the required disclosure documents. See generally HOMER
KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
(1979); Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631 (1973). See also
Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic,
and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 19 (1994) (“[M]ost investors do not read, let alone
thoroughly analyze, financial statements, prospectuses, or other corporate disclosures . . . .”);
Kenneth B. Firtel, Note, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 870 (1999) (“[T]he average investor
does not read the prospectus . . . .”).
276. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–45 (1995) (describing cognitive problems associated with form con-
tracts). Eisenberg notes:
The bottom line is simple: The verbal and legal obscurity of preprinted terms
renders the cost of searching out and deliberating on these terms exceptionally high.
In contrast, the low probability of these nonperformance terms’ coming into play
heavily discounts the benefits of search and deliberation. Furthermore, the length and
complexity of form contracts is [sic] often not correlated to the dollar value of the
transaction.”
Id. at 243.
277. Id. at 244.
278. See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 147–73 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the unconscionability doctrine in sales law).
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adhesion contracts are unenforceable if they are surprising or un-
fair.279 Under investor regulation, these protections are missing.
2. Overoptimism and Overconfidence. Even if she reads the
contract with the issuer and clearly sees and understands its limitation
of liability provisions, Kira still may not bargain to change them. Hu-
mans are inherently overoptimistic in most settings; they think that
good things are going to happen to them and that the bad things that
happen to others will not happen to them.280 Manufacturers often play
on consumers’ naïve optimism281 in selling risky products. Studies in-
dicate that the overoptimism bias affects humans in the sphere of in-
vestments as well.282 Thus, Kira will be overly optimistic that she will
279. See, e.g., Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Crawford, No. 97-17131, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10987, at *9 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999) (holding that adhesion contracts are enforceable
unless they are oppressive or unfairly surprising); Hartland Computer Leasing Corp. v. Ins.
Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that form contracts are not unen-
forceable unless they contain terms that are unexpected or unconscionably unfair).
280. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993) (finding that most people know that half of married couples will divorce but place
their own chance at zero); AMY FARMER ET AL., THE CAUSES OF BARGAINING FAILURE:
EVIDENCE FROM MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 23 (Univ. of Ala., Econ., Fin. & Legal Studies
Working Paper Studies, Working Paper No. 00-08-04, 2000) (finding “evidence that excessive
optimism is a source of bargaining failure in major league baseball arbitration”); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1512 (1999) (“Considerable evidence suggests that smokers perceive
smoking as significantly less risky for themselves than for other smokers, that smokers view
their own risks as not significantly higher than those for non-smokers, and that smokers tend to
underestimate the actual risks to themselves.”); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809–14 (1980) (finding, for ex-
ample, that six times as many college students believed they were more likely to own their own
home than the average person than believed that they were less likely).
281. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 729 (defining naïve optimism as “past experiences
free from harm, a perception that risks are of low frequency, and a perception that the harm is
preventable by human action”).
282. See Werner F.M. De Bondt, A Portrait of the Individual Investor, 42 EUR. ECON. REV.
831, 839 (1998) (finding that investors tend toward overoptimism); SHILLER, BUBBLES, supra
note 63, at 6 (explaining how overoptimism and overconfidence by investors, even professional
investors, help contribute to market bubbles). Even when investors know they’re involved in a
bubble, their confidence remains high. During the Railway Mania in England in the 1840s, a
letter to the editor of the London Times noted:
There is not a single dabbler in scrip who does not steadfastly believe—first, that a
crash sooner or later, is inevitable; and, secondly, that he himself will escape it. When
the luck turns, and the crack play is sauve qui peut, or devil take the hindmost, no one
fancies that the last mail train from Panic station will leave him behind. In this, as in
other respects, “Men deem all men mortal but themselves.”
CHANCELLOR, supra note 69, at 136 (quoting TIMES (London), July 12, 1845).
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obtain good results from her investments283 and will avoid victimiza-
tion.
Kira’s optimism will be fueled by a Wall Street “marketing jug-
gernaut whose dominant message is simple: Wall Street can make you
rich—and fast.”284 Today the hype must bear some relation to reality
or the SEC will take action. If Choi’s proposal is adopted, reality may
well fly out the window. Even with regulation, a top priority for the
SEC continues to be the false advertising conducted by mutual funds,
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other industry profession-
als285—the very actors that Choi would deregulate. Although investor
regulation gives legal carte blanche to those willing to exaggerate or
outright lie, Choi assumes that the market will sort this out; perhaps
he is the optimist.286
After the stock market tanked in 2000–2001, one expert investor admitted, “[w]e were
all wink-winking at each other and saying ‘This is great. We love it. We hope it goes on forever,’
knowing that it wouldn’t go on forever but not wanting to be the first guy to say it’s over.”
Gregory Zuckerman et al., Looking Back: Experts Learn Tech Rallies, Too, Must End, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at C1 (quoting an unnamed investor). The more things change, the more
they stay the same.
283. See Hu, supra note 163, at 861 (“Investors have a patently unrealistic view of the true
downside [of investing in the stock market].”).
284. Marcia Vickers & Gary Weiss, Wall Street’s Hype Machine, BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at
112, 112.
285. See Sarah O’Brien, SEC Muddling Ad Rules, Critics Say, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 28,
2000, at 1, 1 (discussing the recent SEC emphasis on false mutual fund advertising).
286. Even with seventy years of regulation on the books, investment advisers, broker-
dealers, and mutual funds continually misrepresent their performances. See, e.g., Accusations
Against Day Trading Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2000, at C8 (reporting NASD charges of
false advertising against day-trading firms); E-Trade’s Ads Under Scrutiny of SEC and NASD,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2000, at C3 (describing lawsuits for false advertising filed against an Inter-
net brokerage firm); John Hechinger, Pay Attention to the Fine Print, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000,
at C3 (describing new forms of misleading mutual fund ads); Investment Advisers: Pittsburgh
Firm, Official Settle Charges Ads Inflated Client Returns on Investment, BNA SEC. LAW DAILY,
June 7, 2000 (describing the settlement of an case of false advertising against an investment ad-
visor); Laura Lallos, Reading Between the Numbers; Why Those Explosive Returns Can Be Mis-
leading, MONEY, July 2000, at 38, 38 (noting several instances of misleading advertising by mu-
tual funds and reporting Dreyfus’s $1 million fine for exaggerating results paid in May 2000);
Benjamin Y. Lowe, Pennsylvania Money Manager Fined over Fraudulent Claims, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 10, 2000, at C2 (reporting $100,000 in fines for false advertising levied by the
SEC against a fund manager and his firm); Morgan Unit Settles Disclosure Charge, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1999, at C4 (noting a $125,000 payment by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.’s Van
Kampen Investment Advisory unit for misleading mutual fund advertising); Jeff D. Opdyke,
Wade Cook and Regulators Near Settlement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2000, at C1 (reporting that
the SEC and FTC were nearing settlement with investment guru Wade Cook on false advertis-
ing charges); Steve Raabe, Firm Fined for False Advertising: SEC Says Lakewood Company
Overstated Investors’ True Returns, DENVER POST, June 1, 2000, at C2 (noting that the SEC had
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Thus, Kira’s optimism will tend to lead her to believe that she
will succeed where others will fail, that she will know the right path
where others will be misled, that she will be impervious to fraud
where others are victimized. Kira’s vulnerability to overoptimism will
be reinforced by her overconfidence. Just as studies show that she will
tend to believe that she is a better driver and better manager than her
peers,287 she also will tend to believe that she is a better investor,288
even though numerous academic studies show that amateur investors
are poor traders.289
Because of the attribution bias, Kira will tend to view her in-
vestment successes as the result of her analysis and strategies and her
failures as due to bad luck and forces beyond her control.290 Due to
the illusion of control,291 she will believe that the general tide of a ris-
imposed a censure and a fine of $80,000 against an investment advisory firm for false advertis-
ing).
287. See MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 95 (4th ed.
1998) (“[P]eople have been found to perceive themselves as being better than others across a
number of traits, including honesty, cooperativeness, rationality, driving skill, health, and intel-
ligence.”) (citation omitted).
288. See De Bondt, supra note 282, at 831 (finding overconfidence in investors generally, as
well as overoptimism, a tendency to discount diversification, and a rejection of the notion that
there is a positive tradeoff between risk and return); see also SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 132–33
(discussing studies showing investor overconfidence); SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE,
supra note 63, at 142 (“I find that overconfidence is apparent when I interview investors; they
seem to express overly strong opinions and to rush to summary judgments.”).
289. See Vickers & Weiss, supra note 284, at 112 (“Numerous academic studies have shown
that amateur investors make poor traders—buying stocks for the wrong reasons, holding losers
for too long, and acting on whims and emotions.”).
290. This general effect is well-established. See Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward
an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hy-
pothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 298 (1987) (de-
scribing the “well-replicated finding that people tend to make dispositional attributions for their
successes and situational attributions for their failures”); Barry R. Schlenker & Rowland S.
Miller, Egocentrism in Groups: Self-Serving Biases or Logical Information Processing?, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 755, 762–63 (1977) (describing a self-serving bias explanation
for egocentrism in groups).
It affects investors as well. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at
59 (“Even though a rising market ‘lifts all boats,’ there is still at tendency for investors to inter-
pret their investing success as confirmation of their own abilities, and this reinforces their inter-
est in trading stocks.”).
291. See BAZERMAN, supra note 287, at 95 (arguing that “[p]eople falsely believe that they
can control uncontrollable events, and they overestimate the extent to which their actions can
guarantee a certain outcome”) (citations omitted); THALER, supra note 66, at 138 (noting that
lotteries in North America did not become popular until New Jersey introduced a game which
allowed players to pick their own numbers, leading them to feel that they had a better chance of
winning than when numbers were selected at random for them); Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of
Control, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 231, 231 (reporting the results
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ing market is actually due to her own wise decisions regarding either
the investments she has made or the broker she has selected.292 The
illusion of control may well prompt her to resort to margin borrowing,
as investors did at record rates during the recent stock market boom
(three times the historic norm) thus taking on “unprecedented
risk.”293 It also leads investors to trade more, even though investors
who trade more tend to do worse than investors who trade less.294
Kira’s vulnerability to these cognitive limitations does not disap-
pear when she educates herself beyond the level of an unsophisticated
investor. Educated people and professionals are generally just as
subject to phenomena such as overoptimism295 and overconfidence296
as are unsophisticated investors. Indeed, because of the availability
heuristic they may well focus on their own past successes and be even
of studies indicating that “[w]hile people may pay lip service to the concept of chance, they be-
have as though chance events are subject to control”); Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I
Win, Tails It’s Chance: The Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a
Purely Chance Task, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 954–55 (1975) (finding that ini-
tial success in correctly predicting the outcome of a purely chance event, a coin toss, can lead to
a skill attribution and a superrational expectation of future success).
292. In 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of ads based on the illusion of control. They
contained only two words in large print: “Manipulate fate.” WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2000, at C5.
People generally know at some level that they cannot manipulate fate, but Shiller believes there
is an element of what psychologists call “magical thinking” at work here in that “[p]eople have
occasional feelings that certain actions will make them lucky even if they know logically that the
actions cannot have an effect on their fortunes.” SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra
note 63, at 143; see also SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 132–33 (noting that illusion of control, along
with overconfidence, seems especially rampant among day traders).
293. Vickers & Weiss, supra note 284, at 112 (quoting Professor Terrance Odean as noting
that “[c]ontrol is put forth as an unquestioned good, and the simple fact is that investors are not
in control of the stock market”).
294. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 59.
295. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Prob-
lems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 494–96 (1987)
(“[U]nrealistic optimism is prevalent among the population as a whole. . . . and [is] largely un-
related to age, sex, level of education, or occupational prestige.”).
296. BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 241, at 152 (describing many studies over the years,
which have shown that a wide variety of professionals, including securities analysts, tend to be
overconfident); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants
of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992) (arguing that experts “are often wrong
but rarely in doubt”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 660 (noting that “when the pertinent
events are not easily predictable and the feedback is unambiguous, experts tend to be even
more overconfident than laypersons”); Pamela Kent & Ron Weber, Auditor Expertise and the
Estimation of Dollar Error in Accounts, 34 ABACUS 120, 127 (1998) (finding overconfidence in
accountants); Stuart Oscamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 287, 287–93 (finding that psychologists were greatly overcon-
fident in their judgments).
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more overconfident than lay investors.297 Empirical studies show that
professional stock analysts who experience random success become
overconfident in their stock-picking prowess.298
Robert Citron, controller of Orange County comes to mind. He
likely would have done very well on an SEC-administered investor’s
test, but his overconfidence bankrupted wealthy Orange County.299
Boston University’s former president John Silber, who was almost as
smart as he thought he was, put twenty percent of the university’s
portfolio in a single biotech company, with disastrous results.300 Or
consider Long-Term Capital Management. The overconfidence of
Nobel laureates Robert Merton and Myron Scholes and of John
Meriwether, one of the most respected Wall Street traders in recent
memory, almost sank the entire American financial structure.301 Thus,
even issuer-level investors are subject to these cognitive limitations.302
In one version of his proposal, Choi would allow investors to
voluntarily self-select into appropriate regulatory categories.303 By be-
297. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery,
79 OR. L. REV. 301, 315 (2000) (“[N]ot only is the superstar trader more likely to be overconfi-
dent about his abilities, but his supervisors and co-workers are also likely to be overconfident
about the abilities of a trader that they respect and admire.”).
298. Gilles Hilary & Lior Menzly, Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfi-
dent? 28 (Apr. 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
299. See Agent Orange, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 19, 19 (“At the height of his success
Mr. Citron was confident enough to ridicule the acumen of investment bankers at Goldman
Sachs who tried to persuade him that he was riding for a fall.”).
300. SHILLER, BUBBLES, supra note 63, at 8–9.
301. See DUNBAR, supra note 1, at 45 (describing how LTCM’s troubles caused a “near
meltdown of the global financial system”); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE
RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 233–36 (2000) (noting the extreme
hubris of LTCM’s principals); Gregory Zuckerman, Long-Term Capital Chief Acknowledges
Flawed Tactics, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C1 (quoting Meriwether as saying that “[o]ur
whole approach was fundamentally flawed [and] I feel enormous remorse”).
302. See JACOBS, supra note 66, at 88–89 (noting several studies indicating that stock ana-
lysts are overly optimistic); Lucy F. Ackert & George Athanassakos, Prior Uncertainty, Analyst
Bias, and Subsequent Abnormal Returns, 20 J. FIN. RES. 263, 272 (1997) (finding that securities’
analysts are, on average, overly optimistic except in situations where uncertainty is low); Willard
T. Carleton et al., supra note 172, at 19 (finding that brokerage firms’ investment recommenda-
tions are more optimistic than the recommendations of nonbrokerage firms, although it is diffi-
cult to tell whether this is due to an unconscious optimism or a more studied pursuit of self-
interest); David Hirshleifer et al., Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors
Receive Information Before Others, 49 J. FIN. 1665, 1686 (1994) (finding that investment experts
are overconfident regarding their stock-picking abilities); Zuckerman, supra note 301, at C1
(noting that, before the stock market fall of 2000–2001, expert investors were optimistically
claiming that the new economy made P/E ratios irrelevant and that the bull market could go on
indefinitely).
303. Choi, supra note 7, at 312.
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lieving that investors will choose “just right” categories for them-
selves, Choi underestimates the overconfidence and overoptimism bi-
ases.
3. The False Consensus Effect. Another problem for Kira is the
false consensus effect, the tendency of people to believe that others
see the world as they do.304 This affects investors who often think that
because they believe that ABC is a stock worth buying, other inves-
tors will also.305 More importantly, people who are honest and who
personally view the commission of a brazen fraud as unthinkable may
falsely ascribe to their intermediaries, such as stockbrokers, a similar
worldview.306 Overconfidence and overoptimism exacerbate this vul-
nerability to fraudsters.
4. Insensitivity to the Source of Information. Another reason
Kira’s tendency will be to fail to realize that she is being defrauded
and to fail to contract to protect herself from that fraud is the general
human insensitivity to the source of information.307 This insensitivity,
among other factors, causes even trained auditors to tend to over-
weight explanations for accounting anomalies that are given by their
clients even though they are cognizant of their clients’ incentive to
mislead.308 If suspicious circumstances arise, auditors tend to focus
304. See Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 612–13 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (ex-
plaining the phenomenon). See generally Lee Ross et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 279 (1977) (same).
305. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 143 (describing how psy-
chological experiments show that people often think “‘[i]f I buy a stock, then others will proba-
bly want to buy the stock, too, because they are like me . . . .’”)
306. See Langevoort, supra note 245, at 107 (using a case study to explain how this effect
induces lawyers with crooked clients to overlook obvious frauds); Prentice, supra note 75, at 163
(noting a similar potential effect with auditors).
307. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 3, 7–11 (noting that decision-
makers suffer from, among other problems (a) insensitivity to predictability—for example, if
given a description of a company and asked to predict its profitability, people’s predictions tend
to remain the same regardless of whether the information is reliable or unreliable, and (b) the
illusion of validity—people will be confident in the prediction that a person is a librarian when a
description of that person matches a stereotype of a librarian, even if the information contained
in the description is scanty, unreliable, or outdated).
308. See Urton Anderson & Lisa Koonce, Explanation as a Method for Evaluating Client-
Suggested Causes in Analytical Procedures, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Fall 1995, at 124,
130 (finding that auditors have a tendency to find evidence supporting causes of unexpected fi-
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their attention on the client’s supposed integrity, and that factor
dominates the suspicious facts.309 Kira is likely to have the same diffi-
culty with her stockbroker’s explanations for facts that seem to con-
tradict its recommendations,310 especially because studies show that
people have difficulty disregarding information, even when they learn
that it is from an unreliable source.311 A recent empirical study
showed that people recognized that rumor sources were noncredible
and claimed that they were not influenced by them, but traded stocks
as if the rumors were news.312
Fraudulent acts by defendants can worsen this problem. Profes-
sors Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar note how the tobacco industry
often published pro-tobacco propaganda pieces under the names of
“independent” writers, hiding their links to the cigarette trade to
make the articles seem objective.313 Touting is a cottage industry in
the securities business these days314 and one that will move into larger
nancial statement fluctuations suggested by their clients); D. Eric Hirst & Lisa Koonce, Audit
Analytical Procedures: A Field Investigation, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 457, 474 (1996) (“[Audi-
tors] do not normally seek information that contradicts or refutes [client] explanations, unless
information comes to their attention indicating that an explanation may not be valid.”); Lisa
Koonce, Explanation and Counterexplanation During Audit Analytical Review, 67 ACCT. REV.
59, 74 (1992) (finding that auditors tend to evaluate hypotheses inherited from management as
more plausible than they really are).
309. See Mark E. Peecher, The Influence of Auditors’ Justification Processes on Their Deci-
sions: A Cognitive Model and Experimental Evidence, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 125, 136–39 (1996)
(finding that this effect is greater when the client had higher credibility than when it had lower
credibility).
310. Martha Brannigan, Victims of Investment Scams Seem Condemned to Repeat Past Er-
rors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1988, at 29 (describing the case of a fraud victim who “continued to
invest even though the saleswoman offered only excuses for why [the victim’s] prior ventures
hadn’t started paying off”).
311. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 307, at 7–11 (describing people’s insen-
sitivity to predictability, and describing, for example, how, if given a description of a company
and asked to predict its profitability, people’s predictions tend to remain the same regardless of
whether the information is reliable or unreliable).
312. Nicholas DiFonzo & Prashant Bordia, Rumor and Prediction: Making Sense (but Los-
ing Dollars) in the Stock Market, 71 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 329, 346
(1997) (“[R]umors do not have to be believed or trusted to powerfully affect trading, they sim-
ply have to make sense.”).
313. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1491.
314. See Noelle Knox, FBI Swoops Down on Wall Street Mob: Authorities Arrest 120 in
Farthest-Reaching Securities Fraud Yet, USA TODAY, June 15, 2000, at B1 (discussing how stock
touting was part of the Mob’s securities fraud scheme); E. Scott Reckard, SEC Files Internet
Stock Fraud Suit, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at C3 (describing a suit filed for touting via the
Internet); Dean Starkman & John R. Emshwiller, Authorities Probe Growing Wave of Stock-
Market Touts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at C1 (noting a rise in touting activity); Jonathan Weil
& Brenda L. Moore, Houston P.R. Firm Is Fined by SEC over Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
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quarters under investor regulation. Supposedly objective stock ana-
lysts are often subject to the grossest conflicts of interest.315 So even if
Kira is sensitive to the sources of her information, what seems to be
an objective source may not be objective at all. After all, under Choi’s
regime of investor regulation, it apparently is legal for Issuer A to pay
money to Analyst B to state her “objective” opinion that Issuer A’s
stock is a “steal” at current prices. Kira is unlikely to learn of A’s un-
der-the-table payments to B.
Critical to investor regulation is Choi’s assumption that people
will know when they need to bargain for fraud protection and when
they don’t. Unfortunately, people generally believe that they are
good at detecting when they are being lied to,316 when the behavioral
research shows that they are not.317 Most scholars conclude (a) “that
2000, at T2 (reporting the story of a firm that was fined for touting the stocks of microcap com-
panies without disclosing how much those companies had paid them in exchange).
315. See Gretchen Morgenson, Telecom’s Pied Piper: Whose Side Was He On?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2001, at BU3 (explaining how a stock analyst shared in the millions of dollars of fees
that his recommendations of telecom companies brought his firms in business from the compa-
nies he recommended, while costing investors millions in losses); Louis Lowenstein, Corporate
Governance and the Voice of the Paparazzi 52 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (noting that analysts “are under exquisite pressure to hear and see no ‘evil,’ to
write only upbeat reports about the companies which they too see as the source of business far
more profitable than the trading commissions that are the immediate raison d’être of those re-
ports”); see also Debbie Galant, The Hazards of Negative Research Reports, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, July 1990, at 73, 73 (noting the results of a survey in which sixty-one percent of sur-
veyed analysts reported that they had been pressured by employers into tempering negative re-
ports, and giving an example of when Donald Trump successfully intimidated a client into firing
an analyst with whom Trump was unhappy); Robert McGough, Bearish Call on Banks Lands
Analyst in Doghouse, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1999, at C1 (“It is no longer news that analysts’ rec-
ommendations may lack objectivity.”).
Hayward and Boeker recently performed an extensive empirical study of security ana-
lysts’ ratings of corporate equity securities, finding that if securities firms are hired by a client to
assist in a transaction, the firms’ financial analysts tend to assign higher ratings to the client’s
securities than other analysts. This conflict of interest is, they found, a dominant, entrenched
result, and the larger the client, the greater the effect. Mathew L.A. Hayward & Warren
Boeker, Power and Conflicts of Interest in Professional Firms: Evidence from Investment Bank-
ing, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1998).
316. See ARTHUR A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 84–87 (1976) (describing the difficulty
people have in believing that they could be fooled). Authors of popular books often give “tips”
to readers about how to detect liars. See, e.g., SUZETTE H. ELGIN, THE LAST WORD ON THE
GENTLE ART OF VERBAL SELF-DEFENSE 212–17 (1987) (teaching the art of protecting one’s
self from becoming susceptible to lies); HIRSH GOLDBERG, THE BOOK OF LIES 233–36 (1990)
(giving practical advice on avoiding others’ deception).
317. EVELIN SULLIVAN, THE CONCISE BOOK OF LYING 206 (2001) (“In scientifically con-
ducted experiments, the success rate of people being asked to sort out lies from truth, say by
watching people on videotape either lying or telling the truth, has been shown to be poor.”);
Annette Baier, Trust and Its Vulnerabilities, in 13 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 109,
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few people do better than chance in judging whether someone is lying
or truthful,” and (b) “that most people think they are making accu-
rate judgments even though they are not.”318 Choi’s sophisticated in-
vestors often do no better; “scams work all economic classes.”319
Langevoort is likely correct when he observes that “once a broker
successfully cultivates trust, willing reliance by the sophisticated in-
vestor—imprudent though it may seem in hindsight—is quite likely
and, for that reason alone, worthy of some protection.”320
Choi admits that a totally fraudulent brokerage firm might come
into existence and rip off everyone it can.321 In his mind this is a good
thing because “investors who choose intermediaries that fail to im-
plement any investor protections . . . pay less for intermediary serv-
ices.”322 For a wide variety of reasons covered in this Section, it is clear
that Choi’s observation may not be true. Unless investors have a good
sense of the likelihood of their being ripped off, they may not bargain
110 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1992) (noting that the bases of trust, such as feelings, beliefs, and
intentions can be faked by the other party, and concluding therefore that “[t]rust is a notori-
ously vulnerable good”); Shell, supra note 139, at 266 (“[H]uman perception overall is not a re-
liable defense to opportunistic behavior.”); Peter Vallentyne, The Rationality of Keeping
Agreements, in CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID
GAUTHIER’S MORALS BY AGREEMENT 177, 177 (Peter Vallentyne ed., 1991) (“[I]n the real
world, people’s dispositions are opaque enough that it is often possible to deceive others into
thinking that one is trustworthy.”).
Part of the problem comes from the confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance in that
people who place their trust in others search for data to confirm the wisdom of that action. See
David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 42 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (reporting evidence
indicating that “the nature of the information available to individuals, and the way they process
it, can serve to maintain an individual’s theory or theories about other people and society, even
though one might believe that a careful consideration of that information would lead to rejec-
tion of those theories”).
318. PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES 162 (1985). There are techniques that may work to de-
termine whether someone is lying. However, the clues liars give off are subtle and not many
people can detect them. Id.; see also Peter J. DePaulo et al., Lying and Detecting Lies in Organi-
zations, in IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION 377, 387 (Robert A. Giacalone
& Paul Rosenfeld eds., 1989) (describing an experiment in which participants had done no bet-
ter than chance in guessing when sales representatives were pushing products they believed in
and when they were pushing products they disliked).
319. ROBERT J. STEVENSON, THE BOILER ROOM AND OTHER TELEPHONE SALES SCAMS
110 (1998) (presenting a study by an ethnographer who worked in product boiler rooms).
320. Langevoort, supra note 145, at 631. Langevoort goes on to note that “[a]lthough bad
decisions by sophisticated buyers and instances of seller cheating (i.e., any abuse of trust to sell
an investment that is inconsistent with the buyer’s best interests) are surely the exception rather
than the rule . . . they should not be trivialized as ‘random noise’ in the study of investing.” Id.
321. Choi, supra note 7, at 295–96.
322. Id. at 296.
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for a lower price, and Choi only hopes that they will. He points opti-
mistically to customers who complain that Internet broker E*Trade is
slow in executing trades during times of high market volume, but are
compensated by paying only $14.95 per trade.323 If there were a strong
correlation between price charged and quality of service, Choi would
have a stronger point, but there is not.324
Indeed, investors most likely will not be able even to discover if
they are getting a good deal or not,325 which makes it rather difficult
for them to bargain to protect themselves. Many investors who save
money on commissions actually lose money overall because they do
not receive the best execution from the brokers.326 Many online bro-
kers are able to offer low commissions by getting order flow pay-
ments from market makers who often do not offer the best execu-
tion.327 Brokers never deign voluntarily to disclose information on
best execution, although the SEC has imposed some mandatory dis-
closure.328 As former SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt noted, “‘It just
323. Choi is talking about the difference between buying from Saks’s website and buying
from K-Mart’s website. But the real distinction is that between buying from Sears’s website and
buying from the website of a crook who takes the customer’s money never intending to send the
ordered merchandise.
324. Lack of correlation between fees and performance is far from unknown in the securities
industry. One of the early leading studies of mutual funds found “no significant relation be-
tween the rates of management fees and performance results nor between the initial sales
charges and performance results.” SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 366.
325. It is exceedingly difficult for investors, especially small investors, to determine whether
their brokers have sent their orders to the best market. See ALLEN FERRELL, THE
ALLOCATION OF INVESTORS’ ORDERS AND INEFFICIENT MARKET COMPETITION: A
PROPOSAL 18 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 281, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“It may very well be prohibitively expensive for many small investors to acquire the
necessary expertise and information to make a meaningful judgment about whether a broker
has sent their orders to the appropriate market. Indeed, many small investors are probably un-
aware that they are uninformed.”).
326. “Small orders have been routinely routed to securities markets offering inferior prices.”
Id.; see also Charles M.C. Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution for NYSE Listed Securi-
ties, 48 J. FIN. 1009, 1035 (1993) (finding evidence that “order flow patterns may be responsive
to cash inducements, rather than price execution”); Rachel Witmer, Options Markets: Payment
for Order Flow in Options Markets Affecting Order Routing, SEC Study Says, BNA SEC. L.
DAILY, Dec. 20, 2000, at 1 (reporting the results of a study finding that most firms accepting
payment for order flow do not pass the benefit on to customers).
327. Floyd Norris, SEC Is Seeking to Open the Curtains on Stock-Trading Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2000, at C1. Furthermore, as Ferrell notes, “[t]he more side payments a broker
receives, the lower its commission rate is likely to be. The full true cost of trading, as a result,
will not be fully reflected in the broker’s commission rate.” FERRELL, supra note 325, at 27.
328. Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Release No. 34-43590, 65 Fed.
Reg. 75,414 (Dec. 1, 2000); see also Greg Ip, New SEC Rules on Execution Disclosure Will Tell
Investors of Hidden Trade Costs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2000, at C1 (discussing the new rules).
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doesn’t make sense [that investors don’t know what happens after
they click ‘submit’] when you recognize that missing the best price by
the minimum increment available—1/16—on a 1,000-share order is
worth $62.50, an amount that dwarfs the commission of the online
firms.’”329 The investors’ situation in this regard likely will deteriorate
noticeably under Choi’s investor regulation model.
5. Oral Versus Written Communications. It is likely that Kira
will enter into a contract with a securities professional after a period
of negotiation. These negotiations likely will be oral, either in person
or via telephone,330 and eventually Kira will find a professional whom
she trusts. Once Kira decides that she likes a stockbroker or perceives
the broker’s intentions as being favorable, all her subsequent views of
that broker’s actions will be significantly influenced.331 Studies show
that people whose success depends on the efforts of others tend natu-
rally to form positive impressions of those on whom they depend.332
Once they decide to trust, they “overdraw” on the information avail-
able; this simplifies life and allows customers to act as though they
possessed real knowledge about a broker’s future conduct.333 Only af-
ter that trust and positive impression are established will the securi-
ties professional provide the written adhesion contract for Kira to
sign.334
Although Kira would be wise to read the contract in its extensive
detail and to bargain for fraud protection, she probably will not do so.
One simple reason is that in daily commercial intercourse, oral com-
munications trump written communications.335 Securities professionals
329. Ip, supra note 328, at C1 (quoting SEC Commissioner Levitt).
330. See Langevoort, supra note 145, at 629 (“Most investment sales interactions are oral,
occurring either over the telephone or in face-to-face meetings.”).
331. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1524 (“[C]onsumers can be significantly influ-
enced by their perceptions of a seller’s conduct and intentions.”).
332. Langevoort, supra note 245, at 99 (citing Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motiva-
tional Influences on Impression Management Formation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy-
Driven Attention and Individuating Processes, 53 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431 (1987)); Ziva
Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 486–87 (1990).
333. Klas Borell, Trust and Fraud: Occupation and Resistance in Norway, 1940–1945, 27 J.
POL. & MIL. SOC. 39 (1999).
334. This is not a phenomenon limited to lay investors. Hu notes evidence that “[s]ome
banks have exhibited a persistent tendency to commit verbally to swap transactions and docu-
ment them later.” Henry Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1491 (1993).
335. In arguing that investors are not as foolish as some believe when they fall prey to oral
misrepresentations and do not heed written warnings (e.g., when a stockbroker makes all sorts
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are well aware of this.336 Many consumer purchases result from oral
communications between consumer and sales representative, fol-
lowed by the signing of a form contract provided by the seller. In
most of these transactions, the parties’ true “meeting of the minds”
results solely from their oral communications. The writing plays no
part in the negotiation process. It is provided after the real agreement
is reached and is signed, typically by consumers who have, at most,
glanced at it. As Shiller notes:
The channels of human communication that we know today
seem to favor the interpersonal face-to-face and word-of-mouth
communication that developed over millions of years of evolution,
during times when such communication was virtually the only form
of interpersonal communication. The patterns of communication
hard-wired into our brains rely on there being another person’s
voice, another person’s facial expressions, another person’s emo-
tions, and an associated environment of trust, loyalty, and coopera-
tion. Because these elements are missing from the written or elec-
tronic word, people find it somewhat more difficult to react to these
of oral promises and then presents the investor with a contract stating that “the customer agrees
that no representations not appearing in this contract have been made”), Sachs points out:
[A]ny assessment of whether it is reasonable to rely on oral fraud must also reckon
with the possibility that oral statements are by their nature more seductive than writ-
ings. Indeed, the interpersonal dimension may make an oral statement seem more
persuasive than would a written statement, or it may reduce the likelihood that the
investor will evaluate the statement dispassionately. Courts ought to assess the rea-
sonableness of an investor’s reliance in light of this psychological reality.
Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 879, 911 (1994).
336. In counseling stockbrokers on how to effectively market securities, Drozdeck and
Gretz note:
According to Albert Mehrabian, 55 percent of our communication is through
posture, gestures, and facial expressions; 38 percent is through our tone of voice; and
only 7 percent through words themselves. These percentages have proved themselves
valid through scores of other studies that also indicate that 85 to 93 percent of com-
munication occurs below the conscious level of awareness. Therefore, in a face-to-
face presentation, you are able to deliver 100 percent of the message, while a tele-
phone presentation allows you to deliver only 45 percent; and a letter only 7 percent.
DROZDECK & GRETZ, supra note 168, at 222 (citing ALBERT MEHRABIAN, SILENT MESSAGE
248–57 (1971)); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Markets and Information Gathering in an Elec-
tronic Age: Securities Regulation in the 21st Century: Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for
Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 761–62 (1997):
[T]he permissibility of oral selling efforts during the waiting period invites promoters
to persuade buyers of the virtue of the investment before there is much of an oppor-
tunity for review of the required disclosure . . . [so that] salesmanship can readily
trump the late-arriving prospectus (if the investor ever had any inclination to read it
at all.
Louis Menard, Comp Time, NEW YORKER, Sept. 11, 2000, at 92, 94 (noting that even body lan-
guage can be more effective than written communications).
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sources of information. They cannot give these other sources the
same emotional weight, nor can they remember or use information
from these other sources as well. This is an important reason why we
still have teachers—why we cannot tell our children simply to sit
down and read books or rely on computer-aided instruction.337
The fact that investors generally will find oral representations
more persuasive than written disclaimers is true of institutional inves-
tors as well as lay investors, as Langevoort demonstrates.338
6. Other Heuristics and Biases. Other reasons that Kira will
hesitate to confront the intermediary over its form contract (and
likely elicit the “What, you don’t trust us?” response in an attempt to
shame her into signing the contract immediately)339 include the avail-
ability bias noted in Part II.C,340 and her realization that failure to
show trust poisons relationships.341 Additionally, while making deci-
sions, people tend to concentrate on facts that are “available” in their
memories. Thus, they are likely to give undue weight to vivid events,
underestimating the impact of pallid events, which may be just as im-
337. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 155.
338. Writing about both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, Langevoort argues that
it is inconsistent with human nature to expect them to read and rely on written warnings that
contradict oral statements made by a trusted person:
Ready characterization [by the courts] of a failure to read a dense and detailed pro-
spectus as “reckless” is troublesome on a number of levels. Most obviously, there is
an empirical problem. It is awkward to use the term reckless to describe behavior that
is quite normal and expected. Yet anecdotal evidence, supported by many people’s
assumptions about investment practices, indicates that most nonprofessional investors
do not read the prospectuses and other legal disclosure documents they are given. If
this perception is accurate, the court’s assumption that reasonable investors know
better than to rely on brokers’ oral representations and selling brochures is a flight
from reality.
Langevoort, supra note 145, at 682. Langevoort goes on to note that for sophisticated investors:
Reading a prospectus after accepting the recommendation of a broker whom the cus-
tomer is inclined to trust, then, is inconsistent with several phenomena: (1) the time-
saving and responsibility-shifting reasons for using that broker in the first place, (2)
the cognitive commitment to the broker as a credible source of recommendations,
and (3) the preference for making the investment. The motivation is not to read un-
less suspicions have otherwise been aroused.
Id. at 683–84.
339. See id. at 654 (noting that stockbrokers often pretend to be the customer’s friend be-
cause social mores don’t allow friends to challenge each other’s credibility).
340. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
341. See Carol M. Rose, Lecture, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 540–
41 (1995) (observing that in the absence of trust “constant monitoring and checking can poison
the atmosphere”).
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portant but are less memorable.342 Even professional investors are
more likely to capriciously buy assets that have their attention, just
because they have been thinking about them.343
Successful sellers of stocks, rather than focusing on drab numbers
like price/earnings ratios, “often tend to tell a story about the stock, a
vivid story describing the history of the company, the nature of the
product, and how the public is using the product.”344 Eisenberg rec-
ommends that beneficiaries not be allowed to waive the fiduciary
duty owed them by trustees, noting that
[b]eneficiaries would tend to give undue weight to their good rela-
tionship with the manager at the time of contract formation, because
that relationship is vivid, concrete, and instantiated, as compared
with the possibility that the manager would exploit the bargain at
some point in the future, which is abstract, general, and pallid.345
Obviously, Kira may react similarly to the vivid, good initial relation-
ship she has established with the broker.
There is also the representativeness heuristic, which causes peo-
ple to tend to judge probabilities by flouting numerous rules of statis-
tics and to focus instead upon the degree of similarity that an item
seems to bear to a category or parent population.346 Because of this in-
fluence, Kira “would tend to overestimate the extent to which the
342. See Eugene Borgida & Richard E. Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Con-
crete Information on Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 269 (1977) (finding that unre-
liable but vivid information had more impact than much more statistically reliable base rates);
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 30 (1998) (“A perva-
sive fact about human judgment is that people disproportionately weight salient, memorable, or
vivid evidence even when they have better sources of information.”).
343. See SHILLER, BUBBLES, supra note 63, at 5–6 (discussing a survey that showed institu-
tional investors’ holdings were influenced by attention getting past price increases in stock).
344. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 139. This is particularly impor-
tant because the vast majority of investors’ attention is drawn to stocks by tips from other peo-
ple rather than their own analysis from reading periodicals. Id. at 154. Shiller notes studies of
juries that highlight that the winning side in litigation is often that which can produce the most
compelling narrative for the jurors. Id. at 139; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Rea-
soning in Explanation-Based Decision Making, 49 COGNITION 123, 136 (1993) (demonstrating
that jurors construct narrative representations of evidence as part of their decisionmaking proc-
ess).
345. Eisenberg, supra note 276, at 249.
346. See generally DAWES, supra note 269, at 66–89 (explaining the representativeness heu-
ristic); PLOUS, supra note 150, at 109–20 (discussing the Kahneman and Tversky representative-
ness heuristic); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Rep-
resentativesness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 32, 33 (reporting on a
study of the use of the representativeness heuristic by Israeli high school students).
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present relationship with the [broker] is a reliable index of the future
relationship.”347
The representativeness heuristic plays a large role in investing,
leading investors to see patterns in truly random sequences348 and to
believe that recent winners are likely to keep on winning and recent
losers are likely to keep on losing.349 Even professionals are subject to
the bias; Professor Werner De Bondt demonstrates that security
analysts’ long-term earnings forecasts are biased in the direction of
recent success.350 And Professor Hersh Shefrin observes that institu-
tional investment committees tend to believe, based on the represen-
tativeness heuristic, that they can select successful money managers,
money managers with the proverbial “hot hand.”351
347. Eisenberg, supra note 276, at 249.
Related to this phenomenon, and reinforcing it, is the fundamental attribution error. In
this context, it induces Kira to believe that the relatively brief encounter she has with the securi-
ties professional gives her a firm basis to conclude what he is really like overall:
“The basis of the illusion is that we are somehow confident that we are getting
what is there, that we are able to read off a person’s disposition . . . . When you have
an interview with someone and have an hour with them, you don’t conceptualize that
as taking a sample of a person’s behavior, let alone a possibly biased sample, which is
what it is. What you think is that you are seeing a hologram, a small and fuzzy image
but still the whole person.”
Malcolm Gladwell, The New-Boy Network: What Do Job Interviews Really Tell Us?, NEW
YORKER, May 29, 2000, at 68, 72 (quoting University of Michigan psychologist Richard Nis-
bett); see also Daryl Koehn, Should We Trust in Trust?, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 183, 201 (1996) (“If we
are wise, we will treat our judgments of others’ character as suspect.”).
348. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 144 (citing work on the
representativeness heuristic by Tversky and Kahneman for the proposition that people make
judgments in uncertain situations by assuming future patterns will resemble past ones).
349. See De Bondt & Thaler, supra note 163, at 57 (finding that stock market professionals
overreact to recent market crashes or other dramatic events when forecasting future market be-
havior).
350. SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 16 (citing WERNER DE BONDT, EARNINGS FORECASTS
AND SHARE PRICE REVERSALS (1992) for the proposition that analysts are more optimistic
about recent winners than recent losers).
351. Id. at 213. Certainly lay investors have a similar tendency to erroneously choose in-
vestment advisers with poor long-term records on the basis of a recent short-term success. See
Mark Hulbert, The Ways of One-Year Wonders, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at BU8 (discussing
academic studies indicating that while some advisors may have hot hands they are still not
beating the market).
Shefrin points out other problems with institutional investors, based largely on frame
dependence, the notion that decisions can be influenced based on how information is couched:
Placing funds with an active money manager is typically a bad bet. Yet institu-
tions continue to hire active money managers. Why?
The short answer is that the individuals who serve on institutional investment
committees exhibit frame dependence and heuristic-driven bias. When it comes to
framing, committee members tend to think of portfolios as a series of mental ac-
counts, with associated reference points known as benchmarks. Therefore, committee
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7. General Psychological Susceptibility to Influence. As Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein notes, “[a] primary claim of behavioral economics is
that human preferences and values are constructed, rather than sim-
ply elicited, by social situations. . . . [P]references can be a product of
procedure, description, and context at the time of choice.”352 In other
words, sellers can influence people to believe that they want or need
things that, absent the persuasive effort, they would not buy. Hanson
and Kysar have written extensively on this point in the context of
product marketing generally,353 and tobacco marketing specifically.354
This is surely what stockbrokers do as well, even with sophisticated
investors.355
Professor Robert Cialdini posits six basic categories of influence
technique that “compliance professionals” (advertisers, marketers,
stockbrokers, etc.) can use to influence the behavior of human be-
ings.356 Even intelligent, educated consumers and investors are subject
to these techniques. The techniques will not work all the time, but
most people will be subject to their influence much of the time. Most
call on “fixed-action patterns” in which a certain action elicits a
nearly automatic psychological response. Cialdini believes that rather
than thinking rationally about the stimulus, people’s minds tend to go
“click, whirr”357 and respond in a patterned manner.358 Stockbrokers
members tend to mistake variety in manager “styles” for true diversification. In addi-
tion, reference-point thinking leads people to give opportunity costs less weight than
out-of-pocket costs of the same magnitude.
SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 213.
352. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 115, 117 (2000).
353. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 635 (“[M]arket outcomes frequently will be heavily
influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the format of information,
the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within which market transactions oc-
cur.”). If product consumers are easily manipulated, investors likely are also.
354. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1467–1553 (presenting a case study on manufac-
turer manipulation in the tobacco industry).
355. See Langevoort, supra note 145, at 634 (“It should be recognized that intuitively, the
role of the [stock] salesperson is to shape demand, and, whether or not we like to admit it, such
a role extends to interactions with sophisticated customers.”) (emphasis added).
356. See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1993)
(discussing various means through which compliance practitioners are able to stimulate shortcut
responses by giving certain signals for them).
357. One of the biggest failings of economic reasoning’s rational man model is that it fails to
recognize that much human behavior is based upon unconscious factors. See JACOBY, supra
note 74, at 28 (“[A] considerable amount of research over the past two decades reveals that
much, perhaps most, human behavior is controlled by unconscious, not conscious factors.”).
358. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 3–5. As a modest example, Cialdini notes that when peo-
ple ask others for a favor, they will be more successful if they provide a reason. Id. at 20–22. For
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and others have used six techniques to influence investors to make
investments that were perhaps not in the investors’ best interest.
Among the six principles that Cialdini distills is that of reciproca-
tion. Many societies follow the notion that if someone does something
for you, you have an obligation to do something for them.359 Stock-
brokers who are initially unsuccessful in making a sale are counseled
to offer something free (such as a free valuation of the customer’s
portfolio, which will require the customer to provide valuable per-
sonal information) to the potential customer to take advantage of this
human reaction.360
Cialdini’s second principle is commitment and consistency:
“Once we make a choice or take a stand, we will encounter personal
and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commit-
ment.”361 In our society, a high degree of consistency is associated with
logic, rationality, and honesty, whereas inconsistency is viewed quite
negatively.362 Marketers in several fields successfully have used this
technique to induce people to buy products they likely did not want
example, one study found that if people are in line for a copying machine, they will be successful
ninety-four percent of the time if they say: “Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox
machine because I’m in a rush.” Id. at 3. However, they will be successful only sixty percent of
the time if they provide no reason: “Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox ma-
chine?” Id. at 4. However, if they provide a reason, even if it seems bogus, their success rate will
be ninety-three percent: “Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine because I
have to make some copies?” Id. at 4–5. Cialdini explains that “the word because triggered an
automatic compliance response from Langer’s subjects, even when they were given no subse-
quent reason to comply. Click, whirr.” Id. at 5.
359. For an illustrative experiment, see Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on
Compliance, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 627, 630–32 (1971). A subject was placed in a
room with “Joe.” Id. at 21. Supposedly they were there to rate paintings as part of an experi-
ment in “art appreciation.” Id. In some instances, Joe left the room for a couple of minutes and
came back with a couple of sodas, telling the subject: “I asked him [the experimenter] if I could
go get myself a Coke, and he said it was OK, so I bought one for you, too.” Id. at 21–22. In other
instances, Joe did not do the favor. Id. at 22. At the end of the experiment, Joe asked the subject
to buy 25 cent raffle tickets for a $50 prize. Id. Later, the subject was asked how much he liked
Joe. Id. As a general rule, the more the subject had liked Joe, the more tickets the subject had
bought. Id. However, when Joe had done the subject a favor, even those who had disliked Joe
bought as many tickets as those who had liked him. Id.
Cialdini attributed the phenomenal early success of the Hare Krishnas in this country
to this principle. Id. at 23–25. They began surprising people in airports with the gift of a flower
or a book and then asked for donations with great success. Id. at 23. Only when people learned
techniques for avoiding the gift did the Krishnas’ financial situation start to decline. Id. at 23–25.
360. See LEROY GROSS, THE ART OF SELLING INTANGIBLES: HOW TO MAKE YOUR
MILLION($) BY INVESTING OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 122 (rev. ed. 1985) (“Properly handled,
the offer of a free service will be accepted more than 50 percent of the time.”).
361. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 51.
362. Id. at 52.
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or need,363 and stockbrokers also have employed the technique.364
Once investors, even sophisticated investors, choose a stockbroker,
then for consistency reasons they will wish strongly to trust that bro-
ker regardless of formal warnings to the contrary.365
363. Cialdini notes that he had always wondered why big companies such as Procter &
Gamble or General Foods often ran contests where customers had to write, in twenty-five
words or less why they liked a particular product. Id. at 67. Once people put in writing that they
like a product, the commitment and consistency concept makes them much more loyal custom-
ers. Id. at 67–68. As another example, door-to-door sales companies using high-pressure tech-
niques started suffering high numbers of cancellations after states enacted home solicitation
statutes giving customers three days to back out of a deal. Id. They quickly learned that the can-
cellation rate was much lower if they had the customer rather than the salesperson fill out the
sales agreement. Id. The act of filling out the contract greatly increased the customer’s personal
commitment to the sale and made it psychologically more difficult to back out. Id. at 67.
In World War II, psychologist Kurt Lewin greatly increased people’s consumption of
intestinal meats by having them make a public commitment to do so. See Kurt Lewin, Group
Decision and Social Change, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 197, 197 (Eleanor E. Mac-
coby et al. eds., 3d ed. 1958). More recently, this technique has been successfully used to reduce
teen promiscuity. See Diana Jean Schemo, Virginity Pledges by Teenagers Can Be Highly Effec-
tive, Federal Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2001, at A22 (summarizing data showing that vol-
untary virginity pledges work to postpone sex among adolescents).
364. Brannigan, supra note 310, at 33:
Some victims [of stock frauds] are reluctant to accept that they have been swin-
dled and continue sending money to a boiler room “because they have a stake in the
investment,” says Mr. [Kent C.] Neal of the Broward County state attorney’s office.
Albert Krieger, a 68-year-old retiree in Gackle, N.D., says over the course of a year
starting in August 1985, he invested $300,000 in some 11 oil partnerships through
[fraudsters] Miller & McKinzie in Fort Lauderdale. “When you’re in that deep,” he
says, “you don’t want to believe you’re in a bad investment.”
These words are very reminiscent of those in an experiment recounted in CIALDINI,
supra note 356, at 100–05. In a famous study, social scientists Festinger, Riecken and Schachter
joined a doomsday cult. Id. at 100. When the appointed hour came and went and neither the
flood that would end civilization nor the spaceships that would save the cult members arrived,
most of the cult members actually became more, rather than less, committed to the demonstra-
bly bogus (to outsiders) cult. Id. at 105. One of the cult leaders stated: “I’ve had to go a long
way. I’ve given up just about everything. I’ve cut every tie. I’ve burned every bridge. I’ve turned
my back on the world. I can’t afford to doubt. I have to believe. And there isn’t any other
truth.” Id.
Investors have similar reactions. A gold investor who became so enthralled with the
metal that he actually bought gold mines, sought investors, and watched the price of gold drop
70% between 1980 and today while missing out on the 1200% rise in the Dow Jones said:
“Every day, I want to give up . . . . But what do I do? I have eighteen hundred share-
holders. We have three kids to educate. It’s brutal. There are days when I have to
force myself to get out of bed to see the gold price. I just hope I’m going to be right
one more time.”
James Collins, Gold People, NEW YORKER, July 17, 2000, at 32, 35 (quoting Michael Levinson,
a gold investor).
365. Langevoort notes:
Most investors lack the time or information necessary to digest all information relat-
ing to potential investments, yet they feel substantial pressure to act. They anticipate
the sort of regret that comes when they have no one to blame for making unwise
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The third basic principle is social proof, the notion that people in
a particular situation tend to take their cues for correct behavior from
others they observe.366 This is why laugh tracks work for television
shows, and why a person in trouble is often better off having only one
person be nearby rather than fifty.367 This is generally a sensible heu-
ristic—if everyone else is acting in a particular way, it is likely the
proper way to act. Marketers long have used this technique to market
all manner of products as “best-selling” or “fastest-growing.” “Man
on the street” testimonials also draw on this principle, because people
are more likely to draw their cues from people they view as similar to
themselves. Securities often are marketed in the same manner.368 In-
deed, social proof is a key explanation for the persistent success of
Ponzi schemes. As Shiller explains:
A critical observation to be made about these examples of Ponzi
schemes is that initial investors were reportedly very skeptical about
the schemes and would invest only small amounts. A story about an
arbitrage profit opportunity in postage reply coupons [the scam of
the original Charles Ponzi], if merely told directly, without the evi-
dence that it had made others a lot of money, would not sound
choices but themselves, and thus they are highly motivated to seek out apparent ex-
perts, such as stockbrokers and investment advisers, shifting away the locus of re-
sponsibility. Having committed to a particular expert, of course, investors feel a
strong tendency to bolster their choice. Under these circumstances, reliance is apt to
occur regardless of formal warnings or disclosures. To heed them against the recom-
mendation of one’s chosen broker or adviser is to admit the possibility that one has
chosen foolishly.
Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 879 (1995) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted).
366. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 95 (“We view a behavior as correct in a given situation to
the degree that we see others performing it.”).
367. The notion of “pluralistic ignorance” may explain why cases like the Kitty Genovese
case occur. A woman is attacked in broad daylight several times over a period of some minutes.
Thirty-eight witnesses see or hear the event and no one calls for help. See A.M. ROSENTHAL,
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES 30–45 (1964) (recounting details of the attack). In such a case, peo-
ple often think: “If something were really wrong, someone else would be helping or calling the
police. Since nobody else is concerned, nothing must be wrong.” See BIBB LATANE & JOHN M.
DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? 125 (1968) (observing
that, if bystanders see other bystanders being passive, they may be misled into thinking the
situation must not be serious); Bibb Latane & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander
Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 221 (1968) (describing a
study, which found “that individuals are less likely to engage in socially responsible action if
they think other bystanders are present”).
368. Experts in securities sales urge brokers to identify their customers who are most vul-
nerable to social proof and to make continual references to how popular the product or service
is. See DROZDECK & GRETZ, supra note 168, at 177, 186, 192 (describing techniques for per-
suading socially oriented people-persons to invest).
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credible enough to entice many investors. Investors do not become
truly confident in the scheme until they see others achieving large
returns.369
The principle works just as effectively on those Choi would term
“issuer-level investors” as it does on “unsophisticated investors.”370 A
classic example is the New Era scandal of the early 1990s. John G.
Bennett, Jr. made what seems in retrospect to have been a fantastical
proposition to charitable institutional investors: “Give your money to
me for six months, and I will return twice as much by matching it with
gifts from anonymous donors.” It was a classic Ponzi scheme—the
anonymous donors did not exist—but bank presidents, money man-
agers, former Treasury Secretaries, and all manner of sophisticated
investors were taken in. Why? They saw other people like themselves
invest in the scheme, and that convinced them to invest as well:
This is the dirty secret of experts. Outsiders view them with awe,
particularly when their field is an abstruse one such as investing. But
in truth, experts are courageous or impressionable, independent or
conventional, in the same degrees as other two-legged beasts. And
all of an expert’s brains and training will not count for much if, at
the crucial moment, he relies on somebody else’s brains instead of
his own.371
The principles underlying social proof also may account for the
inefficient “herding” behavior often observed in the securities mar-
369. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 66. In the setting of a Ponzi
scheme, “[e]ach victim thinks that the others must know what they are doing. ‘Surely,’ each
thinks, ‘they can’t all be as ignorant as I am.’” Rose, supra note 341, at 552 (citing LEFF, supra
note 316, at 80–81).
370. See Bradley Hitchings & Stan Crock, The Fast-Buck Artist Is Alive and Well and Selling
Dubious Investments, BUS. WK., Dec. 30, 1985, at 143, 143 (discussing Bank of America’s falling
for a Ponzi scheme of junk mortgages).
371. Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value: Why Gurus Weren’t Wise to New Era’s Wiles, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 1995, at C1.
Another example is Chris Bagdasarian’s Normandy America scam. Bagdasarian had a
net worth of $3 million but claimed one of $400 million; he also managed $45 million of other
people’s money but claimed to manage $731 million. He induced “sophisticated” Salomon
Brothers to underwrite a $200 million offering with just a little help from a fraudulent account-
ant. As Choi himself has observed, “[i]n the end, no one asked Bagdasarian for any real evi-
dence of his net worth or investing prowess. Instead, the financial institutions and their execu-
tives relied on one another.” Choi, supra note 214, at 917; see also Roger Lowenstein, Even
Vigilant Gatekeepers Can Blow It, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1996, at C1 (relating the facts of the
Bagdasarian scandal).
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kets.372 And they account for phenomena such as the spectacular run-
up of Enron stock in the late 1990s. Analysts overlooked trouble signs
simply because Enron was fashionable with other analysts.373 As Shil-
ler notes, even “[p]rofessionals ultimately must end up generally as-
suming that what their colleagues believe is true.”374
Cialdini’s fourth principle is that “we most prefer to say yes to the
requests of people we know and like.”375 This “liking principle” is no
surprise and holds the key to the success of the Tupperware Home
Parties Corporation, which persuades people to buy plastic goods
they neither want nor need by transforming their friends into the
seller’s agents.376 Individuals tend to like people who are physically at-
tractive, who are similar to themselves, and who compliment them.
Cialdini notes that people are “phenomenal suckers for flattery” and
tend to believe praise and to like those who provide it even when it is
372. BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 241, at 182–84. They attribute the herding effect to
the fact that “people tend to conform to the behavior of others.” Id. at 176; see also Hirshleifer
et al., supra note 302, at 1689 (modeling herding behavior even among professional money
managers); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 465, 466 (1990) (producing a model showing that money managers concerned with
their reputations might choose to mimic the behavior of other money managers); Mark Hulbert,
Leaders of the Pack Mentality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at BU7 (noting a new academic study
by Patrick J. Dennis of the University of Virginia and Deon Strickland of Ohio State University
showing that large money managers are even more prone than lay investors to quickly dumping
their shares during market corrections, thereby exaggerating declines); SHILLER, BUBBLES, su-
pra note 63, at 11 (discussing the relevance of theories of herding behavior and “groupthink” for
professional investors). Herding behavior is widespread in the markets, but insufficiently ac-
counted for in traditional economic theory. See BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 241, at 19
(“[E]conomic theory was essentially at a loss—even if economists wouldn’t admit it—to explain
why people stampede to invest in the stock of companies for no better reason than that other
investors were doing the same.”). But see SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI & SUNIL SHARMA, HERD
BEHAVIOR IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: A REVIEW 27 (Int’l Monetary Fund Inst., Working Paper
No. WP/00/48, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (observing that in developing coun-
tries “investment managers do not exhibit significant herd behavior and [their] tendency to herd
is highly correlated with a manager’s tendency to pursue momentum investment strategies”).
373. “Wall Street is a fashion show and Enron was fashionable,” says Mark Roberts,
director of research at Off Wall Street, a consulting firm. “The analysts were not
analysing [sic], they were believing. They overlooked signs that there might be trouble
because they were personally enthused.”
McNulty, supra note 114, at 13; see also James K. Glassman, What to Learn from the Fall of En-
ron, a Firm That Fooled So Many, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 10, 2001, at 10 (noting, in a story
about Enron, that “[i]f a few top analysts start buying a story, then practically every analyst buys
the story”).
374. SHILLER, BUBBLES, supra note 63, at 7.
375. CIALDINI, supra note 356 , at 136.
376. See Rex Taylor, Marilyn’s Friends and Rita’s Customers: A Study of Party-Selling as
Play and as Work, 26 SOC. REV. 573, 590–92 (1978) (studying the dynamics of such selling
methods).
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likely untrue.377 He notes that people “have such an automatically
positive reaction to compliments that [they] can fall victim to some-
one who uses them [even] in an obvious attempt to win [their] favor.
Click, whirr.”378 Securities marketers use this all the time.379 It seems
obvious that the striking success of “affinity scams” relates to this
principle.380 Even sophisticated investors often fall victim to such
schemes.381
Fifth, Cialdini notes the impact of authority. He refers to the fa-
mous Stanley Milgram experiments when subjects continued to give
what they thought were painful and even life-threatening electric
shocks to confederates of the experimenter simply because they were
377. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 145.
378. Id.
379. Experts recommend to stockbrokers that while they need not become their clients’
closest friends, they should “learn what most friends would know about significant changes in
their life situation . . . [such as] [t]he birth of a child, the death of a loved one, the changing of a
job.” DROZDECK & GRETZ, supra note 168, at 16; see also GROSS, supra note 360, at 85 (giving
an example of how the author used flattery to sell shares to a company president).
380. Affinity scams occur when members of religious, ethnic, or other groups prey on other
members of their group with a “Hey, I’m one of you so you can trust me” approach. Religious
groups seem to be particularly vulnerable, because perpetrators prey on victims’ religious faith.
See generally Antifraud: Religious Groups Members Vulnerable to ‘Affinity Fraud,’ NASAA
Warns, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 2, 1999 (describing a $200 million scam originating in Florida
involving fundamentalist Christians, as well as similar scams in Texas, Illinois, and Wisconsin);
Ianthe J. Dugan, Broken Trust: A Young Man’s Talk of Stock Riches Lures Host of ‘Regular
Folks,’ WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2000, at A1 (discussing an affinity scam in Washington, D.C. that
victimized African Americans); Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Churchgoers Are the Prey as Scams Rise,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1989, at C1 (noting $450 million in affinity scams targeting Lutheran minis-
ters, Baptists, Jews, Mormons, black church goers, Hispanic Catholics, and others); Louis Lav-
elle, N.J. Man Took Investors for $2.8M, SEC Says Black Communities Targeted in Alleged
Scam, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Oct. 1, 1999, at B1 (describing an affinity fraud targeting
African Americans); Brenton R. Schlender, Religion and Loyal Investors Play Big Role in Al-
leged Trading Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1985, at 19 (describing a $70 million scam involving
mostly Seventh Day Adventists); Randall Smith, Loss-Plagued Baptist Foundation of Arizona
Undergoes Investigation by Regulators in State, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1999, at C1 (noting $100
million dollar loss by Baptist organization in what “could turn out to be an example of what
state securities regulators call ‘affinity fraud’”).
381. Joseph Borg, Affinity Fraud Takes in Friends and Relatives, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Dec. 8, 1998, at 6B (noting that the victims of affinity schemes can be members of
the same profession, such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers, and describing a scam that cost
thousands of doctors over $50 million). Arguably, the infamous New Era scandal is an example
of this, as well-heeled fraudster John G. Bennett, Jr. scammed numerous well-heeled investors,
such as former Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, Philadelphia bank president Richard
Smoot, money manager Julian Robertson, and many others. See Lowenstein, supra note 371, at
C1 (remarking with amazement that such exalted wise men could fall for the equivalent of a
schoolboy’s chain letter).
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told to do so by someone in a position of authority.382 Obviously mar-
keters use this principle all the time with “three out of four doctors
recommend” and even “I’m not a doctor, but I play one on TV”
ploys. Cialdini notes that “[w]hen in a click, whirr mode, [people] are
often as vulnerable to the symbols of authority as to the substance.”383
Based on such evidence, Shiller notes, “it is not at all surprising that
many people are accepting of the perceived authority of others on
such matters as stock market valuation.”384 Stockbrokers often use
this susceptibility to market securities.385
Finally, Cialdini notes the “rule of the few”—“that opportunities
seem more valuable to us when they are less available.”386 Advertisers
often use this scarcity principle to persuade consumers by advertising
that “only a limited number have been minted” or that the offer is for
a “limited time only.” In one study, researchers found that subjects
who tasted one cookie in a jar that contained only two cookies rated
the cookie higher than did those who tasted an identical cookie in a
jar of ten even if they didn’t rate the cookies as tasting any better.
Even though the first cookie didn’t taste any better, it was less avail-
able and therefore more desirable.387 Cialdini illustrates this principle
by citing a standard securities boiler room tactic: an investor is called
by a sales representative who simply attempts to induce the customer
to accept some literature about the firm.388 A second call describes the
great potential profits of a deal in which, it turns out, it is no longer
possible to invest.389 The third call gives the customer an opportunity
382. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 173–77 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO
AUTHORITY (1974)).
383. Id. at 180.
384. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 151.
385. See DROZDECK & GRETZ, supra note 168, at 279 (reminding stockbrokers that they are
recognized experts upon whom investors will rely for advice); GROSS, supra note 360, at 68 (en-
couraging stockbrokers to use endorsements as a sales technique).
386. CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 195. Unsurprisingly, Benjamin Cheever’s recent article in
the New Yorker about his brief career as a car salesman contained illustrations of all six of
Cialdini’s principles. See Benjamin Cheever, How to Sell Cars, NEW YORKER, Apr. 24 & May 1,
2000, at 136, 136–38 (illustrating the liking principle); id. at 140 (illustrating the reciprocation
principle); id. at 144 (illustrating the social proof and authority principles); id. at 154 (illustrating
the commitment, consistency, and availability principle).
387. See CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 209 (citing Stephen Worchel et al., Effects of Supply
and Demand on Ratings of Object Value, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 906, 910
(1975)).
388. Id. at 201 (citing Peter Kerr, Officials Warn Public on Frauds by Phone, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1983, at 12).
389. Id.
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to invest in a deal, but only if he acts immediately.390 The strategy is to
frame the matter as an opportunity about to be lost and to impart a
sense of desirability and urgency by threatening to take away the car-
rot being dangled before the investor.391 Brokers often urge investors
to act quickly, before a particular opportunity passes.392
All of these strategies are persuasive; stockbrokers often use
them to induce investors to make unwise investments.393
8. Calculating Probabilities. Investor regulation assumes that
Kira (a) will realize when she is in danger of being defrauded, (b) will
be able to rationally contract to avoid the danger, and (c) will be able
to calculate exactly how much risk of fraud she faces and how much it
is worth to her to pay for contractual protection from such fraud. It is
already clear that the first two assumptions are questionable. But
even if Kira did realize that she was in danger of being defrauded, she
would have great difficulty in calculating the odds of that danger or
rationally converting those odds into contractual terms.
First, although Choi argues that “rational investors with ade-
quate information on the risks posed by intermediaries will adjust the
amount they are willing to pay,”394 I am unsure exactly what informa-
tion Choi believes investors need to make such judgments. What in-
formation does Kira need to determine the odds that her brokerage
firm will assign her an individual broker with a drinking and gambling
habit who will churn her account?395 If the firm could determine that
such a broker were engaging in risky behavior, it might well fire him
(one would hope). How is Kira to make such a judgment? There are
many brokers with these and similar problems. Each top-notch bro-
390. Id.
391. See Kerr, supra note 388, at 12 (describing how 81-year-old Daniel Gulban lost his life
savings); see also GROSS, supra note 360, at 83 (telling stockbrokers that “[t]he sense-of-loss
close is probably the most universally accepted of all closes as well as the most powerful close
for any seller of intangibles to use on any prospect”).
392. See GROSS, supra note 360, at 115 (suggesting to stockbrokers that they should “[i]f
possible, present a product that has the appeal of scarcity”); MARTIN D. SHAFIROFF & ROBERT
L. SHOOK, SUCCESSFUL TELEPHONE SELLING IN THE ‘90S, at 84 (1990) (suggesting this tactic as
a technique for stockbrokers).
393. See generally Langevoort, supra note 365, at 879 (describing several such techniques
that stockbrokers are trained to use).
394. Choi, supra note 7, at 295.
395. For a frightening portrait of the completely crooked broker, and evidence that this type
of broker is an unfortunately common scourge, see Calvin Trillin, Marisa and Jeff, NEW
YORKER, July 10, 2000, at 26 (describing the personalities involved in the recent insider trading
scandal in Smith Barney’s control-group).
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kerage firm in the country has some of them in its ranks, so it is diffi-
cult to use reputation as a proxy.396 How do investors calculate these
odds? Or how do investors calculate the odds that a respected firm
like Prudential will undertake a massive, nationwide fraud,397 or that a
respected firm like Morgan Stanley will have employees who want to
“rip her face off” even though she is a client?398
People are not good at calculating probabilities in general,399
tending to substitute simple rule-of-thumb heuristics, such as the
availability and representativeness biases, for statistical accuracy.400
Kira, even if she studies hard for her investor exam and earns a high
score, likely will not overcome this limitation. Scholars suggest that
people in general,401 and professionals such as auditors402 and physi-
396. In the analogous realm of products liability where it has been argued that consumers
can use reputation as a proxy for product quality and safety, Slawson has pointed out:
First, whatever the producer’s reputation, the particular product the consumer buys
may fall short of it. In order adequately to protect themselves against this eventuality,
consumers would have to understand the probabilities of each respect in which the
product might fall short, how great a loss or injury such a defect probably would
cause, and what rights, if any, the contract of sale provides for their protection if such
a defect should occur. Second, consumers have no way of quantifying a producer’s
reputation; that is, no effective way of estimating how much higher a price it is worth.
SLAWSON, supra note 178, at 27.
397. See generally SHARP, supra note 165 (describing the Prudential-Bache fraud scandal).
398. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
399. See JACOBY, supra note 74, at 39 (noting that many people “haven’t the foggiest idea of
how to work with independent and especially joint probabilities”).
400. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 346, at 32 (“[P]eople do not follow the principles of
probability theory in judging the likelihood of uncertain events.”); Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichten-
stein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Process-
ing in Judgment, 6 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649, 724 (1971) (stating that people
have great difficulty weighting and combining information to make probabilistic decisions and
therefore “resort to simplified decision strategies, many of which lead them to ignore or misuse
relevant information”).
401. See Stanley F. Biggs & John J. Wild, An Investigation of Auditor Judgment in Analytical
Review, 60 ACCT. REV. 607, 622 (1985) (noting that “[e]vidence from experimental studies indi-
cates that most individuals lack the ability to make accurate extrapolations,” in part because
they cannot intuitively deal with quantitative data, they use nonoptimal heuristics, and they are
deficient in the ability to extrapolate from a relatively simple time-series); Robin M. Hogarth &
Hillel J. Einhorn, Order Effects in Belief Updating: The Belief-Adjustment Model, 24 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 1, 38 (1992); Wilfred C. Uecker, A Behavioral Study of Information System Choice,
16 J. ACCT. RES. 169, 181–82 (1978) (finding in study of accounting students results consistent
with other studies showing that learning in complex probabilistic environments is very difficult
for humans).
402. See Stephen K. Asare & Arnold M. Wright, Evaluation of Competing Hypotheses in
Auditing, 16 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 1, 11 (1997) (finding that auditors, rather than
reasoning in accordance with Bayes’s theorem, tend to use a boundedly rational approach by
evaluating competing hypotheses independently and thereby sacrificing decisional efficiency for
gains in decision confidence and cognitive economy); Lee Roy Beach & James R. Frederickson,
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cians,403 tend, rather than doing the Bayesian rational thing of evalu-
ating evidence with respect to both a hypothesis under consideration
and its alternative, to evaluate the evidence with respect to a single
hypothesis because it is simpler.404
One other point about probabilities is that behavioral studies
demonstrate that people tend to ignore low probability risks.405 This
finding is illustrated by the fact that most people did not use seatbelts
before use was legally required.406 Nor do they buy flood insurance
even when it is available.407 Thus, if due to overoptimism or some
other cause, Kira deems it quite unlikely that the intermediary will
defraud her, she will tend simply to ignore the possibility of that hap-
pening while negotiating her contract.408 Financial models assembled
by sophisticated investors also tend to ignore low probability events.409
Audit Decisions, in DECISION MAKING IN THE WORKPLACE: A UNIFIED PERSPECTIVE 91, 95
(Lee Roy Beach ed., 1996) (“[I]t is highly unlikely that audit evidence is used in a strictly Baye-
sian manner . . . . The auditor’s judgments of what constitutes ‘close enough’ or materially cor-
rect are determined by many nonstatistical variables.”); Michael A. Crosby, Implications of
Prior Probability Elicitation on Auditor Sample Size Decisions, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 585, 592 (1980)
(finding that “the lack of correspondence between the Bayesian [sample sizes] and judgmental
sample sizes [produced by individual auditors] may indicate that auditors are not Bayesian in-
formation processors, that they rely instead on some kind of judgmental heuristic or a sequen-
tial or contingent processing model”).
403. See David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Op-
portunities, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 249, 249 (finding “that
physicians do not manage uncertainty very well, that many physicians make major errors in
probabilistic reasoning, and that these errors threaten the quality of medical care”).
404. The heuristics that investors use in place of Bayesian rationality are often termed “in-
vestor sentiment.” SHLEIFER, supra note 63, at 12, 113–14.
405. Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 570 (1989) (discussing how
people make judgments about events that carry serious consequences but are not likely to hap-
pen); Paul Slovic et al., Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 260 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) (same).
406. Richard Arnould & Henry Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market
Failure, 12 BELL J. ECON. 27, 28–29 (1981).
407. See Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL’Y
227, 255 (1976) (finding that consumers used simple rules of thumb in deciding whether to pur-
chase earthquake or flood insurance).
408. Issacharoff suspects that factors such as this factor, when coupled with illusion of con-
trol and overconfidence, tend to account for the fact that employees tend to underweigh protec-
tion from premature dismissal when negotiating employment contracts. Samuel Issacharoff,
Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783,
1801 (1996). Garvin notes that in negotiating contracts generally, overoptimism and under-
appreciation for remote risks leads parties to “undervalue the risk of breach, and thus [they] will
set too low a risk premium.” Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk,
Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 151 (1998).
409. Hu, supra note 334, at 1489.
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9. Anchoring and Adjustment and the Status Quo Bias. Human
minds are easily anchored to a particular suggested point. When new
information arises, people adjust for it, but typically not in a sufficient
amount.410 Thus, morticians who wish to sell an expensive coffin likely
will first show their most expensive one to prospective buyers to an-
chor the buyers to that price range. Although the buyers may not
purchase the most expensive model, they are much more likely to
purchase a relatively expensive one than if they first had been shown
a cheap coffin.411 Studies indicate that even trained auditors412 and se-
curities analysts413 are affected significantly by the anchor and adjust-
ment phenomenon.
Thus, when the intermediary presents Kira with a contract that
contains a “no fraud liability” provision, it frames the negotiations.
People prefer what they perceive to be the status quo.414 Thus, studies
410. Thus, jurors often use a plaintiff’s ad damnum clause as an anchor in making damage
awards. See Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal Factors in
Jury Verdicts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 163, 170 (1991) (citing various studies of jury awards).
411. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1440 (giving a car sale example).
412. See James A. Heintz & Gwendolen B. White, Auditor Judgment in Analytical Review—
Some Further Evidence, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 22, 31 (1989) (finding strong anchoring
and adjustment effects even though auditors were clearly informed that the preliminary num-
bers they were exposed to were unaudited); William R. Kinney, Jr. & Wilfred C. Uecker, Miti-
gating the Consequences of Anchoring in Auditor Judgments, 57 ACCT. REV. 55, 69 (1982) (con-
cluding that the “anchoring” heuristic was applied by auditors in both analytical review and
compliance sampling settings); John J. Wild & Stanley F. Biggs, Strategic Considerations for Un-
audited Account Values in Analytical Review, 65 ACCT. REV. 227, 238 (1990) (finding anchoring
and adjustment impact upon auditors).
413. SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 20. Related to anchoring and adjustment are order effects.
Under some circumstances, information that is first presented to people has the most impact on
them (primacy effect). In other circumstances, information that is presented last has the most
impact (recency effect). Traditional economic reasoning posits that the order of information
presentation should have no effect upon a hypothetical rational man’s decisionmaking, but the
evidence shows that sequence of information is very important. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE
ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 172
(1980) (“Although order of presentation of information sometimes has no effect on final judg-
ment, and recency effects sometimes are found, these are the exception; several decades of psy-
chological research have shown that primacy effects are overwhelmingly more probable.”). This
is true even as to professional securities analysts. See Jacob Jacoby et al., New Directions in Be-
havioral Process Research: Implications for Social Psychology, 23 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 146,
161–63 (1987) (finding anchoring and adjustment effects in securities analysts).
414. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (“Faced with new options, decision makers often stick with
the status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary company policy, to elect an incum-
bent to still another term in office, to purchase the same product brands, or to stay in the same
job.”). As an example of the status quo bias and its effect on products, Aaker notes that for per-
haps two decades in the 1970s and 1980s General Motors had by most objective measures infe-
rior cars that should have driven its market share to zero. Instead, GM’s market share stayed
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indicate that “contrary to the Coase theorem, different default rules
may lead to dramatically different outcomes, even if transaction costs
are minimal.”415 Therefore, Kira’s strong inclination will be to accept
the “no fraud liability” clause, because to her it seems to represent
the status quo.416
Professor Russell Korobkin notes that because contracting par-
ties tend to prefer the status quo, “lawmakers can probably change
private parties’ preferences for contract terms quickly by altering con-
tract default rules via legislation or judicial decision.”417 The current
regime protects investors via section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, which
theoretically renders void any contractual attempt to waive protection
of the securities laws.418 Investor regulation would quickly change the
default rule.419 That legislative change, coupled with the incentive of
the securities industry’s form-givers to present forms that exclude li-
ability for fraud,420 may combine to substantially reduce antifraud pro-
tection for investors.
Anchoring and adjustment impacts this process in another way.
If Kira is told during oral negotiations that her investment is not
risky, this representation may anchor her view of the situation. To the
around thirty-three percent. DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 49 (1991). “The
fact is that customers do not like to change; you almost have to beat some of them off with a
baseball bat.” Id.
415. Sunstein, supra note 352, at 119; see also Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 664 (1998) (“The most fundamental insight
for contract theory provided by evidence of the status quo bias is that the choice of default rules
matters all of the time, not just when the parties face high transaction costs or asymmetric in-
formation.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000) (not-
ing that many of our rules of law, such as the employment-at-will doctrine, may be the result
more of the status quo bias than of their inherent efficiency).
416. See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 221
(2001) (“Default rules have a tendency to stick . . . .”).
417. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1602 (1998).
418. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000). The comparable provision in the 1933 Act is section 14, 15
U.S.C. § 77n.
419. Korobkin argues:
[W]hen lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive preferences of
contracting parties shift—that term becomes more desirable, and other competing
terms becoming less desirable. Put another way, contracting parties view default
terms as part of the status quo, and they prefer the status quo to alternative states, all
other things equal.
Korobkin, supra note 415, at 611–12.
420. Korobkin, supra note 417, at 1606 (“[T]he use of a form contract as a basis for negotia-
tions should create a similar bias in favor of the form terms.”).
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extent that a subsequently signed, written contract contains written
warnings to the contrary, Kira likely will ignore them.421 Especially
because oral promises trump written warnings,422 it is unlikely that
Kira will be alert to the retraction of those promises in the contract.
People do not understand the effect that these behavioral phe-
nomena have on them, which bears on whether their waivers of legal
rights should be taken as sufficiently informed.423 Thus, Sunstein con-
cludes that “[w]hen people’s decisions mispredict their experience, a
common argument against paternalism—to the effect that ordinary
people choose what will promote their welfare—is no longer plausi-
ble.”424 Anchoring and adjustment affects knowledgeable people as
well as the unsophisticated.425
10. Repeat Errors. One of the most unsettling facets of investor
activity is the tendency for investors to repeat their errors. The be-
havioral literature, however, provides several explanations. First, an
investor who receives evidence that an intermediary or issuer has de-
ceived him or her is unlikely to process fully that information. Be-
cause of the well-established “confirmation bias,” people look for in-
formation that confirms, rather than undermines, their beliefs.426
Similarly, because of their desire to maintain consistency, the concept
of “cognitive dissonance” keeps people from accepting information
that is contrary to decisions they already have made.427 The effect is so
421. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 731–32:
[M]anufacturers [in the consumer product field] may treat anchoring as a valuable
mechanism for fixing consumer risk perceptions during the initial product purchase
context, when all products are safe and attractively packaged; and they may rely on
adjustment from that initial anchor to account insufficiently for the enclosed risk in-
formation which is read, if at all, well after the product has been purchased.
422. See supra notes 330–38 and accompanying text.
423. See Issacharoff, supra note 408, at 1800–03 (discussing this issue in the context of em-
ployees’ ability to adequately protect themselves while negotiating employment contracts).
424. Sunstein, supra note 352, at 145.
425. See BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 241, at 141 (“[P]eople can be susceptible to an-
choring even when they are especially knowledgeable about the subject at hand . . . .”).
426. See generally PLOUS, supra note 150, at 231–34 (summarizing key studies regarding the
confirmation bias, a “catch-all phrase . . . refer[ring] to a preference for information that is con-
sistent with a hypothesis rather than information which opposes it”); SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at
62 (“Investors search only for confirming evidence; and they ignore disconfirming evidence.”);
see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 647 (noting the impact of confirmation bias on
product consumers).
427. Ellickson points out that cognitive dissonance predicts that plaintiffs who have three-
day windows to undo contracts under Home Solicitation Clauses will generally tend not to do
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strong that investors even will remember having had more investment
success than they truly did.428 Having made a decision to trust an in-
termediary, Kira’s tendency will be to ignore evidence showing that
the intermediary lied to her.429 People who have been the victims of
Ponzi schemes continue to believe in the scheme even after it has
been discredited in the eyes of all reasonable outside observers; such
beliefs die hard.430
Additionally, because of a susceptibility to framing, investors
easily can be manipulated from risk aversion to risk seeking. Thus,
Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that 84% of
subjects preferred (a) a 100% chance of gaining $240 over (b) a 25%
chance of gaining $1000 and a 75% chance of gaining nothing, but, in-
consistently, 87% preferred (a) a 75% chance of losing $1,000 and a
25% chance of losing nothing over (b) a 100% chance of losing
$750.431 The subjects’ preferences reversed completely, depending on
whether the chance was framed as a potential gain or as a potential
loss.432
Hanson and Kysar argue that product marketers intentionally or
intuitively apply framing principles to successfully manipulate con-
so. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 42 (1989).
Chancellor notes the role that cognitive dissonance plays in the mass psychology of
stock manias. He notes a description of William Fowler in the 1860s that said that Fowler and
his fellow speculators were engaged “‘in bolstering each other up, not for the money, for we
thought ourselves impregnable in that respect, but by argument in favour of another rise. We
knew we were wrong, but tried to convince ourselves that we were right.’” CHANCELLOR, supra
note 69, at 212 (quoting WILLIAM FOWLER, TEN YEARS ON WALL STREET 322 (1870)).
428. Don A. Moore et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Invest-
ment Decisions, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95, 110 (1999) (finding that
study participants were not only overly optimistic regarding future performance but also consis-
tently overestimated the past performance of their investments).
429. See Langevoort, supra note 145, at 660 (“Having committed to both the relationship
with the broker and the particular transaction, the customer is motivated to bolster these deci-
sions, finding it ego-threatening and shameful to conclude that he or she acted on bad advice.”).
430. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 63, at 66. As noted earlier, see supra
note 364, doomsday cult members often become more devoted to their cause after predicted
dates for the world’s end come and go. See CIALDINI, supra note 356, at 100 (“Rather than dis-
banding in disillusion [after the obvious failure of their prophecy], the cultists often become
strengthened in their convictions.”).
431. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 454–55 (1981) (describing the risk averse nature of majority
choices).
432. See also DAWES, supra note 269, at 122–25 (discussing the basics of preference rever-
sals); Kris N. Kirby & R.J. Hernstein, Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of De-
layed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 88 (1995) (same).
PRENTICE.DOC 05/07/02 10:54 AM
2002] SECURITIES REGULATION 1487
sumers’ preferences, including those for risk,433 and studies show that
via framing techniques, fraudsters inside client companies can fool a
majority of auditors.434 By convincing investors, even intelligent and
educated ones,435 that they are losing the opportunity for wealth that
others are enjoying, industry professionals can induce excessive risk-
taking by investors.436 What in hindsight appears to be greed is simply
the natural human tendency to avoid a loss,437 especially relative to
others. What appears in hindsight to be gullibility is simply the strong
human need to trust.438
So Kira, once bitten by an intermediary’s fraud, may be induced
to invest in a risky new venture to attempt to recoup the losses from
the first venture, just as gamblers who have fallen in the hole can be
induced to “double up” in an attempt to avoid their losses.439 Even
433. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1507 (“The tobacco industry also seems to have
developed ways to take advantage of framing effects by portraying the product so as to mini-
mize smoker risk perceptions.”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 159, at 724 (“Once it is acknowl-
edged that consumer risk perceptions may be affected by, for instance, the manner in which in-
formation is framed, then it becomes inevitable that manufacturers will exploit those framing
effects in a way that maximizes manufacturer profits.”).
434. See Karim Jamal et al., Detecting Framing Effects in Financial Statements, 12 CONTEMP.
ACCT. RES. 85, 102 (1995) (reporting the results of a study finding that some auditors were able
to detect management’s misleading description of the company (the frame) and the underlying
fraud, but, that “[d]espite their motivation, training, and experience, over half (13) of the audit
partners who participated in this study were deceived by management’s frame”); Paul E. John-
son et al., Effects of Framing on Auditor Decisions, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 75, 102–04 (1991) (reporting results of a study finding that a majority of subjects—
both novice and experienced auditors—were fooled by framing effects and failed to detect a
fraud; however, the auditors—novice and experienced—with experience in the particular indus-
try did detect the fraud).
435. In a recent article journalist David Denby wrote of his experience with investing and
how he dove into the market because “like many Americans, I have begun to wonder if risk is
now something I can afford to avoid.” David Denby, The Quarter of Living Dangerously, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 24 & May 1, 2000, at 221, 221.
436. Thus, an ad for online trading by Fidelity.com asks readers: “What if opportunity
knocks and you’re not home?” E.g., NEW YORKER, Apr. 24 & May 1, 2000, at 15, 15.
437. More evidence to support this human aversion to loss is the tendency for investors to
hold on too long to stocks that have lost value while they are more eager to sell stocks that have
gained value. This tendency is inconsistent with standard economic reasoning, but consistent
with prospect theory developed by psychologists Kahneman and Tversky. See Sunstein, supra
note 352, at 124 (giving several real world examples of consumer and investor behavior that are
consistent with prospect theory).
438. See Good, supra note 317, at 32 (“[W]ithout trust, the everyday social life which we
take for granted is simply not possible.”).
439. Numerous studies show that betting on long shots becomes more pronounced at race-
tracks near the end of the day because bettors, most of whom are losing money, would like to go
home winners without risking much in the way of additional sums. They become risk-seeking
and bet on long shots, inconsistent with the rational economic man hypothesis. See THALER,
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corporate executives440 and sophisticated investors441 are subject to this
tendency. Nick Leeson sank Baring’s Bank by losing money and then
doubling up in an attempt to make back the bank’s money.442
Securities professionals are well aware of this tendency of inves-
tors, even sophisticated investors, and take advantage of it. For ex-
ample, citing Procter & Gamble, Dell Computer, Mead Corporation,
and other firms’ announcement of large losses from trading deriva-
tives, Frank Partnoy, a former employee of Morgan Stanley, reports:
Soon after the first losses were announced [Morgan Stanley’s presi-
dent John] Mack told a group of managing directors, “There’s blood
in the water. Let’s go kill someone.” The idea was that if our deriva-
tives customers were in trouble, and we could convince them that
they needed us—perhaps to “double-down” on their losses—we
could make even more money off their hardship. Management sali-
vated at these potential victims, known euphemistically as distressed
buyers. As my bosses told me repeatedly during this period, “We
love distressed buyers.”443
supra note 66, at 135 (citing several studies supporting bettors tendency to bet on long shots in
an attempt to break even for the day).
440. SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 24, 107–17. Shefrin gives as an example of what he calls
“get-evenitis” the inability of corporate executives to terminate losing projects. This tendency is
related to the phenomenon known as “escalation of commitment.” See generally Max H. Baz-
erman et al., Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making, 33 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN
PERFORMANCE 141, 150 (1984) (finding that the escalation phenomenon affects groups as well
as individuals who made the initial decision); Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a
Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577, 584 (1981) (finding that people have a tendency to
escalate commitment beyond the point warranted by “objective” facts).
441. See THALER, supra note 66, at 137 (suspecting that “portfolio managers trailing the
market in the fourth quarter may behave much like the racetrack bettors who bet on longshots
when behind at the end of the day”); Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations:
An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 108 (1996)
(finding that mutual fund managers who are in the middle of their comparison group at mid-
year tend to increase the risk of their fund’s portfolio during the second half of the year to im-
prove their annual performance); Michael J. Roszkowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effects of
“Framing” on Measures of Risk Tolerance: Financial Planners are Not Immune, 19 J. BEHAV.
ECON. 237, 244 (1990) (finding that financial planners show a greater tendency to take risks in a
loss frame than in a gain frame).
442. See Raymond G. Falgui, “Masters of the Universe” (The Nineties’ Traders),
BUSINESSWORLD, Jan. 3, 2000, at 13, 13 (reporting that, when Leeson started losing money, he
took “on more and more risks as he prayed for a turnaround that would allow him to cover his
losses”).
443. PARTNOY, supra note 140, at 99; see also Brannigan, supra note 310, at 29 (“‘It’s like
the guy who goes to Vegas to the 21 or craps tables. He’s losing, but he keeps playing because
he thinks there’s a chance of winning it back.’”) (quoting a former boiler room operator).
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Some people have difficulty summoning sympathy for investors
who repeat their mistakes, but it is important to remember that “the
primary emotions that determine risk-taking behavior are not greed
and fear, but hope and fear.”444
C. Choi’s Behavioral Analysis
Just as a thorough recounting of an ex-spouse’s faults ultimately
makes him sound worse than he really was, the totality of the fore-
going description of behavioral research as it applies to investors
makes them sound more dunderheaded than they usually are. Cer-
tainly not all heuristics and biases apply at all times and in all settings
to all investors. Nonetheless, this body of evidence should give one
substantial pause before jumping on the private-ordering bandwagon
of investor regulation. Even the most intelligent, expert investors are
subject to the vast majority of the cognitive limitations just dis-
cussed.445
To his credit, Choi builds a positive case for investor regulation,
rather than simply basing arguments on a laundry list of mistakes that
the SEC has made over the years.446 However, Choi’s discussion of the
vast body of behavioral literature that undermines his proposal is sur-
444. SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 3 (emphasis added).
445. See SHILLER, BUBBLES, supra note 63, at 2 (arguing that the human errors in judgment
that created the speculative bubble in the stock market in the mid- and late 1990s infected some
of the most intelligent people in our society).
446. Of course, because the SEC may be even busier under Choi’s plan of investor regula-
tion than it is today, it would have been unseemly for him to have attacked the SEC excessively.
Although many SEC policy decisions over the years can be strongly criticized, it remains per-
haps the most admired federal administrative agency and Choi certainly takes great advantage
of it under his proposal. Under investor regulation, the SEC will, at a minimum: (a) prepare a
test and administer it to all potential investors (currently sixty-five million in number, Bryan
Meyer, Don’t Get Burned; A Beginner’s Guide to What to Look for and What to Avoid in the
Stock Market, BUFFALO NEWS, June 22, 1999, at 1D, not to mention the additional foreign in-
vestors who bought $141 billion of U.S. securities in just the first quarter of 2000, Michael Sesit,
Foreigners Flocked to U.S. Securities in First Quarter, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2000, at A24), Choi,
supra note 7, at 310; (b) provide a menu of default options of public regulation that issuers may
opt into and the SEC will enforce, id. at 286; (c) monitor transactions between issuers and inves-
tors to ensure that only qualified investors are approached, id. at 287; (d) regulate manipulation
of third parties, id. at 287; (e) create a menu of default options for regulation of broker-dealers
and other market participants that they can opt into and the SEC will enforce, id. at 291–93; (f)
publicize the new plan and all its options, id. at 290; (g) select who can qualify as an HVO, id. at
297; (h) publicize information on market participants to minimize investors’ search costs, id. at
311; (i) inform the market as to the proportion of different classes of investors that exist, id. at
312; and (j) provide whatever regulation is needed to minimize third-party effects of investor
regulation, id. at 325.
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prisingly thin. After noting several heuristics and biases, but seem-
ingly focusing on only cognitive dissonance, Choi initially ventures
that “[c]ognitive dissonance is likely to be correlated with an inves-
tor’s investment experience.”447 Choi offers not one iota of evidence
to support this surmise. One point worthy of repetition is that profes-
sional and institutional investors generally are subject to the same
heuristics and biases that render amateur investors vulnerable.448 In-
deed, “studies show that experience can reinforce cognitive errors”449
rather than cure them.
Nor are these problems easily remedied by information or educa-
tion. Certainly more information and more education are good things
for investors. To the extent that a scheme of investor regulation
447. Choi, supra note 7, at 317.
448. See SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 58 (“Wall Street strategists are prone to committing a
variety of behavioral errors and biases: gambler’s fallacy, overconfidence, and anchoring.”);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 379–400 (1989) (finding that in the wake of the Oc-
tober 1987 stock market crash, institutional investors, like others, based their reasons for trading
on hunches, emotions, and intuitions); SHLEIFER, supra note 63, at 12 (“Professional money
managers are of course themselves people, and as such are subject to the same biases as individ-
ual investors.”); Hu, supra note 163, at 863 (“[I]nstitutional investors are managed by humans,
and humans are susceptible to cognitive biases.”); Benjamin M. Friedman, Comments and Dis-
cussion, in Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE, supra note 66, at 212, 215 (“There is simply no reason to believe that institutional in-
vestors are less subject to such social influences on opinion [that cause “herd behavior”] than
other investors, and there are substantial grounds for thinking that they may be even more so.”);
Langevoort, supra note 65, at 867 (“These traits apply not only to the average individual inves-
tor, but to professionals as well.”); Riva D. Atlas, Even the Smart Money Can Slip Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, § 3, at 1 (noting that in 2001 many sophisticated “superrich” investors lost
hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars in the stock market by making the same cognitive
and strategic errors that plagued unsophisticated investors); Peter Huang, Regulating Securities
Professionals: Emotional and Moral Aspects of Fiduciary Investing 29–30 (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing studies showing that even profes-
sional securities traders react emotionally to financial decisions, information, and outcomes);
Peter R. Locke & Steven C. Mann, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Loss Realization Aversion?
27 (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding in empiri-
cal study that professional traders exhibit the same irrational loss realization aversion as unso-
phisticated traders).
Interestingly, the fact that professionals are subject to the same behavioral foibles as
lay investors coupled with the recent increase in institutional ownership of equity securities
magnifies the impact that their errors have on the stock market. See SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at
6–7 (citing as an example the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund, whose fail-
ure nearly scuttled the American economy); John Cassidy, Time Bomb, NEW YORKER, July 5,
1999, at 28, 28 (noting that, before a massive bailout, LTCM “nearly went bankrupt and, ac-
cording to some observers, almost took the entire financial system of the United States down
with them”).
449. Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Efficiency in Financial Markets,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at 21, 23.
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would encourage investors to learn more about the process of invest-
ing and the workings of the securities markets, it would accomplish
some real good. Professor James Fanto argues extensively for in-
creased education of investors.450 But Professor Henry Hu notes that
“there are limits to the efficacy of education,”451 and even Fanto ad-
mits that he “does not suggest that education alone can deal with fi-
nancial fraud or that it should be used to lessen the scope of the du-
ties of financial professionals toward consumers.”452 Indeed, the
evidence shows that most of the cognitive limitations and biases dis-
cussed in this Article are extremely robust and greatly resistant to at-
tempts to “educate them away.”453
Overoptimism, for example, is greatly resistant to de-biasing.454
Regarding overconfidence by institutional investors, Langevoort
notes,
The natural objection here is that over time investors should
learn from their mistakes, acquiring a natural humility. But while
this does happen, overconfidence has proven to be a sticky behav-
ioral phenomenon. Again, self-esteem plays a motivating factor.
People dwell on successes and attribute them to skill and diligence.
Failures are more readily dismissed as the product of chance and
other unforeseeable external causes. Learning is thus difficult with
respect to investing. Feedback is neither unambiguous nor immedi-
ate. For any active investor, a number of successes will provide the
more heavily weighted source of feedback. Market volatility and the
450. See James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 107–08 (1998) (arguing for
greater investor education, and focusing on more than issuer disclosure).
451. Henry C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivative, Retail Mutual Funds,
and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2372 (1996); see also Latin, supra note 241, at
1253 (“[C]onsumer education often proves relatively ineffective, though not valueless, with re-
gard to product-related accident risks.”).
452. Fanto, supra note 450, at 135 n.108.
453. See SHEFRIN, supra note 63, at 80 (“The evidence from behavioral decision-making
studies is that people learn slowly.”); Ward Edwards & Detlov von Winderfeldt, Cognitive Illu-
sions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 244–46 (1986) (noting that de-
biasing does not generally work very effectively); Garvin, supra note 408, at 168 (arguing that
“effective learning is far from common”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 280, at 1551 (discussing
how de-biasing cigarette consumers who have been subject to manipulation by tobacco compa-
nies may be impossible or, at least, prohibitively expensive); JACOBY, supra note 74, at 86
(“From a behavioral scientist’s perspective, it would be naïve to believe that education or ther-
apy would be sufficient to dispel such deep-rooted irrational tendencies.”).
454. See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 132 (1995) (arguing that manipulating per-
ceptions of risk is difficult).
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predictable occurrence of bull markets assure that there will be posi-
tive feedback to distort. As to losers, most investments continue in-
definitely: there is always the hope of reversals of fortune after ini-
tial setbacks, and hence no closure. In this sense, a sophisticated
investor’s optimistic, self-serving schema of competence and exper-
tise can resist downward revision for unusually long periods of time.
Conversely, it will be subject to significant inflation as a result of any
hot streak that appears to occur.455
Choi’s second response to the behavioral literature is to argue
that because his proposal “focuses on determining investor knowl-
edge not at the time of any particular transaction but rather before
any investment transactions commence . . . many of the biases from
cognitive dissonance are reduced.”456 But no matter what category of
investor an investor’s test results assign her, she must make invest-
ment decisions thereafter (unless she is a D student) and all of the
biases will apply. Choi’s argument seems inapt.
Third, Choi hazards a guess that “the licensing process itself may
warn investors of the possibility of different biases including, for ex-
ample, hindsight bias.”457 Unfortunately, it is not just a matter of in-
forming people of the existence of a hindsight bias,458 for humans find
it difficult to disregard information that they know even when they
455. Langevoort, supra note 145, at 639–40.
456. Choi, supra note 7, at 317.
457. Id. at 317–18.
458. The hindsight bias is the tendency of people to regard things that have occurred as
having been relatively obvious and predictable. Fischhoff describes the bias in these terms:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in fore-
sight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively inevitable’ before it happened. People
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was
actually the case.
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 158, at 335, 341; see also Baruch Fischhoff,
Hindsight [not] Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (reporting
the results of studies indicating existence of the hindsight bias); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth,
“I Knew It Would Happen”—Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 3–13 (1975) (reporting the results of one of the first studies
showing hindsight bias); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past
Events after the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 323 (1990) (concluding that
“research and theory on hindsight phenomena suggest that the decision maker is unlikely to
even be aware of the influence of the to-be-disregarded information, much less able to undo its
effects”).
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are specifically instructed to do so.459 Unfortunately, evidence shows
that the hindsight bias, like many other biases, is notoriously difficult
to “de-bias.”460
Finally, Choi points out that because the current regulatory re-
gime relies primarily on disclosure, it is equally vulnerable to prob-
lems caused by investors’ cognitive limitations.461 This is a good point,
but not precisely true. Investor regulation not only creates an atmos-
phere that will likely increase securities fraud activity by a substantial
amount,462 it also leaves fraud victims largely without remedy. That is
a significant disadvantage as compared to the status quo.
Professor Robert Ellickson rightly notes that “a legal system de-
voted to rationalism might undercut its authoritative credibility if the
system were to cater to weaknesses in human cognition.”463 But simply
to recognize limits on human reasoning is not tantamount to “catering
to” those weaknesses.464 “If the law posits a hopelessly unrealistic
world and holds all comers to its standards, the law runs the risk of
unfairness.”465
Choi does his own catering by developing an elaborate scheme to
protect unsophisticated investors from themselves. To protect unso-
phisticated investors from themselves, investor regulation dramati-
459. Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on Predicting Bankruptcy with Account-
ing Information, 10 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 267, 267 (1985). But see Paul Slovic & Baruch
Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 544, 544, 550–51 (1977) (indicating that, if subjects are forced to
consider specific reasons why things might have turned out differently, the bias can be mitigated
to some extent).
460. In laboratory experiments, researchers have attempted numerous methods for de-
biasing in this context, but “[c]omplete elimination of the [hindsight] bias has eluded psycholo-
gists.” Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 587 (1998). Still, researchers have had more luck de-biasing the hindsight bias than
most others. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1289 (1999) (“[M]ost of the studies indicate that forcing
subjects to think concretely about all possible outcomes reduces the hindsight bias markedly.”).
461. Choi, supra note 7, at 316–17.
462. See infra notes 504–20 and accompanying text.
463. Ellickson, supra note 427, at 39; see also Hillman, supra note 8, at 734 (“Robust law that
encourages communication and planning by holding the parties to their contract ultimately may
be more effective than law that liberally absolves promisors from their obligations.”).
464. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 757 (2000) (“In the absence of adequate feed-
back, adopting a hard line on cognitive errors will simply penalize parties for mistakes that they
could not have avoided.”).
465. Garvin, supra note 408, at 164; see also Langevoort, supra note 145, at 671–72
(“[B]laming the investor for her own cognitive failings created by the broker’s manipulative
selling tactics hardly seems fair.”).
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cally reduces their freedom of investment. This practice will help pro-
tect them from their own mistakes, but it comes at a substantial cost
in terms of freedom of choice. True, unsophisticated investors will
fare better if confined to passive mutual funds.466 But the investor
regulation proposal proves too much. Even the most sophisticated in-
vestors will fare better if they are similarly constrained.467 Unsophisti-
cated investors, like sophisticated ones, want a large measure of free-
dom to invest.468 They are entitled to that freedom, but the law should
protect investors’ natural mistakes caused by the limitations of human
decisionmaking processes from the intentional frauds of securities
professionals.469 Every system of securities regulation should carry a
right to be free from fraud.470
IV.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTOR REGULATION
Any radical redesign of the federal securities regulatory system
that might be enacted is sure to have several unintended and adverse
466. As Choi notes, most investors do better through a passive index fund than through an
actively managed fund or by picking their own stocks themselves. See Burton G. Malkiel, In-
dexes: Why the Critics Are Wrong, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1999, at A30:
In most years, a Standard & Poor’s 500 index fund has a rate of return about two per-
centage points better than the average manager’s; for the 10 years ending in 1998, the
index outperformed the average manager by 3.5 percentage points, and did better
than more than nine out of 10 active managers.
467. Passive mutual funds are likely the best investment for most other investors as well.
“[I]n most years the majority of . . . professional money managers actually performs worse than
stocks in general. Indeed, over periods of a decade or more, roughly 75 percent of all stock
funds underperform the market.” BELSKY & GILOVICH, supra note 241, at 162.
468. Jonathan Clements, Racier Bets May Not Be Best Route, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2000, at
C1 (“‘People want to be players. They want to own the stocks they read about in the paper
every day.’”) (quoting financial planner Harold Evensky); see also Hu, supra note 163, at 838
(“Private economic decisionmakers are entitled to make decisions on whatever grounds they
wish, no matter how substantively foolish in the eyes of the government or anyone else, so long
as they do not create significant externalities or offend key social policies.”).
469. Langevoort, supra note 145, at 641 (noting that, because of the various heuristics and
biases previously stated, even sophisticated investors do make mistakes); id. (“[I]t is precisely
these [behavioral] motivations that some brokers will try to manipulate to create customer de-
mand for investment products. Thus, legal responsibility must be assigned in cognizance of the
subtle opportunism that tempts brokers. The law may wish to protect unconscious investment
motivations from conscious and deliberate manipulation.”).
470. Shefrin and Statman maintain that market fairness has various entitlements. One is
freedom from misrepresentation, which they define as “entitl[ing] people to rely on voluntarily
disclosed information.” Shefrin & Statman, supra note 449, at 22. Another aspect of “fairness” is
“freedom from impulse,” defined as “entitl[ing] people to protection from possible imperfect
self-control.” Id.
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consequences.471 The disadvantages of investor regulation and other
reform plans are discussed in this Part.
A. Reducing the Efficiency of the Capital Markets
The proposals by Choi, Romano, Mahoney and the others come
at an odd time in that they fly in the face of a developing global con-
sensus favoring American-style securities regulation as the optimal
approach to producing efficient securities markets.472 The chord they
strike is that much more dissonant in light of substantial recent em-
pirical evidence indicating that “more is better” (at least to a degree)
in securities regulation. Often, legal regulation fosters, rather than re-
strains, business.
471. Choi is justified in criticizing the complexity of current securities regulation by referring
to a “vast number” of regulations, Choi, supra note 7, at 280, and to “many layers of regula-
tion,” id. at 283. But consider this problem. If ABC, a small start-up company, wishes to hire
India, a top-notch programmer who has just graduated from Stanford’s computer science de-
partment, India may well demand stock or stock options in ABC in addition to salary. ABC
cannot oblige until India takes Choi’s investor certification exam and if she gets a “D”, ABC
cannot meet her demand even if it is in desperate need of her services.
India may then choose to start her own company to exploit a brilliant idea she has. Her
tax accountant advises her to incorporate and when she does so, she discovers that it is illegal
for her company, India, Inc., to issue any shares to her because she got a “D” on the investor
certification exam.
Now, surely with some minor exemptions built into Choi’s proposal, these problems
can be avoided. But it is problems such as these, arising continuously over the course of the past
seventy years, which account for the complexity of the current scheme of federal regulations.
Any author of a dramatic reform proposal such as Choi’s is optimistic if he or she thinks in-
creased simplification is likely to be an advantage of the new plan.
472. See SHEN-SHIN LU, INSIDER TRADING AND THE TWENTY-FOUR HOUR SECURITIES
MARKET: A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL REGULATION IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ECONOMY 20–
21 (1999) (describing the emergence of a global consensus that insider trading should be regu-
lated by governments); CHARLES R. MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK: WHY FINANCIAL
CRISES AND CRASHES HAPPEN 78 (1999) (“The securities regulatory system that evolved
through the 1930s . . . has proven itself the most successful in the world.”); Amir N. Licht, Inter-
national Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 233 (1998) (discussing the success of the SEC and the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in creating a “convergence” of insider trading
regulations based on the U.S. model); Alfred Keuppers, Germans Look Longingly at SEC
Model, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at A15 (noting that many people in Germany believe that
recent German reforms in securities are helpful but don’t go far enough because the country
needs an SEC-like institution); COFFEE, supra note 180, at 82 (describing how, between the late
1960s and the 1980s, each of the major European economies created an agency modeled after
the SEC). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) recent
adoption of principles recommending U.S.-style mandatory corporate disclosure is one indica-
tion of this trend. Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, OECD Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance, OECD Online, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.htm (Apr.
16, 1999) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
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Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, with each other and with others, have
done much of the empirical work in this area. They have found evi-
dence that countries with better investor protections, measured by
both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement,
have more valuable stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities
per capita, and a higher rate of initial public offering activity than do
countries with worse investor protections;473 that firms in countries
with better protection of minority shareholders from the depredations
of majority shareholders are valued higher;474 and that in Poland, strict
enforcement of American-style securities laws was associated with
rapid development of a nascent stock market, whereas in the neigh-
boring Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a
near-collapse of the stock market.475
Numerous other authors make similar findings. Empirical aca-
demic studies have (a) determined that countries that enforced their
473. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131
(1997). These authors later extended this study beyond the effect of legal protections of inves-
tors on the efficiency of capital markets to examine the impact of the quality of government on
economic development. Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 222, 222 (1999). Their findings were interesting, including that bigger governments tended
to be more efficient than smaller governments and that effective governmental institutions (ar-
guably the SEC would be an example) contribute to economic development. Id. at 266. On the
other hand, it seems clear that less interventionist legal regimes, such as the U.S.-style common
law, are more efficient than more interventionist regimes such as French civil regimes and so-
cialist regimes. Id. at 265; see also Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 26
(2000) (finding that the legal reform to reduce the diversion of corporate resources from the
corporation to controlling shareholders (“tunneling”) is “a crucial element of promoting finan-
cial and economic development”); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113, 1152 (1998) (reviewing substantial evidence that “describes a link from the legal system to
economic development”).
474. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation 4 (Oct. 1999) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). The authors note that “[b]y limiting
expropriation [by majority shareholders through such practices as insider trading], the law raises
the price that securities fetch in the marketplace.” Id. at 2. There is no evidence that the sup-
posed savings in securities prices that investor regulation would achieve for those sophisticated
investors willing to bargain away investor protections would counterbalance the adverse effect
of eliminating minority investor protections, such as insider trading rules. Even sophisticated
investors are subject to exploitation if they are minority shareholders.
475. Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. the Coasians 28 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The regulated Polish stock market has grown
faster, has maintained greater liquidity, and has been a better source of capital for firms than the
less regulated Czech market.”). In particular, Johnson and Shleifer note the aggressive Polish
oversight of intermediaries. Id. at 25. Choi relies heavily on intermediaries in his scheme, but
without governmental oversight they are unlikely to protect the integrity of the markets.
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insider trading laws had a lower cost of equity;476 (b) found that
“weaker insider trading regimes have, on average, less liquid equity
markets”;477 (c) concluded that “[c]ountries where corporations pub-
lish relatively comprehensive and accurate financial statements have
better developed financial intermediaries than countries where pub-
lished information on corporations is less reliable”;478 (d) learned that
both laws on the books and effective legal institutions are needed to
create optimal access to external finance;479 (e) found that “[f]irms in
476. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazen Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading i (2001) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“We find that the cost of equity in a
country, after controlling for a number of other variables, does not change after the introduction
of insider trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution.”).
477. Laura N. Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theo-
ries of Insider Trading 6 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
478. Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 33
(1999). This is especially important for Choi who creates a plan that relies extensively upon fi-
nancial intermediaries, yet by eliminating mandatory corporate disclosure surely weakens those
same intermediaries.
479. Black, supra note 208, at 783 (arguing that the two essential prerequisites for vibrant
securities markets are “laws and related institutions [that] must give minority shareholders (1)
good information about the value of a company’s business; and (2) confidence that the com-
pany’s insiders (its managers and controlling shareholders) won’t cheat investors out of most of
the value of their investment”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 644
(1999) (stating that “only those legal systems that provide significant protections for minority
shareholders can develop active equity markets”); John H. Welch, The Americas: Making In-
vestment in Brazil Fair for the Little Guy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2000, at A23 (“The lack of pro-
tection for minority shareholder rights in Latin America may explain why the region’s domestic
equity markets are highly illiquid and local business development is so stunted.”); Maria Maher
& Thomas Andersson, Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic
Growth 36 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (compar-
ing corporate governance features of OECD countries, and observing that “[t]he empirical evi-
dence to date seems to suggest that . . . protection of minority shareholders is critical to the de-
velopment of equity markets”); Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition
Economies 15–16 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Although several of the articles discussed in this section paid particular attention to
what would be denominated corporation laws rather than securities laws, Coffee points out that
the critical restraints that most limit agency costs are today contained in federal secu-
rities laws. Indeed, the importance of federal securities law may so overshadow that
of state corporate law as to make the distinctions among state laws relatively unim-
portant in the case of the publicly held corporation (at least with regard to limiting
agency costs).
Coffee, supra, at 699. See generally Zdenek Drabek & Warren Payne, The Impact of Transpar-
ency on Foreign Direct Investment (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (finding that increased transparency, as affected by efficient government institutions,
strongly enforced property rights, the relative absence of corruption, and the like, was corre-
lated to increased foreign investment); Franco Modigliani & Enrico Perotti, Security versus
Bank Finance: The Importance of a Proper Enforcement of Legal Rules 19 (Feb. 12, 1998) (un-
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countries that have active stock markets and high ratings for compli-
ance with legal norms are able to obtain external funds and grow
faster”;480 (f) determined that countries with better protections for mi-
nority shareholders suffered milder financial crises in 1997–98;481 (g)
discovered that protection for minority investors is associated with
greater firm-specific returns variation and lower synchronicity in
stock prices, opening the way for more efficiency-producing firm-
specific risk arbitrage;482 (h) found evidence indicating that strong mi-
nority-investor rights curb over-investment in declining industries;483
and (i) learned that if countries want efficient financial sectors, they
should reform their judicial systems by emphasizing the rights of out-
side investors, by making contract enforcement more efficient, and by
creating flexible legal systems that evolve to meet changing condi-
tions.484 Overall, La Porta and his colleagues conclude,
Such diverse elements of countries’ financial systems as the breadth
and depth of their capital markets, the pace of new security issues,
corporate ownership structures, dividend policies, and the efficiency
of investment allocation appear to be explained both conceptually
and empirically by how well the laws in these countries protect out-
side investors.485
published manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding that the degree to which a
legal system fosters corruption is inversely correlated with the efficiency of its securities mar-
kets); Edward B. Rock, Encountering the Scarlet Woman of Wall Street: Speculative Comments
at the End of the Century (Dec. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (arguing that not private ordering or self-help, but corporate law protections account
for the elimination of many of the frauds and manipulations that occurred in the 1880s).
480. Alsi Demirghc-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, 53 J.
FIN. 2107, 2134 (1998). The authors note that “[a]n effective legal system is important because a
firm that wishes to obtain long-term financing must be able to commit credibly to controlling
opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders.” Id. at 2108.
481. Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 141, 172–78 (2000).
482. Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 258 (2000).
483. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187,
210 (2000).
484. Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Politics, and Finance 38 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
485. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 1 (2000) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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All of these studies486 call into question the traditional law and
economics view,487 which Choi and some other reformers adopt, that
regulation is essentially unneeded when economic actors simply can
privately order the world. La Porta and his colleagues note that
whether private contracting is a better approach than government-
enforced regulations is an empirical question and all the recent stud-
ies “reject[] the hypothesis that private contracting is sufficient.”488 As
Coffee notes:
This claim that financial contracting largely renders regulation ir-
relevant cannot explain, however, the close correlation between a
country’s level of capital market development and the nature of its
legal system. The more logical conclusion is that law does matter,
and regulation can somehow better promote economic efficiency
than can reliance on financial contracting alone. By themselves, pri-
vate contracting and the voluntary incentives for disclosure seem in-
capable of producing the level of continuing disclosure necessary to
sustain active securities markets.489
486. While some of these studies have been legitimately criticized on methodological
grounds, see, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 69, at 766 (questioning the quality of the authors’ data);
Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Finance: Cultural Dimensions of Corporate Governance
Laws 5 (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (challenging,
for example, the La Porta paper’s grouping of countries according to legal families), or on
grounds that they overemphasize the causal role of the law in bringing about these good results,
see COFFEE, supra note 180, at 9 (arguing that legal change tends to follow rather than precede
economic change); Mark J. Roe, The Quality of Corporate Law Argument and Its Limits 6
(Apr. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the
“law-driven story” is certainly largely true but often overdrawn), there certainly are many dif-
ferent studies by many different authors pointing to the same basic conclusions.
487. La Porta and his colleagues acknowledge the traditional law and economics view that
argues that most regulation of financial markets is unnecessary because the parties can simply
protect themselves contractually. La Porta et al., supra note 485, at 6 (observing that, according
to the law and economics perspective, “most regulations of financial markets are unnecessary
because financial contracts take place between sophisticated issuers and sophisticated inves-
tors”); see also FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 22 (1991) (arguing that a contractual approach to corporate law is largely
optimal); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976) (lauding the complex
set of contractual relationships that make up the successful modern corporation).
488. La Porta et al., supra note 485, at 6.
489. Coffee, supra note 16, at 4; see also Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1996)
(arguing that the American financial reporting systems’ openness “makes American industry
more efficient and competitive . . . . [because] corporate executives, like the rest of us, behave
more honestly, diligently and competently when they know that their stewardship of other peo-
ple’s money is open to scrutiny”); Michael J. Trebilcock, External Critiques of Laissez-Faire
Contract Values, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 93 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
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B. Undermining Trust
There are several reasons that American-style regulation pro-
duces the deepest, broadest, and most efficient stock markets. One of
those reasons is trust.490 Black observes:
The United States is not the only country with a successful secu-
rities market, but it surely has one of the best. The United States
markets are, for many countries, a source of envy (unlike, for exam-
ple, our tort system). It’s magical, in a way. People pay enormous
amounts of money for completely intangible rights. Internationally,
this magic is pretty rare. It does not appear in unregulated mar-
kets.491
Trust is a basic building block of a well-functioning society492 and
an efficiently functioning economy.493 Although some economic theo-
rists view trust as irrational, it often exists even in the absence of legal
compulsion.494 Certainly the reputational constraint encourages eco-
nomic actors to be trustworthy and to honor their commitments.
However, it is also true that “legal sanctions support a vital process of
1999) (“Markets cannot function without effective government, and moreover markets cannot
do everything. To pretend otherwise is to define complex problems out of existence.”); Daniel
Akst, The Invisible Hand of Uncle Sam, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 4 (“[T]he idea that gov-
ernment can’t—or shouldn’t—do anything is hubristic nonsense, and was recognized as such by
no less than Adam Smith.”).
490. By “trust,” I mean trust in all its forms, including what contractarian Ribstein denomi-
nates “weak form” reliance—the decision to rely on another person or institution because of the
availability of legal sanctions to punish noncompliance. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 553, 571 (2001). Barney and Hansen model trust as coming in this weak form, in a semi-
strong form where the trustor is protected by structures the parties have set up, and in a strong
form where the trustor is protected only by the values, principles and standards of behavior in-
ternalized by the parties to the agreement. Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness
as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 179 (1994). By defining
trust to eliminate what he calls “weak form reliance,” Ribstein argues that the law undermines
trust (as narrowly defined). Ribstein, supra, at 576–84. However, Ribstein admits several times
in his recent article that the law actually bolsters trust when trust is used in the broader sense
than I use it here.
491. Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 92–93 (1998).
492. BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 166 (1983) (observing that trust
is “one essential source of social order”).
493. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 185 (2d ed. 1977) (noting
that trustworthiness “reduce[s] the costs of transactions”); Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer,
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON.
1251, 1283 (1997) (finding evidence indicating “that trust and civic cooperation have significant
impacts on aggregate economic activity”).
494. Rose, supra note 341, at 533.
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trust building.”495 Fiduciary law strengthens what Professor Tamar
Frankel calls the “culture of trust” in America,496 and securities law
does the same.497 Any investor rationally would be more willing to in-
vest in an issuer or deal with a broker if she knew that mistreatment
by the issuer or broker would be met not just with some ephemeral
loss of reputation, but also legal sanctions. The availability of plentiful
legal sanctions for wrongdoers in the United States is not unrelated to
the fact that American managers, among managers around the world,
score highest in their tendency to trust.498 Frankel notes that “[t]here
is tentative evidence that poor societies are grounded in mistrust
while prosperous economies are based on a culture of trust.”499
495. Shell, supra note 139, at 282; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 205 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing how,
once a society is organized around the trust principle, untrustworthy behavior cannot be sus-
tained, but until society is so organized, “law is necessary in the short run”); Arvind Parkhe,
Understanding Trust in International Alliances, 33 J. WORLD BUS. 219, 223 (1998) (“Trust can
emerge even when significant vulnerabilities exist, if parties to an alliance are protected through
various governance devices.”) (emphasis added); Partnoy, supra note 69, at 764 (“[A]n impor-
tant role of law is to preserve trust.”); Rose, supra note 341, at 538 (“[P]eople use legal ar-
rangements to shore up trust and smooth out business relations.”).
496. TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING: COMPARING BENEFITS, COST
AND RISK 5 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
99-12, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
497. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organizations, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 453, 477–78 (1993) (“Provided that the regulation in question is ‘appropriate,’ both
parties to the transaction—the regulated firm and its customers—will be prepared to make in-
vestments in specialized assets on better terms than they would in the absence of such regula-
tion.”).
498. DONALD L. HARNEET & L.L. CUMMINGS, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR: AN
INTERNATIONAL STUDY 124 (1980).
499. FRANKEL, supra note 496, at 4; see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL
VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 7 (1995) (arguing that a country’s ability to com-
pete is correlated to its level of trust); POSNER, supra note 493, at 185 (“Honesty, trustworthi-
ness, and love reduce the costs of transactions . . . .”).
In a recent paper, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout note the importance of
trust in the functioning of corporations. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustwor-
thiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law 2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Duke Law Journal). While they argue in response to contractarian theory that
the influence of law on trust can be overstated, id. at 13–14, they also state that legal rules can
shape norms which influence individual behavior, id. at 72, noting the importance of judicial
opinions in this regard. Blair and Stout argue that it would be a mistake to allow corporate di-
rectors to contract out of their fiduciary duties because it would send the wrong message to
them regarding their responsibilities to shareholders. Id. at 71. They state that “[c]orporate case
law accordingly can encourage corporate participants to internalize norms of cooperation
through social framing—providing information about the social context of relationships within
the firm.” Id. The same point can and should be made regarding any proposal to allow broker-
dealers to contract out of fiduciary obligations to vulnerable customers.
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A contractarian “take advantage of the other guy if he lets you
can get away with it” approach like investor regulation inevitably re-
duces trust.500 Without legal sanctions, parties often have to resort to
“constant monitoring and checking [that] can poison the atmos-
phere.”501 Reducing trust can create a downward spiral, for those who
trust others less cheat more themselves.502 Frankel argues:
Scholarship advocating contract models for the relationship of
investors and their financial institutions is pernicious because it
threatens our financial system. It may induce investors and savers to
put their money in gold and other unproductive goods, and hide it
under the mattress. As improbable as it seems in the age of millions
of American investors in the securities markets, this possibility
should not be ignored. It happened before, not only in other coun-
tries, but also in the United States. It can happen again.503
C. Stimulating Fraudulent Behavior
Investor regulation, if adopted, would stimulate fraudulent be-
havior by making it more acceptable. Just as morals shape laws,504
laws shape morals.505 When Congress outlaws racial discrimination or
500. See Mitchell, supra note 495, at 186 (noting that laws “which encourage individuals in
our society to seek their own ends without regard for those of others, except to the extent that
they choose to have such regard . . . disregard[s], and ultimately diminish[es], the values of
community built upon the foundation of trust”).
501. Rose, supra note 341, at 540.
502. See FRANKEL, supra note 496, at 16 (“Under conditions of distrust, the assumption and
expectation that others will be treacherous and deceitful gives rise to treachery and deceit.”);
Julian B. Rotter, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1,
2 (1980) (citing a study finding that “low trusters had cheated significantly more often than had
high trusters”).
503. FRANKEL, supra note 496, at 33; see also Tamar Frankel, Accountants’ Independence:
The Recent Dilemma, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 261, 271 (“Investors who cease to trust the
informational integrity of particular issuers may cease to trust the integrity of the entire markets
[sic]. The available literature on public mania suggests as much.”).
504. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 60 (1997) (noting the interaction between
law and societal norms and emphasizing the importance of norms).
505. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 585, 586, 607
(1998) (using economic analysis to argue that “law can change the individual values of rational
people,” and that “[l]aw provides an instrument for changing social norms by expressing com-
mitments”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1538
(2000) (“[C]hanges in law can influence social norms. For example, passing a law against smok-
ing in public places had a dramatic effect on smokers, not because of the formal penalty for
public smoking (which is hardly ever imposed) but because it empowered nonsmokers to levy
social sanctions on smokers.”); Huang, supra note 448, at 5 (observing that economists recog-
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insider trading, people’s views of the acceptability and even morality
of those actions change.506 One theory is that legislation changes what
people believe about approval patterns in their society and because
people value approval, their new beliefs affect their behavior.507 When
the SEC bans manipulation and insider trading, “financial morality”
similarly evolves.508 These unfair and inefficient acts become less ac-
ceptable, and people become less likely to engage in them for both
legal and moral reasons. And, indeed, it is widely acknowledged that
passage of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts reduced securities fraud.509
Investor regulation takes the securities industry in the wrong di-
rection. By removing prohibitions on all manner of securities fraud,
investor regulation makes such fraud more acceptable and therefore
more likely to occur. Although the situations are obviously quite dis-
parate, the result when the Czech Republic adopted a laissez-faire
oriented system is instructive: “Fraud, manipulation, insider trading—
these practices became endemic.”510 When the Reagan administration
nize that “making behavior illegal stigmatizes that behavior differently than raising the cost of
that behavior, for example via taxes”); Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality As Regulators of
Conduct 34 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting
that “legal rules can affect our moral beliefs as well as the operation of the moral sanctions”).
506. See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 95–96 (1999):
Outside sources may influence the development of norms. Law, particularly when it is
perceived as legitimate by members of a community, may have a major impact on
what is considered to be correct behavior. Thus, the U.S. Corporate Sentencing
Guidelines may be expected to influence perceptions of appropriate structures and
policies for assigning managerial responsibility pertaining to corporate social respon-
sibility. Conventional wisdom holds that U.S. law has influenced changes in ethical
norms pertaining to racial or gender-based discrimination and also as to the legiti-
macy of insider trading.
See also Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 695 (1979) (noting that “[p]erhaps society learns what to
value in part through the legal system’s descriptions of our protected spheres”); Richard H.
Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium,
89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938–39 (1991) (discussing how law has cultural consequences); Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1731 (1996) (“[L]aws
inevitably strengthen or weaken social norms by signaling an official stance toward them . . . .”).
507. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339,
389 (2000).
508. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 178–79 (describing the long-term impact of the SEC’s
“revolution in financial morality” accomplished in the 1930s).
509. See id. at 561–62 (stating that “the securities laws had reduced, though not eliminated,
securities fraud”); see also Rachlinski, supra note 505, at 1544 (“[E]ven in the absence of en-
forcement, the mere act of criminalizing conduct can reduce its prevalence.”).
510. Coffee, supra note 16, at 38.
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adopted a deregulatory attitude, traders on Wall Street adopted
shady practices they previously had abjured.511
Choi has two responses to the argument that fraudsters will opt
out of regulation and abuse his self-tailored regulation scheme. First,
he argues that rational investors will refuse to buy fraudsters’ securi-
ties.512 Many will refuse, but some will not, if current experience is any
guide. Under investor regulation, those who can be suckered will pro-
vide free money for the bad guys—no civil liability, no criminal liabil-
ity. Even today, the SEC has great difficulty stopping and punishing
career securities criminals.513 Investor regulation hands them a liveli-
hood on a silver platter.
Second, Choi argues that investors who do buy will pay less for
the securities.514 Maybe, but if the sellers are crooks, any money is free
money. No doubt they would rather get ten dollars per share than five
dollars, but if the shares are bogus they still are earning a handsome,
if illicit, profit.
By increasing fraud, investor regulation will undermine all hon-
est issuers and intermediaries, because of Professor George Akerlof’s
market for lemons concept.515 With less trust and more fraud, legiti-
511. See ABOLAFIA, supra note 143, at 22 (noting that after the Reagan administration be-
gan sending signals that regulatory oversight would be reduced, many opportunistic practices
that previously had been thought of and dismissed as “trashy,” suddenly became widespread
among bond traders); Krawiec, supra note 297, at 329 (detailing how “increased competition,
financial innovations, and the deregulatory attitude of the Reagan administration” created a
new Wall Street “culture significantly different from pre-1980’s norms,” a culture that “ignored
specific regulatory or institutional rules and encouraged more opportunistic behavior”).
512. Choi, supra note 7, at 295 (suggesting that, under investor regulation, regulators could
maintain a record of past complaints against specific intermediaries so investors could use that
information to avoid doing business with them).
513. See Anne H. Wright, Form U-5 Defamation, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299, 1299
(1995) (“The extent to which securities professionals with significant disciplinary histories or
multiple investor complaints manage to remain in the securities industry has attracted consider-
able attention in recent years.”); Julie Kay, Federal Prosecutors, SEC Team Up in Unusual Ef-
fort to Put Away South Florida Scam Artists, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 8, 2001 (“‘A portion
of the cases we do are frustrating, because we see the same players again and again.’”) (quoting
SEC regional director Dave Nelson).
514. Choi, supra note 7, at 295.
515. In a market where consumers cannot obtain adequate information about the products
they are to buy, sellers have an incentive to sell products that are “lemons” because consumers
do not have the requisite knowledge to choose a competitor’s better products. Black, supra note
208, at 786. Professor George Akerlof illustrated the market for lemons problem with used cars.
George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). However, the point is even stronger for securities. Potential automobile
purchasers can examine the engine and kick the tires. Potential securities investors are generally
relying on representations and pieces of paper. If investors cannot verify the information relia-
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mate and honest issuers will have more trouble raising funds because
investors will have to be more wary. Intermediaries and issuers are
not optimally motivated to earn a good reputation from their actions
because crooks will free-ride on honest players’ efforts to establish
industry-wide credibility.516 This tendency helps explain why legiti-
mate actors in the securities industry show no interest in investor
regulation.
On the other side of the table, even the most sophisticated ven-
ture capitalists and institutional investors will have to incur greater
expense to protect themselves in deals.517 It is difficult enough under
existing securities laws to determine the wisdom of an issuer’s busi-
ness plan and the adequacy of its resources. How much more expen-
sive will due diligence be when financial disclosure is not mandated,
regular, or uniform, when a company can choose whatever accounting
approach best massages its financial appearance, and when it is no
longer illegal for the company to lie to its auditor?518 How are even in-
stitutional investors to uncover issuer frauds when most that occur are
not even discovered by the independent auditors who often have
been on the job for years?519 How much money can investors really
bly, then they will discount the value and decide to pay less for what they are receiving. In such
a market, even reputable sellers have an incentive to sell lemons, because their representations
are no more believed than those of the crooks.
516. As Black has noted:
In the language of welfare economics, investment banking (or accounting or secu-
rities lawyering) involves an externality—any one participant can’t fully capture its
own investment in reputation. Some of the investment enhances the reputation of the
entire profession. That externality reduces incentives to invest in reputation. And
new entrants can free ride on reputational spillover from established firms. . . .
The result is ironic: The principal role of reputational intermediaries is to vouch
for disclosure quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities mar-
kets. But information asymmetry in the market for reputational intermediaries limits
their ability to play this role.
Black, supra note 208, at 788.
517. Investor regulation could set markets back one hundred years to a situation where “[i]n
the nineteenth-century American market . . . intrinsic values were actually hidden by the opera-
tions of speculators. Under such conditions, the outsider could only trust to luck in making an
investment decision.” CHANCELLOR, supra note 69, at 189–90.
518. Investor regulation would apparently eliminate the current 1934 Act provision making
it illegal for issuers to lie to their auditors. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2000).
519. Most issuer frauds are not brought to light by the issuer’s auditor. See HOWARD R.
DAVIA ET AL., MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANT’S GUIDE TO FRAUD DISCOVERY AND CONTROL
vii–ix (1992) (referencing a study finding that most frauds are discovered not by outside auditors
or by internal auditors, but by accident, and observing that “it is overwhelming to think that
companies must rely on ‘accidental discovery’ for detection of a majority of fraudulent activ-
ity”). Many frauds go on for years. See, e.g., Charles Gasparino & Mitchell Pacelle, Cendant
Nears Settlement with Holders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A3 (noting that the fraud in the
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save by bargaining away unwanted legal protections when due dili-
gence expenses and legal costs (for negotiating to secure the legal
protections that are desired) rise substantially, as they inevitably will
under a system of investor regulation?520
D. Creating Opportunities for Organized Crime
Evidence from Russia521 and Japan522 indicates that where there is
a dearth of legal regulation, organized crime often streams into the
vacuum. Investor regulation’s presumed world of rational economic
actors efficiently ordering their private affairs is in many settings un-
realistic. In an extensive article, Professors Curtis Milhaupt and Mark
West argue that opportunities for organized crime are created by de-
ficiencies in state-supplied institutions and that organized crime is the
“dark side” of private ordering.523 West demonstrates that corporate
extortion by “sokaiya” gangsters (nominal shareholders who are paid
large sums to refrain from disrupting annual shareholder meetings)
who have ties to Japanese mobs flourishes because of low levels of
corporate disclosure.524
Cendant scandal went undetected for more than three years); Debra Sparks, Asleep at the
Audit?, BUS. WK., Mar. 6, 2000, at 150, 150 (describing a hedge fund fraud that went undetected
for more than three years).
520. Even institutional investors are inherently at a disadvantage when dealing with an is-
suer:
Although institutional investors have the power to bargain with the issuers, the ques-
tion remains as to how far the institutional investors can protect themselves. Can the
institutional investors get material nonpublic information before insiders trade on it?
The answer is “no” because no matter how strong their bargaining power will be, out-
siders are still outsiders. If the institutional investors finally figure out the insiders’ in-
tentions and follow the insiders’ direction to purchase or sell securities, the impact of
insider trading would be more serious. More public investors will sustain damage be-
cause of the greater trading volume by the institutional investors. . . . The claim that
institutional investors can protect themselves because their portfolios are diversified
is flawed. If insiders in half of the institutional investors’ portfolio companies trade on
inside information, institutional investors will lose badly no matter how diversified
their portfolios are.
LU, supra note 472, at 19–20.
521. See, e.g., Mike Cormaney, RICO in Russia: Effective Control of Organized Crime or
Another Empty Promise?, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261, 268–69 (1997) (describ-
ing how organized crime had taken advantage of a “legal vacuum” in Russia to increase its con-
trol of the economic marketplace).
522. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 97 (2000) (ex-
amining organized crime in Japan).
523. Id.
524. Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United States:
Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (1999).
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By eliminating effective securities regulation, investor regulation
creates a lush opportunity for organized crime. Clearly the United
States is in a much different position than Russia, or even Japan. But
the implications of these studies cannot be overlooked in the United
States, given organized crime’s penchant to invade the securities in-
dustry even in the presence of stringent SEC monitoring. In June
2000, the federal government charged 120 people, including members
of five organized crime families with wide-ranging securities fraud.
The investigation upon which the charges were based had uncovered
“mob-related figures threatening violence and extortion—even a
murder-for-hire plot—related to stock fraud scams. Prosecutors also
alleged that there were attempts to rip off union pension plans, to in-
filtrate brokerage houses, and to manipulate stocks.”525 Another ex-
ample is the influence on the Myers Pollock Robbins brokerage firm
by associates of the Bonanno and Genovese crime families.526 Using
the old “pump and dump” scheme, supplemented by bullying clients
and numerous fraudulent statements, conspirators defrauded 16,000
investors out of more than $176 million between 1992 and 1997.527 In
one aspect of the scheme, an associate of the Bonanno family and two
others worked with Myers Pollock Robbins broker Jonathan Lyons to
use boiler room tactics to sell HealthTech securities.528 Defunct bro-
kerage firm Stratton Oakmont also may have had mob ties in its
fraudulent heyday.529 In March 2000, the federal government an-
nounced indictments in connection with a stock-fraud operation in-
volving ten licensed stockbrokers, four of the five traditional organ-
ized crime families operating in New York, as well as members of
525. Jeffrey Goldfarb, Mob-Related Stock Fraud Charges Involve 120 Defendants, $50 Mil-
lion, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, June 15, 2000, at D2.
526. See Seven Plead Guilty in Wall Street Mob Case, NAT’L POST, Jan. 22, 1999, at C2 (not-
ing that seven defendants had pled guilty in a 97-page racketeering indictment naming nineteen
men involved with Myers Pollock Robbins); Greg B. Smith, Brokers Nailed in Stock Scam,
DAILY NEWS (New York, NY), Apr. 15, 2000, at 45 (noting that “capos” in the Genovese and
Bonanno crime families and a Bonanno soldier had all pled guilty and gone to jail in connection
with the Myers Pollock Robbins scheme).
527. David Rohde, 44 Indicted in a Huge Stock Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at
B3.
528. See Broker Pleads Guilty in Mob-Linked Fraud; Key Figure in HealthTech Securities
Case, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Nov. 6, 1998, at B2 (describing the scheme and the liability
arising from it).
529. See Stratton Tied to Mob Case?; Defunct Brokerage May Come up at Trial, Judge Says,
NEWSDAY (New York, NY), Mar. 23, 1999, at A43 (stating that evidence of ties between the
brokerage firm and organized crime was expected to be presented at trial).
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Russian organized crime.530 In December 2001, federal prosecutors
charged a Colombo crime-family associate and others with attempting
to profit from anthrax fears by manipulating the market for shares of
a company claiming to be the sole distributor of a device that kills the
disease in seconds.531 There are other examples,532 and some involve
prominent firms.533 If the problem is this severe with stringent gov-
ernment regulation, investor regulation seems certain to exacerbate it
substantially.
By significantly limiting the governmental enforcement structure
for the securities industry, investor regulation not only encourages
fraudulent activity and creates opportunities for organized crime, it
530. CNN Moneyline News Hour, (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 2, 2000) (quoting How-
ard Safir, Commissioner, New York City Police Department).
531. Nichole M. Christian, Four Are Charged in Scheme that Preyed on Anthrax Fears, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at D2.
532. See, e.g., Brokers Facing Sanctions, CALGARY SUN, July 15, 1999, at 59 (noting that the
British Columbia securities commission was taking action against two Vancouver stockbrokers
arrested in the U.S. in connection with mob-linked stock dealings); Gina Edwards, Former A.S.
Goldman CFO Arrested in Murder-for-Hire Plot, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2000 (de-
scribing the arrest of former “mob-tinged” boiler room operation executive in a plot to kill the
judge in his case); It’s Time to Jail Penny Stock Crooks, BUS. WK., Nov. 20, 1989, at 156, 156
(editorializing that organized crime was a huge problem among penny stockbrokers); Edward
Iwata, Alleged Mob Ties of S.F. Brokerage Probed, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 1, 1998, at A1 (noting
that investigators believe that twenty or more stock brokerage firms are “run by bosses and sol-
diers of the underworld’s most powerful Mafia families: Gambino, Genovese, Bonanno, Co-
lombo and DeCavalcante”); David Lefer, Stock Scams Are Eyed in Dual Slay[;] Victims Had
History of Shady Deals and Betrayal of Business Associates, DAILY NEWS (New York, NY),
Nov. 7, 1999, at 27 (reporting the investigation of suspected Russian or American mob ties to
murders of a former stockbroker and his associate); Helen Petterson, 2 Brokers Plead Guilty in
Mob-Tied Stock Plot, DAILY NEWS (New York, NY), Jan. 27, 1998, at 30 (reporting the guilty
plea of two stockbrokers “in cahoots with the mob” in a stock manipulation scheme); Michael
Schroeder, Brokers Charged in Big Stock-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at A3 (noting
the indictment by New York officials of eighty-five stockbrokers in three separate cases involv-
ing more than $100 million in losses and ties to the Colombo crime family and Russian mob-
sters); Michael Schroeder, U.S. Accuses 13 of Major Stock Fraud With Links to Organized-
Crime Family, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at B5 (describing federal indictments in a fraud
scheme linked to the Gambino crime family); Gary Weiss, The Mob on Wall Street, BUS. WK.,
Dec. 16, 1996, at 92, 92 (describing how “substantial elements of the small-cap market have
been turned into a veritable Mob franchise”); Rachel Witmer, Law Enforcement and Regulatory
Agencies Battle Organized Crime on Wall Street, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 14, 2000, at D2
(quoting an FBI official as testifying before Congress that “[i]n the past approximately eight
years, organized crime’s involvement in the financial and securities markets has become signifi-
cant”).
533. Weiss, supra note 532, at 92 (“Among the firms that have been subject to Mob intimi-
dation, sources say, is the premier market maker in NASDAQ stocks—Herzog, Heine, Geduld
Inc.”).
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retards the growth of law as an efficient force in the securities field.534
As Milhaupt and West note:
Japan illustrates that states can miss out on enforcement network
and learning externalities. Laws and enforcement institutions exhibit
increasing returns characteristics. Widely used laws are likely to be
well serviced by lawyers and judges. The more laws are used, the
more they will lead to the development of precedents and the so-
phistication of legal professionals. The growth of experienced, state-
sanctioned rights-enforcement and information agents, in turn, is
likely to foster demand for law reform generally.535
Government enforcement is a public good536 that investor regulation
may substantially dissipate.
CONCLUSION
In 1998, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) lost four bil-
lion dollars in a matter of months. Its struggles dragged a vibrant
stock market down fourteen percent, dealt a long-lasting blow to the
bond market, and required a $3.4 billion bailout to ensure that the en-
tire American financial structure did not collapse.537 According to
then-Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, LTCM’s losses created
the greatest financial crisis in a half-century.538 LTCM was loaded with
Nobel laureates in economics and the most respected traders on Wall
Street whose sophisticated trading models made one crucial mis-
take—the models did not take into account the fact that human be-
havior is often irrational.539
534. See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457, 475
(2001) (“The law can regulate intermediaries more effectively than individuals.”); Steven Walt,
Introduction: Privatization and Its Prospects, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 517, 527 (2001) (noting that gov-
ernments are the most efficient enforcers of any securities violations).
535. Milhaupt & West, supra note 522, at 95.
536. See COFFEE, supra note 180, at 51 (“[T]he creation of the SEC gave public investors a
public guardian to champion their rights—in effect, a public subsidy for the prevention of
fraud.”); Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of
Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 267 (1995) (noting that regulatory
enforcement is a public good).
537. Zuckerman, supra note 301, at C1.
538. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 301, at 195.
539. DUNBAR, supra note 1, at 184, 205, 206–07 (observing that LTCM was, in large part,
done in by the fact that other investors and markets more generally acted “irrationally”);
JACOBS, supra note 66, at 293 (“Markets have a way of confounding such solutions [as LTCM’s
powerful mathematical models] precisely because they are comprised not of computers, but of
human beings subject to behavior outside the realm of mathematics.”); LOWENSTEIN, supra
PRENTICE.DOC 05/07/02 10:54 AM
1510 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1397
John Meriwether, one of LTCM’s principals, has been accused of
becoming overly cautious in light of his experience.540 However, no
one can accuse Professors Choi, Romano, Mahoney, and the other re-
formers of lacking confidence or of being risk averse. All propose that
regulation of the most successful capital market in the history of the
world541 be turned on its head. All make plausible arguments that
should be considered seriously, but ardor for these paradigm-shifting
changes should be tempered by both the raft of new empirical evi-
dence supporting American-style regulation as the optimal approach
to regulating securities markets,542 and the large body of behavioral
evidence indicating that investors, even sophisticated institutional in-
vestors, are unlikely to protect themselves adequately through private
ordering.543 It is a telling point that although many academics take
these proposals seriously, virtually no one in the “real world” does.544
That investment banks, stock exchanges, venture capitalists, institu-
tional investors, and others who would seem to be the primary bene-
ficiaries of Choi’s proposal show no interest in it, or, for that matter,
note 301, at 173 (“[LTCM’s principals] had programmed the market for a cold predictability
that it had never had; they had forgotten the predatory, acquisitive, and overwhelmingly protec-
tive instincts that govern real-life traders. They had forgotten the human factor.”); Zuckerman,
supra note 301, at C1 (“Despite sophisticated trading models mapping past behavior of securi-
ties prices, the firm’s brainy traders had little understanding of human behavior. Such as: Inves-
tors often bail out in a panic.”).
540. Zuckerman, supra note 301, at C1.
541. See Kahan, supra note 10, at 1518–19 (“While the present system of securities regula-
tion is far from perfect, the U.S. securities markets have grown at impressive rates, investor con-
fidence in the system is high relative to other countries, companies have been able to raise sub-
stantial amounts of capital, trading is cheap, and liquidity is high.”).
542. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text; see also Lowenstein, supra note 489, at
1355 (noting that the U.S. disclosure system as enforced by the SEC “has helped to create mar-
kets that are the standard for the world, markets that offer access to pools of equity capital that
exist nowhere else”).
543. See Madison, supra note 265, at 327 (arguing that recent incidents “make a strong case
that institutional investors are no match for the derivatives-dealer ‘rocket scientists’”). Indeed,
the derivatives debacles of the early 1990s certainly showed that institutional investors are often
as vulnerable as unsophisticated investors to the sharp sales practices of industry professionals.
See generally Geoffrey B. Goldman, Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of
Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Should Regulators “Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed”?, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1112 (1995) (recounting the huge losses rolled up by Procter & Gamble, Met-
allgesellschaft, Glaxo, Orange County, West Virginia and others, as well as the unfair practices
of many of their derivatives dealers); G. Bruce Knecht, Houston Firms Sold Risky “Toxic
Waste” for Wall Street Giants, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1994, at A1 (describing how inappropriate
derivatives were sold to small institutional investors).
544. Kitch, supra note 12, at 630 (“There is no groundswell of interest from either the indus-
try or its customers to change the current regulation. It is as if the academic writers think it is
1932.”).
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in those offered by Romano, Mahoney, and the others, should give
one pause.545
In light of the behavioral evidence provided, it is apparent that
uniform, mandated disclosure is more thorough and efficient than hit-
and-miss privately negotiated disclosure, and even sophisticated in-
vestors are quite vulnerable to securities fraud. The current federal
securities regulation scheme can be improved in a myriad of ways
(many of which are hinted at in Choi’s proposal), but before Congress
seriously considers any changes as dramatic as those discussed in this
Article, recent behavioral insights must be considered seriously.546
545. Coates, supra note 20, at 533 (“Good companies . . . are not, to put it mildly, in the van-
guard of the renewed assault on the SEC. In fact, industry trade groups have been supporting
movement in the opposite direction . . . .”).
546. See Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 537, 538 (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2001))
(“Ultimately, these [behavioral] considerations undermine the economic analysis of law, and
indicate the need for a fundamental re-orientation of legal theory.”).
